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PREFACE
The strategic defense initiative has brought the issue of strategic
defenses and particularly ballistic missile defenses back to the
forefront of the ever raging national security debate. Issues that were
thought foreclosed by the ABM Treaty in 1972 have reemerged as a host of
new questions have been instigated by President Reagan's speech of March
23, 1983. This study will address the major implications and issues
associated with the launching of the SDI. Five chapters assess these
issues which include the lessons of the first ABM debate, prospective
BMD models, the potential impact of a U.S. BMD on U.S. nuclear policy
and associated obstacles to any change, the future role and composition
of U.S. offensive nuclear forces, and the future of arms control.
I would like to give credit and thanks to Carol A. MacDougall for
her tireless support throughout the long months of writing as well as
her many hours reviewing the paper for overall quality. I would like to
thank Professors Eric Einhorn, Edward Feit, and Stephen Pelz for their
guidance, support, and keen insights in helping to make this a much
better study. I also would like to thank William Martel for his support
and direction in undertaking this project. I am grateful and indebted
to all of them for their important and useful suggestions and
contri buti ons
.
As an employee of the United States Government, in no way should
any of this work be construed to be U.S. government policy or position.
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ABSTRACT
The Strategic Defense Initiative: Implications for
U.S. Deterrence Policy
February 1987
Alan S. MacDougall, B.A. Saint Anselm College
Ph.D., University of Massachusetts
Directed by: Professor Eric Einhorn
This dissertation concerns the issues surrounding the debate over
the strategic defense initiative and its implications for U.S.
deterrence policy. While ballistic missile defenses (formerly called
ABMs) were believed foreclosed from the nuclear balance as a result of
the ABM Treaty, the SDI program has Drought ballistic missile defenses
back into the strategic equation. It is possible to suggest that
missile defenses, as envisioned by President Reagan, may make a
significant contribution to U.S. national security. Given this
proposition, the dissertation follows the analysis as outlined below:
1. The original ABM debate of the late 1960s is reviewed with
respect to the arguments of proponents and opponents of the ABM. This
debate led the U.S. to accept the dominance of offensive nuclear forces
in the nuclear balance. Additionally, the U.S. decided to adhere to a
policy for assured destruction based on the precept of mutual national
vulnerability.
2. While the U.S. had foresworn working on ballistic missile
defenses during the 1970s, the strategic nuclear balance and foundations
of deterrence have changed. As a result, the U.S. is seeking to
vi
evaluate the potential advantages of ballistic missile defenses. Three
defense models are analyzed relative to their missions as well as major
obstacles to their implementation.
3. United States strategic nuclear policy has evolved since the
late 1960s to incorporate three major policy schools: assured
destruction, countervailing, and nuclear war-fighting. Ballistic
missile defenses fit with these policies in quite different ways.
Additionally, a U.S. ballistic missile defense will have profound
implications for the stability of the nuclear balance. There are a
number of major obstacles to the integration of a missile defense into
U.S. nuclear policy to include technology, program costs, and major
political hurdles.
4. United States strategic offensive nuclear forces may be altered
significantly by the deployment of a missile defense. However, new
offensive weapons such as the cruise missile and advanced bomber could
enhance the ability of offensive forces to penetrate strategic defenses.
5. A U.S. missile defense could effectively break up the ABM
Treaty and spell an end to the arms control process. On the other hand,
the SDI also may serve as an impetus to a new arms control treaty which
incorporates reductions in offensive nuclear forces.
vii
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INTRODUCTION
THE STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE:
IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. DETERRENCE POLICY
An analysis of the political and strategic implications of
ballistic missile defense is the heart of this paper. The central issue
associated with a strategic defense, as envisioned by President Reagan's
strategic defense initiative (SDI), is the potential for a complete
revisTon of U.S. deterrence thought and specifically strategic nuclear
policy. While the current strategic defense debate is a critical
element in the future direction of U.S. deterrence thought and nuclear
policy, there are a number of factors that will impede change. The
politics of defining U.S. nuclear policy and arms control with the
Soviet Union may restrain the efforts of proponents of a radically
different U.S. deterrent posture.
Strategic analysts of the nuclear era, both inside and outside the
government, generally accept the proposition that nuclear war is
prevented by a policy and condition for deterrence. This proposition
further prescribes the notion of a nuclear balance of power in which
there can not be any hope of political or strategic gain from the
initiation of a nuclear war. The basis of these concepts and the
foundation of the nuclear balance between the U.S. and Soviet Union has
been the dominance of offensive nuclear weapons since 1945. An
effective defense against offensive nuclear weapons could thoroughly
re-write the way the U.S. has thought of deterring nuclear war and
1
maintaining the nuclear balance. In effect, the development of
strategic defenses leads the U.S. to question the basic purpose of Us
strategic nuclear policy and the composition of its nuclear forces.
It is the objective of this thesis to describe and analyze the
possible implications of the development of strategic defenses for the
various components of U.S. deterrence theory and policy. As U.S.
deterrence theory entails a number of related components - a declaratory
nuclear policy, a force development policy, a weapons employment policy
should war occur, and an arms control policy - it is essential to
examine how a strategic defense could impact each of these areas. In
this context, the general thesis question can be made as follows:
What are the political and strategic implications of ballistic
missile defenses for U.S. strategic nuclear policy, U.S. nuclear
forces, and the strategic arms control process?
A number of more specific questions come to mind when considering the
subject:
1. How does the current debate over BMD compare with the ABM
debate of the 196Us and if they are different why?
2. Will a defense dominated strategic balance profoundly change
nuclear doctrine or merely alter its basis?
3. What would be the focus of U.S. nuclear policy respecting our
policy for deterring nuclear war? For example, will the U.S.
continue to maintain a policy for retaliation?
4. What mix of offensive and defensive weapons will ensure U.S.
security in a BMD dominated balance?
5. What are the options for U.S. policy during a transition
period to a defense dominated balance that can maintain a stable
transition?
6. What are the different BMD models and system's architecture
and how effective are they likely to be against the emerging
offensive threat?
7. What might be the impact on the levels of damage that could
result in a BMD world?
8. What roles can arms control play in a defense transition?
9. What are the political obstacles to BMD deployments?
A reasonable assumption might be that ballistic missile defenses
will become a part of U.S. or Soviet strategic forces in the near
future. The potential for BMD to revolutionize the way the U.S. views
the nuclear threat demands that its implications be understood. That
is, as ballistic missile defenses become an increasingly important
component of the strategic nuclear equation, it will be crucial to
have explored the implications for policy and nuclear force that will
inform and guide the decisions concerning the possible roles for a
U.S. ballistic missile defense.
Chapter One will address the major currents and tenets of the
original ABM debate. In particular, it will focus on the arguments
for and against the ABM systems of the 1960s and how they influenced
U.S. deterrence thought in the 1970s. The lessons of the original ABM
debate are invaluable to the current defense debate. The similarities
and differences between the aryuments concerning the ABM then and BMD
today are critical to our understanding of the implications that a
strategic defense might have for U.S. nuclear policy today.
The cycle of offense and defense in weapons technology
development, policy revision, and strategy has been dynamic for many
decades. The ABM debate of the 1960s emerged while the advantages of
offensive nuclear forces over defenses were increasing. The U.S. had
maintained a clear advantage in the numbers of nuclear weapons
deployed and their relative capabilities as compared to the Soviet
Union as the first U.S. ABM system, the Nike-Zeus, was developed in
the late 1950s. A primary impetus for the ABM system was the Soviet
Union's growing capability to develop a credible and threatening ICBM
force in the 1960s. The U.S. began to explore missile defenses as a
means to maintain some margin of strategic superiority vis a vis the
Soviet Union and to address the potential vulnerability of U.S.
nuclear forces to a projected quickly growing Soviet nuclear force.
The thrust of the current strategic defense debate stems from an
essentially different set of strategic dilemmas. United States
nuclear forces have become more vulnerable to a Soviet nuclear attack
over the past decade and, as a result, the strategic balance between
the superpowers is considered increasingly less stable by many U.S.
analysts. The Reagan Administration, upon entering office, charged
that U.S. strategic forces were at their weakest point relative to
Soviet forces in many years and that the situation would worsen unless
new programs were initiated.
There was really very little doubt in the 1960s that U.S.
offensive forces were capable of carrying out their deterrent mission
whether or not an ABM system was deployed by either superpower. The
emerging vulnerability of U.S. offensive nuclear forces to a
counterforce attack today, a result of the MIRVing and decreasing CEP
of Soviet nuclear forces, has led many strategic analysts to question
the continued deterrent credibility of U.S. offensive nuclear forces
to deter Soviet aggression and maintain stability in a crisis
envi ronment
.
The guiding principle of U.S. nuclear deterrence theory is the
proposition that neither superpower can risk a nuclear war because of
the threat of assured national annihilation. This threat, according
to traditional deterrence doctrine, is made credible by the mutual
vulnerability of each nation to a retaliatory strike by either side's
nuclear forces. The only means of assuring this threat, according to
the theory, is the maintenance of an invulnerable offensive nuclear
force capable of retaliating after any initial attack.
During the early 1960s, as ICBMs and submarines became more
reliable vehicles for launching nuclear weapons, the U.S. sought to
develop and procure a redundant TRIAD of offensive weapon systems.
The technical objective was to ensure the free flight of U.S. nuclear
warheads to the Soviet Union in case of war. The ABM was envisioned,
apart from this goal, as a means of degrading a Soviet
intercontinental missile attack and protecting U.S. population centers
and industrial resources. These defense objectives were later
replaced by the less demanding goal of protecting U.S. ICBMs from a
counterforce attack and the nation from third country threats as the
ABM systems proved less capable against increasingly sophisticated
offensive forces.
The success of the Safeguard program developments led to a number
of questions in the strategic community. As the Soviet arsenal began
to catch up with that of the U.S. in the late 1960s, would a policy
for massive retaliation or counterforce make any sense? Massive
retaliation had been an outgrowth of U.S. strategic bombing concepts
employed in World War II and had been extended to U.S. nuclear policy.
Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara, had advocated a counterforce
policy for the U.S. in the early 1960s as a means of preserving U.S.
nuclear superiority. Both policies began to appear less in the U.S.'s
national interest as its superiority in nuclear weapons eroded. As a
result, U.S. policy began to shift in favor of an assured retaliation
posture. Central among its tenets was the idea that societal
vulnerability was a reality of the nuclear era and that this condition
could not be transcended. The Safeguard system was assessed to be
capable of augmenting U.S. nuclear forces but could not protect the
U.S. against a determined attack, hence, offensive forces would
continue to maintain the burden of deterrence.
McNamara later argued that an enemy need only saturate U.S.
defenses to achieve wartime objectives. The defense capabilities of
ABMs could only delay an enemy's development of offensive capabilities
to attack with success. In summary, the ABM emerged as the strategic
balance was becoming more equal and the offensive arms race came to be
seen as a greater threat to strategic stability than the vulnerability
of the nation at large. However, national vulnerability remains the
building block of nuclear deterrents in an offensive nuclear balance.
From these strategic conditions emerged the dominance of a policy
for assured destruction. Later codified in the SALT I talks, assured
destruction became U.S. strategic gospel and is seen by its advocates
as the only means to prevent the use of nuclear weapons by preserving
a credible threat for retaliation. In conjunction with the growing
dominance of this policy was a perceived requirement to maintain a
redundant nuclear force. The deployment of a strategic Triad of
ICBMs, SLBMs, and strategic bombers is an effective means for ensuring
that U.S. retaliatory forces can withstand any attack and still strike
back with tremendous power. That is, should any part of the Triad be
destroyed, any of the other legs can launch a devastating retaliation
against an enemy. The U.S. decided that a force level equivalent to
roughly 1,054 ICBMs, 600 SLBMs, and roughly 450 strategic bombers was
sufficient to meet its deterrent objectives. These forces were judged
by the Department of Defense to be capable of causing 'unacceptable
damage' to any enemy under any condition. The U.S. froze the numbers
of its nuclear weapons at a level consistent with assured destruction
pol icy.
The two major U.S. ABM programs of the 1960s, the Nike and
Safeguard ABMs, would not have changed the U.S. force posture
appreciably. In effect, the ABM debate helped solidify U.S. strategic
nuclear policy and force posture behind assured destruction. The
potential usefulness of ABM defenses for either superpower accelerated
development and deployment of multiple independently targeted reentry
vehicles (MIRVs), thereby enhancing the offense's overall assured
destruction capability. Yet, the development of the ABM was felt most
strongly in the strategic arms control arena.
Arguments against an ABM system gained support with the emergence
of assured destruction policy. The U.S. began to favor a parity of
forces between the U.S. and Soviet Union as an effective means of
preserving a stable strategic balance. Opponents of the ABM concluded
that one of the more threatening prospects for U.S. security was an
all-out offensive arms race. Defenses, in this context, were seen as
a primary impetus to a new offensive arms race. As such, United
States security could be guaranteed only if neither superpower sought
superiority and each restrained its offensive arms developments.
These arguments, in turn, supported arms control as a means to cap the
arms race and help promote a stable nuclear balance.
The development of the ABM led, in part, to a number of changes
to U.S. strategic policy, forces, and arms control positions. These
revisions eventually led to the severe limitation of ABM deployments
through the ABM Treaty. In effect, the ABM was unable to meet the
criteria for strategic and arms control stability imposed by champions
of assured destruction, which represented an emerging principle of
U.S. strategic nuclear policy.
The Reagan Administration and other proponents of a ballistic
missile defense system today argue that the deployment of a missile
defense will strengthen deterrence by negating the offensive threat,
thereby enhancing U.S. security. They question whether deterrence by
threat of retaliation can avert a nuclear holocaust indefinitely.
Proponents also argue that a BMD system is the only alternative to a
destabilizing offensive nuclear arms buildup that has been ongoing
since the signing of the ABM treaty.
Ashton Carter and David Schwartz have identified three currents
in the pro-BMD arguments. They state that strategic defense is seen
as a viable option to the present offensive nuclear balance as a
result of: 1. the moral repugnancy with the vulnerability of the
nation to nuclear devastation; 2. the increasing counterforce threat
to U.S. ICBM forces; and 3. the disenchantment with the arms control
process and its inability to restrain the arms race and contain the
Soviet nuclear threat.
Chapter TWO will address various defense models and their related
technology. The extent to which U.S. strategic nuclear policy is
revised by the deployment of a BMD system is a function of the goals
for which the deployment is undertaken. For example, the Sentinel ABM
was conceived as an 'area wide city" defense. The technical
infeasibi lity of an area defense led Department of Defense analysts to
conclude that deterrence could continue to be better served by a
credible offensive retaliatory force. Today the Reagan Administration
is questioning whether deterrence might be better served by the
protection of U.S. cities and strategic forces against a Soviet
nuclear attack. A BMD could function to defend U.S. retaliatory
forces and preserve the strategic balance by helping to close the
so-called 'window of vulnerability'. The responsibility for
maintaining a credible U.S. deterrent, in this situation, would shift
from various strategic force basing modes to a shared responsibility
on the part of the defense system.
Ballistic missile defense also could be used to protect military
targets, such as command-control-communication centers and critical
military satellites. As such, defenses could serve to augment U.S.
wartime escalation capabilities in a nuclear war-fighting mode as
suggested by Colin Gray.
Lastly, BMD might be used to defend 'valued' targets such as the
U.S. population. In this role, a defense system would be expected to
have a considerable advantage over offensive nuclear weapons as to
prevent confident targeting on the part of an enemy.
Chapter Three will address the degree of fit or conflict between
BMD and U.S. strategic nuclear policy as currently formulated. For
example, how will BMD influence U.S. policy for retaliation, national
command authority (NCA), strategic stability, and losses in each phase
of confrontation: peace, crisis, trans-attack, and post-attack? Given
that the purpose of this thesis is to provide a description and
explanation of a U.S. BMD posture and doctrine, the question implicit
in this analysis is how will the integration of BMD with U.S.
strategic nuclear policy enhance U.S. security and degrade the Soviet
nuclear threat? An explanation of the political and strategic
implications of BMD in various scenarios can be made and will focus on
the following aspects: targeting, weapons, and collateral damage.
United States strategic nuclear policy is currently composed of
elements from assured destruction policy, countervailing policy, and
war-fighting policy. The Reagan Administration would like to add to
this elements of a strategic defense policy. Current U.S. policies
are based on the premise that the U.S. will retaliate against a Soviet
attack on a level that threatens unacceptable damage. However, the
options for and roles which retaliation could play change with the
implementation of a defensively augmented strategic balance. With the
incorporation of BMD, the policy of retaliation becomes a function of
the effectiveness of the BMD system. If the U.S. deploys a perfect
BMD system, one capable of destroying every missile launched in a
Soviet attack, a policy of retaliation is unnecessary. At less than a
perfect level of effectiveness, the U.S. will be left with a number of
options for retaliation, such as responding on an equal level of
intensity either against similiar, or very different, targets as those
involved in the initial Soviet attack. If the U.S. chooses to retain
its current policy of retaliation (the most probable scenario in an
imperfect BMD environment), it would then have the option of
conducting an immediate or a delayed response. However, immediate
retaliation may introduce overwhelming numbers of RVs into the attack,
confusing the BMD system and thereby greatly reducing its
effectiveness. A delayed response would be less likely to interfere
with a BMD system, but would allow the Soviets the opportunity to
launch a second strike. In both cases, the U.S. must take into
consideration the potential capabilities of Soviet countermeasures
, to
include the deployment of their own BMD system.
United States strategic nuclear policy is designed to deter
Soviet aggression, preserve the nuclear balance, and maintain
stability within the U.S. and Soviet strategic relationship. Each
nation is attentive to opportunities and disadvantages at the margin
of the strategic balance. A BMD system could make a marked difference
in the present balance. In order to assess the impact a BMD system
could have on strategic stability, it is important to understand what
is meant by 'stability'. One must keep in mind that stability is
actually only relevant in a crisis situation. For it is in these
instances that the threat to use nuclear weapons is greatest and where
the stability of the balance is likely to determine whether or not
nuclear weapons are used. For instance, if the nuclear balance is
very stable, neither side is as likely to believe that gains can be
made by escalating a crisis and using nuclear weapons.
At the most basic level, stability is composed of conditions
which make the initiation of a nuclear war as unlikely as possible.
One component of stability begins with an appreciation of the
unimaginable destruction any nuclear war would cause. The strategic
balance will remain stable as the appreciation for nuclear devastation
continually is realized by each nation. Should one side perceive
favorable opportunities at the margin of the balance, strategic
stability is likely to weaken, portending disastrous results.
Strategic stability also can be defined in terms of force
postures. Here the superpowers seek to make a nuclear attack as
uninviting as possible by deploying their forces in as an invulnerable
mode as possible. The United States, for its part, has emphasized its
strategic Triad thereby assuring a redundancy of retaliatory
capabi 1 ities.
Strategic stability is likely to be affected by the deployment of
a BMD system under differing strategic conditions. In peacetime, a
BMD system might increase the uncertainty of an attacker's success and
thereby enhance deterrence against a calculated military stike. Under
crisis conditions, the effectiveness of a BMD may influence the
decision as to when and how to escalate beyond the nuclear threshold.
During an attack, the decision to escalate the intensity of nuclear
attacks might depend on the integration of a BMD system into a
war-fighting strategy. In a post-attack environment, decisions as to
the prolongation and/or conclusion and post-war strategy might depend
on the success of the BMD system.
The development and deployment of a BMD system by the U.S. is
expected to provoke a number of Soviet responses. The Soviets may try
to challenge a U.S. BMD system by escalating their offensive nuclear
buildup and increasing their defensive programs.
The Soviets may view the U.S. BMD program as a technological
challenge and respond in a number of other ways. The Soviets could
respond through the arms control process, seeking to delay or restrain
U.S. BMD efforts, a strategy the Soviets used in the original ABM
debate. Soviets have already proposed a complete ban on space-based
weapons
.
A more ominous implication is the threat of a Soviet preemptive
attack on a U.S. BMD system or U.S. offensive weapons. Many critics
of the U.S. BMD program, such as the Union of Concerned Scientists,
have suggested that a U.S. BMD deployment would increase Soviet
insecurity and vulnerability as to portend a Soviet first strike.
That is, a highly destabilized balance might arise in the event that
the U.S. could defend itself against a Soviet first strike as well as
a retaliatory strike. To avoid a destablizing BMD deployment, the
U.S. might attempt to deploy its BMD while reducing offensive forces
(particularly MIRVed counterforce ICBMs) during a defense transition
period.
Chapter Four will discuss issues concerning the alternative level
of offensive and defensive weapons that the U.S. will have to choose
between. As well, it will be necessary to address the value of the
ballistic missile in the face of an effective ballistic missile
defense and the emergence of other, potentially more penetrable
weapons systems, such as advanced cruise missiles with stealth
technol ogy
.
The stability of the strategic balance also is dependent on the
nuclear weapons currently deployed to support U.S. deterrent policies.
The deployment of a BMD system will have important implications for
the posture and composition of U.S. offensive nuclear forces.
In view of the potentially destabilizing effects of a BMD, it is
unlikely that the U.S. will dismantle entirely Us strategic offensive
forces. Yet, the U.S. might consider a number of options to help
preserve a stable strategic balance. The U.S. could increase its
offensive nuclear forces, although this option may be seen as the most
threatening by the Soviet Union. The Soviets are likely to perceive
an increase in U.S. offensive forces as an attempt by the U.S. to
attain strategic nuclear superiority. Second, the U.S. could maintain
its forces at current levels. However, the most stabilizing option
would call for reductions in U.S. offensive forces during the
transition period. Yet, this kind of transition is likely to be the
most difficult to attain. Such a balance would probably require
in-depth agreements between the U.S. and the Soviet Union about the
composition of their respective offensive nuclear forces. Offensive
arms reduction agreements have alluded arms control talks between the
two nations for nearly twenty years and are unlikely to become easier
to reach in the currently antagonistic atmosphere.
The U.S. nuclear arsenal possesses both countervalue and
counterforce targeting capabilities. If, as expected, BMD degrades
Soviet nuclear attack capabilities, the U.S. could continue to target
Soviet ICBMs in an attempt to minimize further Soviet attacks. The
U.S. also would have the option of allocating its offensive forces
against Soviet countervalue targets in a more traditional assured
destruction mode. In both cases, U.S targeting will depend on the
effectiveness a BMD system might have against a first strike.
The deployment of a BMD by the U.S. also will bring into question
the future effectiveness and deterrence value of the ballistic
missile. As the ABM brought into question the value of the single
warhead ICBM and helped foster the development of the MIRV, the
current BMD developments will undoubtedly raise questions about the
effectiveness of current U.S. nuclear forces. The potential
obsolescence of the ICBM and SLBM may cause a shift to cruise missiles
and advanced stealth bombers. The superpowers will seek to enhance
their retaliatory capabilities in order to maintain the mutual hostage
relationship (assuming BMD works imperfectly). Hence, deployment of
greater numbers of air-breathing nuclear forces, such as the cruise
missile, may effectively circumscribe a BMD system in the forseeable
future.
One option for the U.S. force structure is continued reliance on
ballistic missiles. The increased survivability of U.S. ICBMs, due to
a U.S. BMD system, might be negated by the possible deployment of a
Soviet BMD system. A second option might be to rely more heavily on
SLBMs because of their mobility, sum vabi 1 ity
, and shorter flight to
target characteristics. Among these options, the deployment of cruise
missiles and stealth bombers appears to be a highly credible means for
preserving a retaliatory capability.
Almost all estimates of the effectiveness of a BMD system agree
that a percentage of attacking RVs will penetrate or "leak' through
the defense. Even under 'leakage' conditions, a BMD system would
lessen the value of ballistic missiles for a retaliatory attack.
Given this condition, it is important to question the value of
deploying a BMD system if strategic forces are subsequently shifted to
coordinate a BMD deployment with an effective air defense system. The
calculations for an attacker and defender will become uncertain as
both will have to expect that their forces will have lost much of
their effectiveness.
A ballistic missile defense deployment also will raise questions
concerning the value of an overall strategy for strategic defense if a
population defense is sought. Should civil defense become a major
element in a strategic defense posture?
Chapter Five will address the implications of strategic defenses
for arms control. Primary among the important issues to be discussed
are the conditions under which a U.S. breakout would occur and the
future prospects for arms control. The transition to a BMD world will
certainly aggravate the asymmetries within the strategic balance and
threaten its stability. Arms control can undoubtedly provide some
opportunities to manage the transition period as it helped foreclose
on a defense transition in 1972 in hopes of other stabilizing measures
to follow (namely offensive arms reductions).
The arms control process has been an integral part of the
strategic nuclear relationship between the U.S. and the Soviet Union
for twenty years. Arms control has helped preserve the offensive
nuclear balance within certain bounds (i.e. number of launchers), but
has been unable to halt the generalized offensive arms buildup in the
quantity and quality (i.e. accuracy and lethality) of weapons systems.
The uneven record of the arms control regime in promoting stability
and in stopping the arms race has led many strategic analysts to
question its continued value. Yet, despite the mixed results of arms
control, it is likely to be an important part of a defense era.
The most important arms control treaties for BMD are the 1963
Test Ban Treaty, the 1967 Outer Space Treaty and the 1972 ABM Treaty.
The 1967 Treaty bans all weapons of 'mass destruction' from outer
space. The 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, the offspring of the
orginial ABM debate, is one of the most important elements in the
current defense debate. The Treaty does not explicitly restrict the
development of space-based lasers. Yet, the general interpretation is
that large-scale testing or deployment of a space-based BMD would
require major revisions of the Treaty or its abrogation.
One argument in favor of the ABM Treaty in 1972 was that it would
help restrain the offensive arms race. The U.S. government stated in
conjunction with the ratification debates in the Senate that should
offensive arms control negotiations prove unsuccessful following the
ABM Treaty, the U.S. would reserve the right to withdraw from the
Treaty. Both the U.S. and the Soviet Union have the night to withdraw
from the ABM Treaty if they believe that their 'national interests-
are jeopardized by certain activities of the other party or other
unspecified developments. Proponents of BMD today point to the lack
of successful offensive arms control as one reason for the need to
abrogate the Treaty and get on with strategic defense development and
deployment. It is more likely that the U.S. will achieve a
technological level from which it could deploy a space-based BMD
system before the Soviet Union. It also seems likely that either the
U.S. or the Soviet Union will eventually breakout of the Treaty and
deploy a nationwide defense system.
There are several options which the U.S. can consider should it
achieve an adequate technological level to deploy a defense system.
The U.S. could delay its own BMD deployment until the Soviets were
capable of deploying a system of their own. Under a simultaneous
breakout the political implications for each nation could be more
easily managed. In particular, the Soviets might not perceive a U.S.
BMD deployment under these conditions as a strategic challenge to
their nuclear forces. This scenario is likely to require arms control
agreements on the timing and terms of a mutual breakout in order to
preserve a stable transition. As well, it might provide the impetus
for broader agreements to include offensive weapons systems.
In the case of a unilateral breakout by the U.S. or the U.S.S.R.,
the other superpower will view the breakout as a sign of great
political importance and evidence of its military inferiority. Arms
control agreements are likely to be very difficult to arrange in this
environment as little could be done to alter the political
consequences of a unilateral breakout for the other nation. The
destabilizing implications of a unilateral breakout could increase the
possibility of enemy preemption during a crisis in order to forestall
inferiority
.
From the perspective of arms control, the transition period to a
defensive balance is likely to be extremely sensitive. This period
may provide an opportunity for arms control as the inferior nation
(assuming a unilateral breakout) would have great incentive to prevent
strategic inferiority. The superior nation also will feel pressure to
stabilize the strategic balance through arms control in order to
decrease the risk of a preemptive attack.
The value of arms control, to date, has been its ability to limit
defensive and offensive nuclear forces. The predictability of the
superpowers' strategic force postures, a result of arms control
treaties to some extent, has been seen as a stabilizing factor in the
nuclear balance. The development of defense technology has been
viewed as an anachronism to the deterrence school that places great
faith in arms control and hence, arms control advocates will not give
up easily during the debate over a BMD deployment that would require
the abrogation of current treaties.
Ballistic missile defense is a direct refutation of the
philosophical bases underlying the ABM Treaty, the cornerstone of the
arms control process to date. Yet, it may be unwise to limit BMD as
it may be less threatening by itself than offensive nuclear forces and
may enhance U.S. security. If this interpretation is correct, the
deployment of BMD may result in an accelerating arms control process
in the future, exactly the opposite of the view held in the original
ABM debate that saw an emphasis on limiting ABMs in order to promote
arms control. The time near the deployment of BMD may have the
greatest incentive for negotiations.
One can imagine a number of likely prospects for future arms
control agreements. A reduction in offensive forces may prove the
most stabilizing path to seek. As such, agreements might be reached
before, during, or after BMD deployment. An agreement to reduce
counterforce weapons (the MX ICBM for the U.S. and the SS-18 for the
Soviet Union) might be a promising means of preserving a stable
balance during the transition period. For the defense, arms control
might address limits on countermeasures to BMD, such as penetration
aids, decoys, and ASAT weapons (an active countermeasure to the BMD
system)
.
NOTE: Much of the confusion surrounding the current debate about the
strategic defense initiative is a function of the terminology
involved. While the strategic defense initiative, strictly speaking,
is a technology research program concerned with assessing and
developing the technological requirements for a BMD, it does not
represent a formal U.S. policy shift toward defense. The Reagan
Administration has stated repeatedly that the SDI is aimed at making
an informed decision possible by the early 1990s as to whether or not
to begin full scale development of a missile defense. Critics of the
SDI very often are more concerned with possible shifts in U.S. nuclear
policy than with the technology being researched. Hence, it is
possible to think of this debate as concerned with various levels. At
the doctrinal level it is a debate between offensive and defensive
deterrence theory. At the strategic level are questions of the nature
and type of defense to support a U.S. deterrence posture. That is,
the U.S. may entertain area versus point defenses in support of
countervalue or counterforce defense missions, respectively. Lastly,
the current debate is engulfed by the various defense technologies.
The strategic defense initiative is directed primarily against the
threat of ballistic missiles. However, defense against the nuclear
threat also encompasses strategic air defenses, civil defense, silo
and military facility hardening programs, anti-submarine defense
weaponry, and the like. While opponents and proponents of the SDI
spar, they often do so at these different levels. An understanding of
the SDI's implications necessitates that each level be examined.
The formal strategic defense initiative is divided into five
major technological arenas. First is surveillance, acquisition,
tracking, and kill assessment (SATK). These technologies are required
to allow a ballistic missile defense system to detect, identify,
locate and track an enemy's attacking missiles. These systems
generally are dedicated for space-based platforms in a boost phase
defense scheme. The major problems associated with these technologies
are their ability to perform their missions throughout the ballistic
missile's trajectory from boost to reentry. The second program
encompasses the exotic weapons more formally called directed energy
weapons (DEW), namely lasers (chemical, free electron, and x-ray) as
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well as particle beam weapons. Both ground-based and space-based
employment of these weapons are envisioned. Third, the SDIO is
charged with exploring kenetic energy weapons to include 'smart
weapons' (i.e. systems similar to the Homing Overlay Experiment) and
traditional ABM type interceptors. Fourth, overall system design and
battle management technologies are being researched to identify the
command-control-commumcation requirements for a strategic defense.
This area may emerge as the most critical and potentially the most
difficult to develop. Lastly, the program has been directed to
explore survivability, lethality, and key technologies to assure the
system's ability to operate in a hostile environment.
As such, the program directors have been charged with exploring
all potentially promising technologies and defense concepts during a
five-to-ten year research and development phase. A part of the
program's premise is to expand the number of defense options available
to a president in order to prevent the Soviets from countering a U.S.
defense too quickly. Whatever the outcomes of the SDI program, it is
unlikely that strategic nuclear deterrence theory will remain the same
in the United States. The SDI program has questioned the basis of
U.S. deterrence thought for the past twenty five years. The original
ABM program in the 1960s, while important to the future direction of
U.S. nuclear policy, was not proposed as a possible means of
re-writing the post-World War II strategic foundation which many
believe has prevented a nuclear war between the superpowers. The
central objective of the strategic defense initiative is to re-write
this past history and help construct a new strategic world.
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CHAPTER ONE
THE ABM REVISITED
In approaching a subject as complex as ballistic missile defense,
it is important to look at the past to help decipher the future. This
chapter will address several major themes. First, a review of the
strategic issues associated with the ABM debate of the 1960s will be
presented. Second, implications of the original ABM debate will be
reviewed in order to understand some of the possible implications of
the strategic defense initiative. And finally, U.S. deterrence policy
will be analyzed in order to understand strategic patterns that may
have an impact on the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI).
The anti-ballistic missile (ABM) was conceived of as a means of
combating the tremendous offensive threat posed by ballistic missiles
to the security of the United States. As in the case of the emergence
of the long-range bomber threat in the 1950s, the U.S. defense
community set out to develop an effective countermeasure. In this
regard, the task of destroying ballistic missiles was thought of as
the logical extension of the capability of surface-to-air missile
defenses (SAMs), which in the 1950s were designed to shoot down
bombers. These ideas eventually resulted in the U.S. ABM program
called Nike-Zeus.
The ABM and strategic defenses in general have been held in
constant fascination by the military since the 1940s. Yet, after
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having deployed an ABM defense system in the early 1970s, the U.S.
decided to set these weapons aside in favor of and in conjunct, or/with
a different approach to maintaining U.S. security. While a number of
factors
- both technological and political - have led to a
vacillation in support by policy leaders for a U.S. strategic defense,
the Department of Defense has maintained a ballistic missile defense
technology research program. Until President Reagan's call for the
development of a comprehensive and effective strategic defense in
March 1983, ballistic missile defenses had played a short-lived and
minor role in U.S. deterrence policy at the strategic level.
Defenses, however, have played a central role in U.S. deterrence
policy in the past and ballistic missile defenses may come to play a
very important role in U.S. deterrence policy as a result of the
strategic defense initiative.
The post-World War II era can be divided into two distinct phases
with regard to the importance placed upon strategic defenses. The
first phase corresponds roughly with the period 1945 - 1972 during
which strategic defenses were considered essential to the U.S.
deterrent capabilities. The U.S. developed and deployed
surface-to-air missile defenses against the predominant strategic
threat posed during the 1940s and 1950s, Soviet strategic bombers.
The U.S., much like the Soviet Union, also prepared extensive civil
defense plans to help limit the level of damage the U.S. might receive
during a war. Once ballistic missiles proved to be effective delivery
systems for the superpowers' nuclear weapons, both superpowers began
to work on ant i -bal 1 i sti c missile defenses.
The second phase, ,972-1983, began as a result of the signing of
the ABM Treaty between the superpowers. This period represents the
formal acceptance of the theory that offensive nuclear weapons hold a
tremendous advantage over defenses.
A third phase in the post-war era may have started as a result of
the Strategic Defense Initiative in 1983. While it is too soon to
draw any definite conclusions about this new period, defenses against
nuclear forces again may enter the U.S. strategic calculus.
The strategic objective envisioned by weapons designers for the
ABM was effective protection for the nation from a nuclear attack
carried by ballistic missiles. A defense of this capability is
unquestionably desirable from both a military and political
perspective. The ABM was conceived of as a means by which the U.S.
might reduce, if not altogether escape, the tremendous potential
damage that could result from a nuclear attack. This vision still
captivates many in the political and military community as
demonstrated by President Reagan's call to the scientific community to
"render nuclear weapons obsolete." 1
Research on possible defenses against ballistic missiles began
shortly after Nazi Germany used the first guided missile - Buzz Bombs
and V2 rockets - against England during World War II. The rapid
development of radar detection and tracking technologies, command and
control equipment, as well as nuclear weapons enhanced the feasibility
and desirability of full scale ABM research and development. Bell
Laboratories, under contract to the Department of Defense, concluded a
study in i%6 on various components that were necessary for the
26
development of an ABM system. Bell labonator.es indited that some
level of destruction against ballistic miss.les was poss.ble. By
1962, the U.S. had developed an ABM system with which it believed a
national defense might be built. During the same year, a U.S.
Nike-Zeus ABM interceptor was fired over the Kwajalein Atoll at an
incoming missile reentry vehicle launched from Vandenberg Air Force
Base. While the Nike-Zeus did not intercept the reentry vehicle
directly, the Army reported that it came close enough to destroy the
target had a nuclear warhead been employed. 2 This event formally
entered the ABM into the strategic nuclear debate.
The tremendous potential for national destruction that the
offensive nuclear forces of the U.S. and Soviet Union could unleash
provided a military and political impetus for ABM research and
development. In addition, there was a solid moral imperative for an
ABM defense as it was difficult to rationalize the 'balance of terror'
that threatens the superpowers. Three major identifiable reasons led
to the emergence of ABM defense. The first reason for the development
of the ABM was the military's desire for effective defenses against
the ballistic missile. Second, the U.S. government saw its
responsibility to protect the nation and prevent the type of
destruction that would result from a nuclear attack. Lastly, it is
morally repugnant for the nation to be vulnerable to a nuclear attack
that might cause millions of deaths. These more general
justifications for the ABM held sway until the mid to late 1960s.
The strategic nuclear balance of the early 1960s closely
resembled a David vs. Goliath equation, where the U.S. was clearly the
Goliath in nu.bers of nuclear forces as well as related employment
capabilities. The 'missile gap' scare of the early 1960s had spurred
the Department of Defense to begin procuring a large number of
deliverable warheads and an array of delivery vehicles which by the
early 1970s deluded roughly 1,000 ICBMs, 41 strategic nuclear
submarines, and a fleet of B-52 strategic bombers. These strategic
forces afforoed the U.S. a certain level of freedom in its foreign
affairs and some strategic and political leverage in international
crises. For instance, U.S. strategic nuclear superiority relative to
the Soviet Union among other factors clearly influenced the Soviet
Union's decision to withdraw its intermediate range ballistic missiles
(IRBMs) from Cuba in 1962. However, the Cuban missile crisis taught
the two superpowers the necessity of stabilizing their nuclear
relationship. The mutual national vulnerability that each superpower
recognized more clearly after the Cuban incident further prompted
strategists to question the danger of the threat of nuclear war to
U.S. security. The ABM was portrayed in this context as a potentially
effective means of reducing the U.S.'s vulnerability to a nuclear
attack, thereby enhancing U.S. security.
The reality that the nation is vulnerable to a nuclear attack is
as compelling a reason for deploying defenses today as it was in the
early 1960s. Various projections of the numbers of fatalities with
and without an ABM defense were made. The number of American deaths
from an all out nuclear exchange between the two superpowers was
estimated by the late 1960s at around 100 to 120 million without the
protection of an ABM system. Studies also projected that at least 75
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Percent of the U.S.'s industrial capacity would lie in ruin after a
nuclear exchange. Clearly, these figures are tantamount to complete
national destruction. An ABM defense capable of lessening these
levels of destruction was seen as militarily valuable to ABM
proponents. However, anti-ballistic
.issile opponents pointed out, in
response, that an ABM defense was unlikely to lower the level of
damage significantly as an attacker could simply increase the size of
an attack in order to achieve sirmlar results.
The ABM debate of the 1960s stirred the U.S. military planning
and policy community to consider significant changes to U.S.
deterrence policy and force structure. The character of the arguments
for and against the ABM was indicative of the larger debate over the
future direction of U.S. nuclear policy. That policy, having evolved
into a policy for massive retaliation during the 1950s, was
increasingly less credible in the eyes of U.S. strategists by the
early 1960s. In addition, the U.S.'s shift in favor of a more
flexible nuclear policy was influenced by the growth in Soviet nuclear
capabilities, the birth of an arms control theory in the early 1960s,
and the changing perspective on U.S. security requirements which
included the concept of ABM defenses.
I. Arguments for the ABM
The success of the ABM development program, highlighted by the
successful Nike-Zeus reentry vehicle intercept, greatly boosted the
hopes of ABM advocates that the U.S. would integrate an ABM system
3into its strategic arsenal. Meanwhile, the Kennedy Administration
initiated a general nuclear policy review. The primary focus of this
review was to ensure that U.S. nuclear superiority remained intact
while allows for generally greater flexibility. The first U.S. ABM
system was proposed as a means of enhancing U.S. nuclear superiority
and overall strategic defense capabilities. During the early 1960s a
number of ABM proponents envisioned a U.S. strategic offensive and
defensive posture capable of limiting damage to the United States in
the event of a nuclear attack. A strategy for damage limitation might
be implemented to limit the potential damage to the U.S. from a
nuclear attack as well as to help preserve U.S. political flexibility
in its foreign relations. It was argued that by assuring that the
U.S. could survive a nuclear attack, few nations would threaten to use
nuclear weapons against the U.S. for political or strategic gain. A
U.S., defended by an ABM system as well as civil and air defenses,
could continue to contain Soviet aggression and respond to
international incidents, both militarily and politically, without
threatening a massive military retaliation as envisioned during the
1950s. Anti-ballistic missiles were seen as a critical component of a
damage limitation strategy.
President Kennedy and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara
concluded that the technical impediments to defeating even marginally
modified offensive forces were too many and decidied to drop the idea
of a meaningful damage limitation strategy. The military
establishment quickly sought to define a new role for the
anti-ballistic missile. For a short period of time, civil defenses
were advocated in place of the Nike-Zeus ABM as a potentially
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effective means of Uniting damage to the U.S. population. However
the civil defense program was assessed to be only marginally effective
without the concurrent deployment of an effective ABM system,
samara concluded that the U.S. could not hope to maintain strategic
nuclear superiority through a damage limitation strategy as an
effective damage limiting capability was not technically feasible. As
a result of McNanara's assessment, the Department of Defense shifted
the focus of ABM defense research toward less comprehensive and less
demanding defense missions.
Although criticized as only marginally effective at best, the ABM
had become an important program to the military establishment. The
Department of Defense began to explore the possibility of using the
Nike system for other than wide area defense. While this shift was
effected on paper, the ABM systems were upgraded by the introduction
of more technologically sophisticated components. McNamara concluded
that the capabilities of the superpowers' nuclear forces were likely
to continue to expand and improve but that the trend was toward their
becoming similar in overall capability. Central to this trend was the
growth of the Soviet offensive nuclear arsenal and a leveling off in
the number of forces deployed by the United States. Hence, the U.S.
could not expect to maintain nuclear superiority through the
deployment of ABM defenses alone.
United States strategic policy, predicated on the maintenance of
deterrence, had entered a period of transition in the early to mid
1960s. That period, which lasted until the mid 1970s, saw U.S. policy
reject the strategy of a massive retaliation and accept an assured
retaliation or minimum deterrence mode. Concurrently, the U S
concluded that it did not require strategic forces ahove those already
scheduled for deployment. In addit.on, the Soviet buildup was not
expected to achieve weapons levels similiar to those of the U.S. until
the early to mid ,970s. This evolution in U.S. policy and its
corresponding strategies are often associated with the concept of
"Mutual Assured Destruction".
As U.S. policy began to reflect and accept the growing equality
of strategic force capabilities between the superpowers and,
correspondingly, reject the notion of preserving U.S. strategic
nuclear superiority, the debate over the possible roles for an ABM
defense was enlivened. Proponents, fresh from the defeat of the
Nike-Zeus, continued to promote the development of the ABM to meet
other defense missions. Principal among these was the prevention of
national devastation from a nuclear attack. The ABM's role might be
to protect certain population centers or U.S. strategic offensive
nuclear forces. The protection of U.S. strategic nuclear forces was
viewed as a means of augmenting the U.S. deterrent and preserving its
credibility. However, the Nike program was geared primarily toward a
population defense and was not as effective for a defense of military
instal lations.
As alluded to earlier, one lesson of the Cuban missile crisis was
the need to promote and preserve a stable nuclear balance. As U.S.
offensive forces reached a relative plateau in the late 1960s (1,000
ICBMs, roughly 500 SLBMs, and nearly 500 strategic bombers; and
approximately 1,000 ICBMs, 125 SLBMs, and 150 long range bombers in
the Soviet arsenal), many U.S. analysts argued that proton of a
stable strategic balance was not only essential, but would require
protection against the threat of counterforce weapons. The Kennedy
and Johnson Administrations had concluded that the U.S. possessed
sufficient force to preserve U.S. security and promote a stable
balance without deploying an ABM defense. However, uncertainty over
the future posture and size of Soviet counterforce systems convinced
the Nixon Administration to support the redirecting of the ABM program
toward development of a more dedicated counterforce ABM defense.
Proponents began to argue that the ABM was essential to the
survivability of the U.S. retaliatory nuclear forces as the U.S. had
already decided not to match the Soviet buildup in offensive forces.
New offensive deployments by the U.S. were assessed as
unnecessary and potentially destabilizing to the strategic balance.
That is, the U.S. concluded that an increase in U.S. offensive
capabilities might precipitate a weakening of strategic stability in a
crisis situation or lead to an arms race. In addition, another crisis
similiar to the Cuban incident could pit the U.S. against a more
capable Soviet Union. As such, an ABMs 1 role could be to prevent a
successful Soviet counterforce attack. Analysts feared that a
counterforce attack might degrade U.S. nuclear forces as to deny the
U.S. the ability to carry out an effective retaliatory strike on the
Soviet Union. An ABM defense also might provide the U.S. sufficient
time to analyze the size and kind of attack the U.S. was facing and
the appropriate U.S. response.
Proponents of the ABM argued that the U.S. had few alternatives
to an increasingly vulnerable offensive force under the then current
conditions. However, U.S. forces deployed in the Triad were unlikely
to have become vulnerable to a true dinning counterforce attack.
Strategic analysts who favored the Safeguard ABM system argued that
Soviet nuclear weapons like the SS-9 ICBM were designed for
counterforce attacks and could seriously damage U.S. nuclear forces.
The warhead carried by the Soviet SS-9 ICBM (10 to 15 megatons in the
single warhead version and 5 megatons in a three warhead MIRVed
version) and its improved accuracy (.5 nautical miles) over older
Soviet ICBMs worried Pentagon strategists that the U.S. Minuteman ICBM
force would become vulnerable to a counterforce attack in the early to
mid-1970s
.
One option for countering a counterforce threat might have been
to institute a Launch-on-Warni ng policy. Under this kind of policy
the U.S. could launch its missiles once incoming Soviet nuclear
missiles have been positively detected and identified. However, this
policy is fraught with potential disaster should the U.S. launch as a
result of a false detection. Secondly, in the event of war, the
escalation process (whereby a nuclear war might be limited, if it can
be controlled at all) would have been precluded. In sum, a
Launch-on-Warning policy would place a U.S. nuclear response on a
'hair trigger' basis. The options for implementing a
Launch-on-Warning or 1 aunch-under-attack policy (LOW and LUA,
respectively) reappeared in the late 1970s as the U.S. strategic
community began to debate the so-called 'window of vulnerability'.
While these options illustrate the feasibility of adjusting policy to
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.eet new threats, they also demonstrate the ever dynamic role of
technology. As in the late 1960s, the U.S. has reconsidered
deployment of an ABM defense to protect its strategic weapons JUdged
increasingly vulnerable to a Soviet attack.
A favored alternative of ABM proponents to a vulnerable ICBM
force was the deployment of an ABM defense around missile silos. The
objective of such a defense would be to allow the U.S. time to ride
out an attack on the assumption that the ABM system would degrade an
enemy's attack sufficiently to preserve U.S. retaliatory forces.
Better use of the time available for detection and tracking of
incoming missiles might enable the U.S. to evaluate which of its
forces it might want to launch before the attack has hit and which
could be held back for a retaliation. In this fashion, the U.S. could
attack the Soviet Union's remaining missiles as well as other military
and political targets more effectively by allocating its nuclear
forces appropriately. From the proponents' perspective, the ABM would
help protect the nation and preserve a credible deterrent force. That
is, proponents were certain that an ABM defense could help to deter a
Soviet nuclear attack and protect the U.S. better than the maintenance
of a military posture without defenses.
The Pentagon and Joint Chief of Staff (JCS), owing in part to
their air defense experience, were solidly behind the notion of an
'area defense' role for the ABM. An area defense ABM system is
designed to protect major cities, industrial centers, as well as
nuclear forces. However, this type of comprehensive nationwide
defense was beyond the U.S.'s technical capability in the late 1960s.
le
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One of the maJO r obstacles traditionally associated with the
develops of a defense has heen the definition of an acceptabf
level of effectiveness. The ABM technology associated with the
Sentinal and Safeguard systems would not have been able to achi,
very high kill rates against Soviet reentry vehicles. Yet, the
systems were judged capable of degrading an attacking ballistic
missile force by some measure.
The level of effectiveness required to deploy an ABM is dependent
on the defense objective sought by the deployment. The Sentinel ABM
defense, largely an area defense, was considered incapable of handling
a large Soviet offensive force modified with penetration aids. For
example, neither Sentinel or its predecessors (Nike-Zeus and Nike-X)
were judged to be effective against a sophisticated saturation attack
which might include the deployment of dummy warheads and MIRVs.
A number of ABM advocates, such as Herman Kahn, pinned their
hopes on a 'thin defense' similar to the Safeguard system eventually
deployed. While Safeguard was essentially a redesigned and renamed
Sentinal ABM defense, it was promoted as an effective means to provide
an ABM infrastructure for the United States. The initial deployment
scheme for the Safeguard defense was to include 15 to 20 site
defenses. The current defense debate often confuses a 'thin defense'
with the concept of point defenses. Point defenses, such as the LOADS
system, have been advocated in connection with the deployment of the
MX ICBM as a means of enhancing its survivability. Point defenses
serve to protect selected important targets such as strategic weapons
components or related command-control- communication nodes. The 'thin
defense' was envisioned as a basis for the deployment of an 'area
defense' at a later date and would have started hy protecting sites
such as U.S. „,iss„e silos. Safeguard's second phase was to include a
system upgrade and additional deployments to compose a more
comprehensive nationwide defense sometime in the late 1970s.
ABM advocates also promoted the idea that a 'thin defense' could
increase U.S. security by protecting the nation against an accidental
or third country attack. Although a somewhat lower threat to U.S.
security at the time, the proliferation of nuclear weapons was
expected to continue. The possession of nuclear weapons by a greater
number of countries could lead to a commensurate increase in nuclear
threats. Oefense against small third country attacks could have been
mounted fairly successfully with the Safeguard system. The Johnson
Administration, under political pressure to save the ABM as a result
of congressional criticism, advocated deployment of the Sentinel ABM
system as a defense against Chinese nuclear forces. China's strategic
nuclear forces were assessed to be developing quickly enough to become
a significant threat to the U.S. by the mid-1970s.
Finally, a number of government officials such as Secretary
McNamara saw the ABM defense as a potentially effective strategic and
political lever for the arms control talks. McNamara had argued that
an all-out strategic offensive and defensive arms race was potentially
the most destabilizing threat to the strategic nuclear balance. A
number of analysts, seeking to prevent an arms race, argued that any
means of gaining leverage in the arms control talks could be
strategically useful. The Soviets had begun to deploy an ABM defense
around Moscow In the m id 1960s and mny saw ^ ^
with their growing !CBM force s as a chaUange to the u.S... nuCear
position and a possihie bid for superiority. This prospect was
considered extre^y threatening fro. a strategic and political
perspect,ve. ABM proponents argued that deploys of an ABM defense
Oy the U.S. couid strengthen its strategic position and provide the
necessary flexibility in dealing with the Soviets in the a™
1 imitation talks.
While the preceeding arguments greatly influenced the decision to
90 forward with the Safeguard deployment as well as the ABM Treaty,
the positions of ABM opponents were equally compelling and also
influenced the future diction of U.S. deterrence policy in the
1970s.
II. Arguments against the ABM
The flurry of ABM advocacy in the 1960s created an equally active
and vocal opposing constituency. A number of arguments against the
ABM defense scheme emerged from challenges that the abm was
strategically misguided to claims that it would be entirely cost
ineffective. While some of these arguments pointed to so-called
"critical flaws' in the system's technology, others criticized the
overall concept of defense against nuclear weapons, central to the
critics' charges was a belief that nuclear weapons could not be
conceived of in any role other than the preservation of deterrence.
That is, many believed it was irrational if not dangerous to tamper
with the superpowers' strategic offensive forces -- or their ability
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to threaten an enemy which sen/Pri t-h *n n rved as the foundation of deterrence.
The most influential and persuasive of th«T the arguments against the
ABM stemmed from a ^i- nf c+„,+set of strategy assumptions and principles
concerning the nuclear balance of the 1960s.
rhe initiation of a strategic nuclear exchange, purposefully or
by accident, would result in an immeasurable level of human and
"t.rl.1 destruction. For example, the U.S. had begun preparations in
the 1960s for the destruction of one third of the Soviet Union's
population and nearly two thirds of its industrial base, the scope
•of this destruction clearly impressed most policy makers that nuclear
war was simply not w,nable. Measures of success and failure might
have been imagined but were simply unrealistic and irrelevant for
opponents of the ABM. Oiven these conditions, the first principle
concerning nuclear war for ABM opponents was that a nuclear war simply
could not be won. While this does not imply that ABM proponents
believed that a nuclear war could be won, opponents could forsee no
use for an ABM as a result.
The purpose and roles of warfare in national policy was forever
altered by the development of nuclear weapons. The major impetus to
this conviction was the force and credibility that nuclear weapons
provided offensive warfare as compared to defensive warfare. In the
opinion of most analysts, the level and intensity of violence capable
of being unleashed by a nuclear weapon is so great as to preclude the
use of nuclear weapons and restrict the frequency and intensity of
warfare (both conventional and nuclear) for the superpowers.
Offensive warfare acquired a level of destructive intensity far
super,or to known defenses in the 1,40s and 1950s. There are a,most
no defenses against a nuclear explosion, hence an attacker simply
requires an effective deliver, system to obtain an advantage over an
ene^'s defenses. Opponents of the ABM took this ardent one step
further hy charging that so ,ong as a nuCear war couid not ho won and
nat,ons are unable to effective,, defend aga,nst a nuclear attack
nations are caught in an offensive stalemate. That is, all nations
were effectively vu,nerab,e to a nuclear attack. Furthermore,
opponents argued, in order to ensure that a devastating nuclear war
would not break out, the U.S. must turn the argument on its head and
attempt to preserve the offensive 'balance of terror'. Hence, it
would be the responsibility of each nation, having accepted the
preceding tenets as fact, to remain attuned to the strategic offensive
balance in order to prevent its weakening. A weakening of the balance
could occur as a result of a nation seeking advantages over other
nations or by the deployment of defenses against nuclear weapons.
The most secure position in this regard, one which accounted for
the condition of an unavoidable balance of terror, is one which
promotes a stable balance. To opponents of the ABM, this position is
obtainable only to the extent that each superpower refrains from
seeking nuclear superiority. Although strategic nuclear superiority
may be meaningless from a strategic and political perspective,
attempts to achieve it can destabilize the strategic balance and lead
to war in a severe crisis. For most strategic analysts the most
effective stabilizing measure was the preservation of an invulnerable
offensive nuclear force. ABM opponents were particularly concerned
that any
.,„„. defense might cha|lange ^ .^^.^ ^
strategic forces and thereby destabilize the strategic balance
One method of enhancing stability within the strategic balance
would have been agreements toward disarmament. However, neither
superpower was politicly or strategically willing to disarm for fear
of clandestine weapons deployments as well as third party threats,
uiven these conditions, a stable 'balance of terror' might b*
preserved if the superpowers see. to maintain a secure second strike
retaliatory force and avo,d forces capable of threatening the other's
nuclear arsenal
.
Lastly, all measures designed to escape the balance of terror
might be seen by an enemy as an attempt to prepare for a nuclear
exchange and to limit one's damage from a war. Since such efforts,
according to ABM opponents, are clearly irrational and dangerous,
'
these preparations can only be regarded as provocative and
destabilizing to the strategic balance.
While these more abstract arguments were considered important by
decision makers, the most concrete and salient arguments against the
ABM appear to have focused on the technical merits of the system's
structure. The structural design of the most advanced ABM systems of
the 1960s, the Sentinel and Safeguard programs, were a result of the
dissatisfaction with the technology of the original ABM program, the
Nike-Zeus. The Nike program depended on relatively unsophisticated
technology including rotating tracking radars, high altitude
interceptors of marginal maneuverability, and very large nuclear kill
mechanisms. The assessment that the Soviet Union's offensive forces
could saturate or confuse these systens resulted in their
cancellation. The follow-on ABM system's ztn *«»h s structure was designed to
overcome the major flaws of the Nike program.
Both Sentinel and Safeguard were structured around two
interceptor missiles and a network of phased array radars. The
Spartan AB M was a direct follow-on to the N ike program. Like the Ni ke
interceptor. Spartan was a high altitude interceptor which carried a
Urge megaton yield nuclear warhead designed to kill by x-ray
emissions ahove the atmosphere. 4 That is, the warhead was designed to
create large areas of debris and x-ray disturbances that would cover
the path of an attacking reentry vehicle thereby destroying it. This
area is generally referred to as the kill radius of the defense
interceptor. The Spartan system's terminal defense interceptor, the
Spent missile, was designed to destroy warheads that had penetrated
Spartan exoatmospheric defenses. The Sprint was capable of
intercepting within 40 miles of the defended target and carried a
kiloton range warhead. Although the dual interceptor defense system
was considered a significant improvement over the modest N,ke program,
advances in sophisticated penaids and saturation tactics further
hampered the Department of Defense's effort to deploy the ABM from a
technical perspective. 5
The ABM system's major strategic flaw was its focus on area
defense. Area defense demands an extremely high level of
effectiveness if not perfection. A single penetrating warhead over a
major urban area can cause thousands and possibly millions of deaths
and tremendous material destruction. The ABM systems were unable to
the original delimiting o6jectjve and^
marginally useful from this perspective.
"-any critics charge, the system with techn1cal
others merely referred to probable Soviet measures to degrade the
ABM's effectiveness as a sufficient reason not to deploy.
"Most
critics of the ABM technology were really referring to the fact that a
modified Soviet nuclear force could outwit and overwhelm an ABM
system. That is. although Safeguard could have handled a smal, Soviet
attack quite effectively, it would be relativeiy cheap and easy to
nul 1 ify an ABM defense"
.
6
Two major categories of offensive counte™easures were already
envisioned in the earlv lufiiic ecn y iyeus. The first category is generally
labelled 'passive' measures where improvements are made to the
ballistic missile. The Sentinel and Safeguard systems would have had
to adjust to a profusion of offensive enhancing hardware. These
countermeasures included technical improvements to the ballistic
missile as well as measures designed to confuse an ABM's tracking and
designation system. Metal sheets or chaff, dummy warheads, and
balloons could confuse the ABM system's discrimination capabilities
and proliferate the number of targets the system would be required to
handle, thus improving the chances that the real warheads would
penetrate and destroy their targets.
Among the most important active countermeasures developed by the
U.S. was the MIRVed warhead. The basing of multiple warheads on a
single ballistic missile greatly complicates the job of an ABM defense
by expanding the number of targets it is required to kill in order to
maintain its original level of ef fecti vene^ Thi r ness. The measurable level of
ABM effectiveness can be judged by the percentage of reentry vehicles
it is capable of destroying. This level can be degraded and is
generally a function of the number of warheads deployed on each
missile and the difficulty of detecting and tracking them.
Another deadly countermeasure is the designation of certain
warheads to detonate on impact with an ABM defense interceptor. Th 1S
kind of tactic allows the attacker to achieve some measure of
destruction against a target and also can blind the ABM radars
allowing other reentry vehicles to penetrate the defense. Generally,
a measurable level of target destruction can be achieved only by
detonating the nuclear weapon within the atmosphere. Therefore,
detonation of the warhead upon impact with the ABM inteceptor can
achieve only some offensive success when engaged by endoatmospheric
interceptors. Detonation outside the atmosphere may clear a path
through which other reentry vehicles can penetrate.
The second category of countermeasures includes efforts that
might be called tactical. The Soviets could reduce the impact of the
ABM's kill radius by employing special angles of attack, either low,
high, or varied and staggered trajectories, thereby escaping a part of
an ABM's effective range. The Soviets also might attempt salvo and
successive attacks to challenge the ABM's radar and missile launch
timing capabilities.
Although the technical arguments were sometimes inaccurate on
both sides of the debate, the more important issues were only so to
the extent that the technical arguments remained unresolved. The
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strategic implications of a depioyab,e ABM nested, in pant, on the
'eve, of k11,sacn , ev ab,e by the defense. Proponents had conceded
that an ABM would enhance U.S. security by degrading the level of
the other hand, addressed this point oy charging that such a
degradation in Soviet offpnsivp r»n»k4T*e e capabilities would quickly lead to an
action-reaction cycle and a renewed and vigorous arms race. The
deployment of an ABM defense that might reduce the retaliatory
capabilities of Soviet nuclear forces could lead to the proliferation
of greater numbers of offensive nuclear weapons as the Soviets seek to
regain any lost capability. This proliferation, they charged, would
result in an increase in the destructive power of the superpower's
nuclear arsenals. In addition, an increase in offensive nuclear force
would not enhance U.S. security, but only decrease it by making the
balance of nuclear forces more precarious and less stable.
A principal assumption of this argument is the belief that only
"offensive nuclear forces can be relied upon to preserve the nuclear
balance" and assure that the Soviet Union is deterred from attacking
the U.S. or its allies. 7 That is, any lessening of the credibility of
the U.S.'s or Soviet Union's second strike retaliatory forces by the
deployment of an ABM is sure to be seen as a weakening of deterrent
capability. As neither superpower could accept this condition, the
development of measures to reenforce offensive retaliatory capability
are likely to be required. Under these conditions, the balance of
power might begin to tilt in favor of one or the other superpower
thereby potentially destabilizing a crisis to the point where one
superpower attacks. The ,1st of technica, and tactica, measures
™entioned ahove, have heen presented as some of the maj on avenuei for
redressing a loss of deterrent credibility. Critics of the ABM
-*»1»d that one of the qu ,c k est and ffl ost effective counte™eas ures
to an ABM decent wou.d involve the si mp ,e expansion or
fractionation of offensive fnrrpcVG ro ces
-
These countermeasures could be
achieved by MIRVing ballistic missis nr k a issiles or by deploying greater numbers
of missiles, launch vehicles, and/or reload capabilities.
The most dangerous threat to the nation's security that could
result from an ABM deployment is the possibility that nuclear weapons
could be used in a severe crisis. Assured destruction theorists
charged that the deployment of an ABM system would be perceived as an
attempt to limit damage and achieve some measure of nuclear
superiority and that this goal is highly destabilizing. While a U.S.
ABM system might be ineffective against a concerted and large scale
Soviet attack, it might be effective against a degraded and
interrupted retaliatory attack. Hence, deployment of a U.S. ABM
system concurrently with a counterforce capability could lead the
Soviets to feel threatened with decapitation from a U.S. attack. As a
result, the Soviets might attack during a crisis to preclude a defeat.
The Soviets could launch a first strike in order to limit damage to
the Soviet Union and prevent an 'all or nothing' response in
anticipation of a U.S. attack. That is, the Soviets might expect to
have the choice between a greatly degraded and potentially poorly
coordinated retaliatory attack or an all-out attack on U.S. cities
after an initial U.S. strike. Hence, the incentive to launch a
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-prise first
crisis might be heightened by a U.S. ABM
deployment. These conditions are characterize, as 1nstabil1ty m]e
genera, concept is xnown as 'crisis stablHty' as oppose, to
strategic stabi 1 ity 1
.
proceeding arguments, both pro and con, concerni„ g the ABM in
the 1960s raised a number of quest,o„s about U.S. deterrence theory
These guestions ,ed to a number of decisions with which the current
BMD deoate is contending
- the U.S. decided to forgo an area defense
to see* „m1ts on defensive systems with the Soviet Union, and to
reenforce offensive deterrence hy a policy of assured destruction.
Given these decisions, it 1s instructive to explore the
and differences between the current defense debate and the l 960s
debate to understand the decis,ons that may follow the current debate.
HI. Implication s of the Early ABM Debate
The preceding analysis provided a basis for discussing the
implications of the original ABM debate for U.S. strategic nuclear
policy. As the events and decisions surrounding the ABM in the 196Us
and early 1970s influenced profoundly the substance of U.S. policy for
the past fifteen years, so too will the defense debate today influence
the course of U.S. policy for the next fifteen years. The
implications of the original debate for U.S. policy during the 1970s
can be helpful to understanding how the SDI might affect U.S. policy
in the late 1980s and 1990s.
U.S. strategic nuclear policy is composed of four major
substantive divisions. Each policy division addresses a different but
-l^d set of
, SS ues concerning tht Wy , n whjch ^^
^Pes o f strate9 ic „uclea r weapons the requires>ns ^
Positions, a„d> f1nally> the manner fn whjch ^ ^^ ^
enemy in a nuclear exchange should deterrence fail.
Of the four substantive policy components,
"the most public and
™ostw,de,y discussed... is ,.3. strategic dec, aratory pel
,
cy [t
» comprised of a set of princples and arguments about our nuCear
posturing and our position vis a vis other nuCear powers."*
,„ other
«ords, it is a set of 'first principles' which state how the U s
looks at deterrence, the strategic balance with the Soviet Union, and
force postures that preserve the nuCear balance. For example, "the
U.S. has always argued that a nuCear war will re su,t in unimaginable
damage to the parties involved" and, "therefore, seeks a policy that
assures that a nuclear war will not be fought.
"
S
During the 195US,
this notion was affixed to U.S. policy through declarations that the
U.S. government would respond to a nuclear attack with a swift and
massive nuCear retaliation. Such statements provide an understanding
of U.S. declaratory policy as a public means for deterring a nuclear
attack. The policy for massive retaliation and its operational
strategies were backed by a comparatively large nuclear force
comprised of long-range strategic bombers, intermediate-range
ballistic missiles, and a small number of ICBMs. Illustrative of this
declaratory dimension of U.S. policy were periodic nuclear exercises,
designed to demonstrate U.S. deterrence resolve and capability.
A debate over the appropriate nuclear policy for preserving U.S.
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security emerged in the early 1960s and lac* ay US ldsted until the late 1960s
This period was filled with doctrinal as well ,s „ •a strategic options for
altering U.S. deterrence policy one of whi.wy
'
lch appeared as the ABM
defense came to prominence.
United states strategic nuclear superiority was
during much of the 1960s at levels of tnree an. f0U r times the S12e of
Soviet nuceer forces. That 1s, the U.S. could Inflict between three
inflict on the U.S. result of a larger U.S. nuclear arsenal.
«h!le the ,eve,s sound missive, the Sov|et^ ^^^
of causing extremely high 1eve,s of damage tQ ^ ^ ^
economic Oase. The U.S. was free to explore new policies witnout
having to fear that these actions might weaken the Soviet Union's
perception of the U.S. deterrent. Vet, the Soviet Union's effort to
catch up with the U.S. in numbers of weapons after the Cuban missile
crisis implied that the U.S. !ead would not last without U.S.
countering actions. One option would have entailed efforts to
preserve U.S. nuclear superiority. Yet, such an effort would have
been extremely expensive and fraught with political hazards, as the
O.S. was then becoming more deeply involved in the Vietnam war. The
U.S. was faced with deciding whether to match a greatly accelerated
Soviet nuclear Buildup subsequent to the Cuban missile crisis, in
order to maintain its margin of superiority, or to do something else
to prevent the Soviets from catching up.
One of the proposed alternatives for maintaining U.S. nuclear
superiority was a 'damage limitation' strategy. In this case, U.S.
-le,rpolicywould focus on herring Soviet aggress1on
0ff8nSiVe nUC,ear P
— but * assuring that the lm , of
-M. the Soviets could infl ,ct on the U.S. could not surpass the
level of daraage with wMch the u.3. could retal1ate> This strategy
was designed to preserve n <; „.,,iP U.S. nuclear superiority by procuring a
manage ,„Hict1„ g capacity far greater than any potential aggressor
<n the early l960s> the Kennedy Administration briefly entertained a
damage limitation' policv but ,w,'h„hncy, decided against it for a number of
Political and strategic reasons.
Schilling has argued that "a damage limitation strategy would
required the U.S. to develop and deploy coonterforce weapons an
active defense component comprised of ABMs
, air defenses, and
sophisticated anti-submarine weapons, and passive civil defenses." 1 "
The arguments in favor of a 'damage limitation' strategy were
compelling to some analysts in view of the Soviet nuclear buildup.
Vet, U.S. technical prowess in each of these areas was judged
inadequate for achieving a true counterforce damage limiting
capability. Schilling concluded that, "by the mid to late 1960s, the
ability of the U.S. to add significantly to its damage limitation
capability by adding only to its offensive forces was judged limited.
As well, there was no certain way to destroy Soviet submarine-launched
ballistic missiles. Through the deployment of MIRVs, the U.S. would
have achieved some capability against Soviet IUBM forces and strategic
bomber bases, yet this capability could only be exercised through the
use of a first strike''. 11 It Is not hard to understand why "there was
little support for proceeding to this type of posture". 12
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^ ^ toadamagelimitat1on po , icyand stra^ ^
« tensive system, particular, an effective ABM was
considered critical to the success of this strategy. w
.
tne „ s
decided against the deployment of a comprehensive ABM defense, because
of the nu.erous technical reservations, as well as
-vll defense and air defense progran,. The value of civil and air
verses was assessed to Pe direct, y related to the scope and
effectiveness of an ABM defense. Since the U.S. decided against a
comprehensive ABM defense, hoth civil and air defenses appeared to
«a*e little sense by themselves. Schilling has stated that "by not
deploy i„g damage „-1t.t1,n defensive systems, rather than fa,,ing to
ma.ntain some ratio or margin of offensive force, the U.S. lost the
opportune to maintain nuclear superiority.'^
,t 1s questionab,e
whether the U.S. real.y lost the opportunity to maintain superiority
or whether superiority s,mply could not be maintained in the nuclear
environment once the Soviets had decided to procure a .nature nuclear
arsenal
.
Meanwhile, a policy for preserving offensively based deterrence
became increasingly persuasive. The theoretical focus behind this
doctrine was the theory of mutual assured destruction. According to
Donald Brennan, this theory argues that "since we could not
effectively defend against each other, the threat of societal
destruction was unav 01 dable, and each S1 de had to deter the other with
large offensive nuclear forces". 14
The central precepts of U.S. strategic nuclear policy which
resulted from this period of debate were codified by the 1969 National
Secure
— -is,on to christen a deterrence p0„ cy of
-ategic sufficiency,
-The central e , ements „ Qf ,
^ declaratory policy was the maintenance of
—gic forces capable of assured destruction," The princjpa
,
~ for assured destruction strategy fn the context „
sufficiency were the following:
Soviet Union believes it win k«will be destroyed by a determined U.S.
retaliation to such an attack.
the point of direct confrontation with the Soviet Union.
3- It should reduce the reasons for an arms race". 16
The critical component of this policy rested on the ma,ntenance of
a secure second strike capab„ity to f „f„ct massive destruction on the
Soviet Union's urban and industrial target sets. During the 1960s
Secretary of Uefense HcNamara identified assured destruction with the
ability to destroy 35 percent of the Soviet Union's population and 66
percent of its industrial resources. 17
Effectively, this policy focused on the reality that the
superpowers were vu,nerab,e to a nuclear attack and that this fact might
act as the means of deterring an attack by either superpower. It also
owes much to the recognition that an assured retaliation posture is
composed of easily procured and maintained deterrent forces. The theory
stipulates that the "naked vulnerability" of the superpowers "makes the
use of nuclear weapons less likely and will tend to foster mutual
understanding". 1 " The theory further suggests, that so long as mutual
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-'---my reminsthe
balance> there are few f™-itilK tomutual assured
de
;
truction
-
b~ -™ t ta, mutual assured destruction
-s Up theposst bi Htyfo r a d ,sto rt edformofdeterrence
. ^
deployments to maintain MAD." 19
The ABM decision, in the context of the strategic policy debate
that ended in the dominance of a theory of strategic sufficiency
effective!, meant that the Soviet Union would be free to develop'*
-anage inflicting capability eq ua, to that of the U.S. by the !g 7 0s
The U.S., in other words, deci ded against efforts to maintain its
nuciear superiority because an effective ABM system and other measures
to achieve that end were unavailable and potent,al,y d angerous. The
U.S. reso,ved Us declaratory policy dehate hy settling on a policy for
'strategic sufficiency' that rested on the tenets of the concept of
mutual assured destruction which, in turn, suggested that the U.S. forgo
meaningful ABM defenses. However, the theory a!so suggested that any
ban on ABMs must be mutual. Whi1e the , anguage Qf ^ dec]my
policy has changed somewhat since the early ,g 7Us
, the basic focus of
this policy has remained intact. The U.S. continues to emphasize the
unwinable nature of nuclear war and project a capable U.S. willing to
deter Soviet aggress, on. The Reagan Administration appeared to alter
U.S. declaratory policy in the early lg80s by discussing the possibility
of nuclear war in Europe, but has returned to the more sensible public
stance.
The second policy division concerns the types of strategic weapons,
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—apab1 mies, and raission requjrements
United States force development policv h., hy as been guided by the policy of
essentially r equ i red the U.S. to maintain a strategic force
capabilities to those of the Soviet Union m „fku , in other words,
"the U S
;™ the Soviets to achieve parity lB^
f° rCeS
' bUt
allow the Soviets to 9ain an ability to
inflict considerably 9 reater damage on the U.S. than the U.S. could
inflict on the Soviet Union." 20
The focus of decision making in the nolicv ^ ka n p y area subsequent and in
conjunction with the dprkinn *~ a ,daeifion to deploy a limited Safeguard ABM defense
-cerned the issue of whether or not the U.S. would attempt to match
the Soviet offensive buildup. The ABM decision
,mp,ied that the U S
would continue to rely primarily on its offensive forces to deter a
to be sufficiently capable of carry out an assured destruction strategy
well into the la7Us. Hence, an increase in the size of the U.S. nuclear
arsenal was considered unnecessary and viewed as potentially
destabilizing to the strategic balance and an impetus to the arms race.
Vet, the requirements for enhancing U.S. flexible options in its force
employment policy meant that the U.S. had to continue to modernize and
upgrade the capabilities of its offensive forces.
One of the most important issues in the U.S.'s debate of whether to
upgrade its nuclear forces revolved around the decision of whether to
MIRV its offensive forces. The potential effectiveness of ABM defenses
against a limited retaliatory attack and Soviet efforts in the ABM area
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e<U.S. strategists to conCude that M , RVs were a valuabU strategic
"
6nhanCement
-
—'P.'
-P- U s to their deployment.
, B effect
, MIRVs _
as consistent with U.S effnrtc t„ i° rtS t0 ,mplement
"sured destruction policy
an- a,so would increase the fl exi ble opti 0n retirements as outlined fB
^e National Security Oounci, m„dum which
^
strategic sufficiency 1
.
United States systems involved in the MIRV program were the
deployment of the ninuteman ,„ ICBM with three warheads and the
Poseidon SLBM with up to 14 warheads. The U S arsenal hin u.o. began to rereive
MIRVed Minuter Ills start lng in 19 7o and M1RVed PoseidQn^
starting in 1972. ,n addition, the U.S. strategic bomber force was
scheduled for United modernization with the introduction of the FB-111
Bomber, a smaller, penetration capable weapon system as well as the
incorporation of advanced technology to the B-52s in the early
,970s
The maturity of U.S. nuclear forces were reaffirmed after the ABM
decision, united States forces would remain fairly evenly d,vided
within the strategic triad of ICBMs, SLBMs
, and strategic bombers.
However, the number of deliverable warheads per force has shifted in
favor of the sea-based component and less in favor of the strategic
bombers. The forces were fully redundant and sufficiently reliable as a
secure and credible assured destruction deterrent. The major
characteristics of the U.S. nuclear arsenal as of 1970 are displayed in
Table 1.
The third policy component is comprised of 'action policies' and is
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gflpjQy^^ policies.
encompass the group of strategles and^ ^^
of U.S.
Tab1e I- U.S. STRATEGIC Niir. FnpJFjIp£^J^
ICBMs: 1. 54 Titan n
2. 500 Minuteman I
3. 500 Minuteman II
Wa_rheads
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500
500
SLBMs 1. 16 Polaris Submari nes 900 (est.)
Bombers: 1. 646 B-52s 5000 (est.)
nuclear forces during wartime. The U.S. has always taken precautions to
prepare its nuclear forces for use in the event of war even though it
publicly declares that the primary purpose of its force is to deter
nuclear war and present the threat of retaliation to the Soviet Union
should it attack. For example, the maintenance of forces capable of
inflicting some level of damage on Soviet urban centers and economic
assets has not meant that the U.S. has ignored the requirements for
wartime targeting of other Soviet strategic assets. That is, "the U.S.
has not defined its requirements for second strike targets solely or
even mainly in terms of values such as population centers or Soviet
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industry". 21 The concensus is that the U S h*c ,n . . has always targeted Soviet
-mar, assets and, as reported since 1974, the U.S. has not targeted
Soviet population centens or industry, per S e, o ut Soviet
'recover,
resources' with a requirement to destroy 70 percent of these targets."
The set of employment policies gu.ding the use of U.S. nuclear
weapons in wartime are collectively known as the S10P. or 'Single
integrated Operational P,an'. The S,UP conta,ns a numher of preplanned
attack options which the U.S. can exercise in the event of a nuclear
attack on the U.S. or its allies. Each option contains a
set of targets and attack sequences for carrying out a U.S. retaliation
or pre-emptive attack. The SI0P is divided into several employment
options which are defined hy their target sets and the size and scope of
the retaliation the U.S. would undertake. 23
1. The first group of attack options could entail a U.S. strategic
retaliation on "Soviet strategic nuclear forces of all types - ICBMs
and their silos, strategic SSBNs and their bases, strategic bomber
bases, and IRBMs. Included in this target set would be Soviet nuclear
weapons storage sites and airfields sufficient to support nJclear
capable aircraft". 24 The objective of this k,nd of attack would be to
cripple Soviet strategic forces and limit the damage Soviet forces
could, in turn, inflict on the U.S. and its allies. The majority of
Soviet strategic nuclear delivery systems are located outside Soviet
population centers thereby holding down the civilian casualties from the
prompt effects of a U.S. attack. However, the radioactive fallout from
an attack, while its fallout patterns are unpredictable, is likely to be
greater from ground bursts required to destroy nardened ICBM silos and
57
their command bunkers. Therefore, the level of collut it ^lateral damage from a
selective nuclear attack on Soviet stratarategy weapons could be high such
^at the attack would not be viewed by the Soviet leadersh.p ds
1 1m 1 ted. 3
a9amst other soviet mUtuy taryets (0HTs) ^ ^
fro, Soviet population centers. These targets wou.d i„ c , ude
,ndJor
weapons storage sites and air defense components, such as their
launchers, missiles and supporting radar sites. 26
3- The third set of options would allow the U.S. to attack Soviet
military forces and resources located near population centers such as
notary oases and concentrates of major weapons systems, ie. fighter
aircraft.
4. A fourth category of targets would ,nclude the Soviet
command-control-communication network. The purpose of attacking these
targets would be to interrupt Soviet battle and war management
efforts.
5. An additional employment option set would entail a massive U.S.
retaliation on any or all Soviet assets including urban centers as a
result of or precusor to spasm nuclear war. 29 included in this set
would be the option for pre-empting a Soviet attack if U.S. leaders felt
sufficiently provoked and sure that the Soviets were about to launch an
attack on the United States. This option recognizes the argument that
under nearly any wartime condition, offensive surprise may prove to be a
meaningful advantage.
As with any weapons system, offensive or defensive, "its usefulness
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n view
-only* ; udged W1,hin the critepion ^ c]eap ^ djscpete
--'"^ ^ectlves designed to promote U.S. security.^ JheSentinel ABM was considered insufficient as »„cie , an area defense,' i
"** P-l'tld and mil1tary obJect1ve of preserving u>s
_ nuc]e^
;
U7'°nty WUh ° Ut ^~— - - and civil defenses and
-Payment of offensive counterforce nuclear weapons. In addition, the
technological obstacles to a high,, effective area defense were
Safeguard asa,im ited S i,o defense was madein,i ght of the
technological obstacles to an area defense as we,, as the domestic
political, and economic constraints on the President and Congress
The ABM deployment decision was made in the context of the shift to
the doctrine for 'strategic sufficiency' and its ideations for u S
strategic nuclear policy. Centra, to the doctrine for 'strategic
sufficiency' was the preservation of f,exib,e options as wel, as an
assured destruction capacity. That is. U.S. political and military
-eaders decided that the political and strategic costs in attesting to
maintain nuclear superiority were too great. The moratorium on
widespread ABM deployments incorporated into the ABM Treaty and emerging
Soviet nuclear parity in the early 1970s increased U.S. interests in
preserving its flexibility in the event of war. The demise of an 'area'
ABM defense prompted U.S. Interest in providing itself a wider set of
choices in responding to a Soviet attack. That is, the Pentagon feared
a condition where a President had to choose between launching an all out
massive retaliation against the Soviet Union or launching no retaliation
at all
.
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With the advent of parity the II <; k „ ,
.
^ ,SSS creaib, e choices foradding to the range of choices with respect to both t„
nf , the timing and scaleof nuclear exchanges with the Soviet Union 3 > n,
th. ,
6 Purp0se of ^ding tothe preplanned options in the SIOP i* t „
' St0preVentth
*needtorushto
"
3 ma 'mer
— the .i, it ary retirements nor
atall. This set of ideas, original,, introduced by
^retary of Defense McNamara, came to he known as Limited Nuclear
Options (UO, under the N i xon Administration. Wh i, e it is in the U S .3
—st as It is in the interest of the Soviet Union to limit in atUck
superpowers to li.it such a war is guestionahle. In addition, the
-Pact of
, jm1 ted nuclear options on the credipi,ity of the u S
deterrent is unknown. Wh „ e LNO theorists daim that a range of options
limited to massive retaliation is .ore credible, the theory is
dependent on assumptions of what is most Hkely to deter an e„emy and
«"attheenemy is,ike,y todoina„ar. The U.S. has developed and
further refined options for selective!, striding non-urban targets and
holding the
.agent, of U.S. offensive forces in reserve as a deterrent
against
.ore
.assive Soviet attacks on U.S. population centers.
These employ.ent options and the associated upgrades to U.S.
nuclear forces have been designed with the following major purposes in
mind according to Werner Schilling:
1. To improve the U.S.'s ability to respond to limited attacks by
the Soviet Union.
2. To improve the U.S.'s ability to initiate limited attacks
6U
against the Soviet Union in the event of war. F,e*,b,e options are
designed to:
A. Make the Soviet Union think about the risks they would be
running by attacking the U.S. or its allies;
B. oeter the Soviets by attacking to destroy certain valued
targets, and,
C Make the Soviet Un,on lose by destroying their military
3?
forces".
The final component of U.S. strategic nuclear policy is its an,s
control negotiating policy. The purpose of these policies "is to
provide objectives with respect to the character and composition, in so
far as it can be controlled, of the strategic balance and capabilities
of U.S. forces in the balanced 0ne „f ^ majop
on U.S. strategic nuclear policy by the policy of 'strategic
sufficiency' was the objective of strategic and crisis stability. That
is, it called for the U.S. to seek to maintain
''a strategic balance that
provides for crisis stability, a balance in which neither side has any
incentive to strike first in time of a crisis. In effect, this balance
would require that both sides perceive no difference between striking
first or striking second either in terns of destruction it could cause
or destruction it would receive''. 34 A primary U.S. method for achieving
a stable balance included efforts in the arms control arena, having
judged an offensive arms buildup to otherwise be unnecessary and ABM
defenses technologically immature and potentially destabilizing.
There were three major reasons that the U.S. focused on seeking
limits to ABM defenses. Each of these arguments hinged on the
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acceptance of a po„cy for mutua , assured destruct
, on
_ ^
locates argued thet a cyciica, act, on-
.action model dominated thea« race an. as sucn, Senses wouid only lead to an ,„crease in
- Un fr0fflanuclearwaralsowouldincreas6i
dangerous and threatening to each nation's retaiiatory capability as
neither could judge precisely the effectiveness of the other's
constant,, changing offensive and defensive forces. Second,,, an irls
race cou,d he highly destabilize to the strategic balance and create a
dangerous environment during a crisis in wh,cn the incentive to strike
.ay be increased. Fina„ y , it Was suggested that the U.S. couid move to
Hating offensive nuclear forces and thereby provide greater security
for each nation by limiting ABM defenses. This, argued arms contro,
advocates, could be achieved only if defenses were limited. In such a
balance, there would be no need for more offensive forces if the
superpowers accepted the tenets of mutual assured destruction.
The central questions with respect to the ABM Treaty were:
1. How could the U.S. prevent the arms race from getting out of
control, one that might be simulated by imperfect defenses?
2. How could the U.S. prevent the destabi 1 i zation of the strategic
bal ance?
3. How could the U.S. prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons
that might result from an intensified arms race?
Each of these questions was resolved temporarily by the 1972 ABM
Treaty. As the defense debate rages today, the arms control issues of
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the late 1,60s and early 197Us have reappeared. The ABM Treat, severe,,
restricted the deployment of ABM components ~ interceptor missiles
Punchers, radars, and mobile elements - and on.y left room for
-search. It provided for an Indefinite ti.e for enforcement and a five
year review schedule as well as a consultative coatee for handling
questions of violation and re-negotiation. The Treaty was regarded as
the single most significant step toward preventing a dangerous and
a stable balance and provide an incentive for reductions in offensive
nuclear arms. The Treaty sought to preclude the nullifying impact ABMs
may have had on the superpowers' retaliatory forces.
Arms control advocates argued in the U.S. Congress that the ABM
Treaty was a necessary step in order to bring about offensive arms
control. J. Coffey stated that the costs of proceeding with an ABM
deployment "as judged by proponents of limits on ABMs, was an erosion of
possibilities of reaching an agreement on further arms control measures
which could promote security." 35 Advocates believed that "deterrence
would be enhanced through the ABM Treaty because it would help preclude
any incentive to preempt through a first strike or attempt nuclear
blackmail during a crisis". 36
The ABM debate of the late 1960s was hard fought and indicative of
the state of flux in U.S. strategic nuclear policy during that decade.
Faced with the issue of deciding whether to preserve its nuclear
superiority as well as a determined Soviet effort to upgrade its nuclear
capabilities, the ABM was promoted both as a panacea and a harbinger of
threat. An ABM defense may have enhanced the deterrent value of U.S.
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nuclear forces to some extent. However it" , was evident that a number of
questions existed with respect to the potential for degrading U s
security as a result of possible Soviet responses to a U.S. ABM
depl oyment.
In sum, the ABM debate led to a number of alterations in y s
strategic deterrence po,icy but did not lead to a fundamental shift in
U.S. deterrence thought. The U.S. decided not to match the Soviet
buildup in nuciear weapons in the late ,960s and the relative Soviet
ability to inflict damage on the U.S. was greatly increased. The
decision to see k Hmits on ABMs also contributed to the decision to dd
little to change the basic posture of U.S. offensive nuclear forces or
their strategic roles as prescribed by assured destruction policy. This
decision implied that the U.S. would accept strategic nuclear parity
with the Soviet Un,on. United States nuclear policy, as codified in the
doctrine for 'strategic sufficiency', meant the U.S. would not challenge
the Soviet Union's efforts to achieve strategic nuclear parity should
they choose.
Secondly, the U.S. sought to emphasize its assured retaliation
posture while enhancing its flexible attack options in the event of
nuclear war. This policy led, in part, to a number of upgrades in U.S.
nuclear forces. As part of the nuclear modernization of U.S. forces,
the U.S. began MIRVing its ICBMs and SLBMs in order to prevent a
degradation to U.S. retaliatory capabilities in the event of a sudden
upgrade in Soviet defenses at some later date and provide added
capability to U.S. flexible options. Lastly, the U.S. decision not to
deploy significant numbers of ABM defenses directly influenced and was
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influenced by the role and scone of IP <: ,SCOp U
- s
-
arms control efforts. Clearly
the Sentinel and Safeguard ABM systems were promoted, in part as
'
harga,ning chips to achieve arms control agreements with the Soviets
The arms control process was perceived as one of the major avenues if
not the most important path, for securing a stable nuclear balance for
-Uinto the 19 70s and a means of noting the potential of the Soviet
nuclear threat.
The ABM debate highlighted the overwhelming advantages of offensive
forces over the defense and accelerated the dismantling of U.S.
defensive forces. As the U.S. moved convincingly to implement
offensively based deterrence theory - assured destruction poMcy and
constrained defensive policy - it appreciated the influence that
technology had on U.S. policy. Offensive and defensive weapons
development in the ,96Us pressed against the credibility of U.S. nuclear
policies, namely massive retaliation. The ballistic missile
revolutionized the nuclear threat and demanded that the U.S. respond to
its increasing vulnerability to Soviet weapons. Additionally, defenses
were increasingly less capable of keeping pace with the offensive
threat. The U.S. decided to shift in favor of offensive deterrence,
convinced that it was the only credible and secure policy from which
U.S. national security could be enhanced.
The current defense debate is once again dependent on the
technological developments of the offensive and defensive fields. The
Reagan Administration has taken the initiative to push for a policy
position prior to proven technological support. Should technology bring
the offensive/defensive scales back into equilibrium or in favor of
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defenSe
'
the reV1S1 ° nS t0 U
- S
' deterrence Policy - declaratory
Pol-,, weapons procured policy nuclear employment policy> ^ _
control policy - could be dramatic.
The ballistic missile defense dPhat-P th„ ur ebate that has emerged today has
-ch i„ common „Uh the earlier ABM debates. Vet, -th. new arguments
for BMD are critically and fundamentally different ^ ^ ^
debate at the same time as they are similar"." As 1n the |96Us ^
issue of strategic defenses in the 1970s and
,980s has emerged while the
U.S. government and the community of strategic nuclear ana, y sts have
become embroiled in a debate over 0.3. deterrence policy. The advocacy
of strategic defenses today is seen by many as a means to completely
re-write O.S. deterrence theory and policy. An appreciation of these
differences and the implications for O.S. strategic nuclear policy
begins in Chapter 2, with an examination of the various defense models
envisioned as products for the strategic defense initiative.
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BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE
: MODELS AND
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The political, strategic, and technical hurdles to the
deployment of the ABM in the 1960s eventual,, were resolved by the
decision to deploy the Safeguard ABM system in conjunction with the
siting of the ABM Treat,. This course was promoted as a result of the
- Uerness of the Uohnson and Nixon Administrations to ach,eve s^e k ,nd
of arms control agreement with the Soviet Union that would derate the
Soviet offensive nuclear a™ buildup and help prevent a destabilizing
defensive arms race, dust as important was the assessment that ABM
defense technology was not as effective as originally hoped. Finally,
political pressure had mounted in the Senate to finalize U.S. ABM plans.
The Nixon Administration choose to build a limited terminal defense of
U.S. ICBM's even though the system had been originally designed as an
area defense. The Nixon Administration had concluded as a result of the
'Packard Study' that the Johnson Administration's proposed Sentinal
'area' defense did not really serve U.S. security and that the
appropriate objective was to defend U.S. missile fields. 1 The signing
of the ABM Treaty, in turn, restricted the superpowers to 2UU ABM
missiles and eventually led the Ford Administration to dismantle the
deployed Safeguard ABM system having concluded that it was cost
ineffective in an offensive dominated strategic nuclear balance. These
hurdles are illustrative of the wide differences that exist between the
original debate over ABMs and the current flirtation with BMD. Although
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tHere were a number of equally ^ ^^ ^
Treat,, it was recognized implic1tly that ^
^
would have limited value for U.S. security.
Having reviewed the centra, features of the strategic defense
<e°ate, it is important to descrihe the missions of the miss„e defense
systems being considered. Unl1ke the ABM debate Qf ^^^
focused on the capabilities and implicates of 'traditional'
anti-ra,ss1,e technologies, the current BMD debate centers around a
-ber of radical,, new defense technologies and a proposed fundamenta,
shift in U.S. deterrence doctrine and nuCear policy. National Security
Decision D,rective <NSDM 85) was issued subseguent to President Reagan's
Strategic Defense speech and stipulated a ,ong-term goa, of seeking to
eliminate the threat of ballistic m,ssi,es.
"A second Directs (NSDM
6-83, ordered the Department of Defense to submit two reports by October
1983
-
one to evaluate the strategic and policy implications of the
defense proposal and the other to define a research and deve,opment
program." 2 These reports
- from the Fletcher and Hoffman Commissions
-
concluded that strategic ballistic missile defenses were feasible and
both militarily and politically desirable.
The Strategic Defense Initiative Organization (SDIO) has been
instructed to explore radically new defense technologies to determine
how they can perform a range of defense missions: counterforce,
countervailing, and countervalue defense. Vet, the SDI as a research
effort addresses only the first half of the Reagan Administration
proposals. Of potentially more lasting importance is the strategic
objectives acclaimed for the potential technological products of the
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*
P
—«-n has ca„ed upon the scentific comity to
render nuclear missiles obsolete', however, the extent to which this
objective 1. advisee much less achievable
,s yet to be decided
The Fletcher Commission concluded that emerging technologies could
m*e an effective BMD possible and that the key to such a system
centered on a tiered defense. As such, a U.S. strategic defense could
Possess great leverage aga,nst Soviet ballistic missiles by attacking
^e
.issues 1n each of three distinct phases of their f,i ght: boost
Phase, mid-course, and reentry.3 The BMD debate is likely to intensify
once the SD,0 determines, if possible, that a promising technology has
been developed sufficient,, to move to a deployable system and its
strategic missions are defined. Not unlike the first ABM debate, the
various defense models
- from counterforce defense to countervalue
defense
- have generated their own set of political, strategic, and
technological hurdles.
Currently, the political atmosphere appears more open to the idea
that 'strategic defenses' are a viable option for the future of U.S.
security. For example, the technological and political critiques of a
'countervalue defense', in the 1960s, more widely known as an 'area
defense', were more focused than they are today. The ABM systems of the
1960s were dependent on fixed site deployment, carried nuclear warheads
as a kill mechanism, and did not enjoy complete political advocacy from
the Administrations in the White House at the time. Hence, the roles
that an ABM could have played in U.S. strategic deterrence policy were
limited by Doth technology and a lack of political support.
Proponents of ballistic missile defenses today not only envision a
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number of different defensive systems mm *
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'
C °mp0Sed of
* variety of BMD
ec
;
9 ' es,but a,s ° foresee
^hly integrated miss,ons. A major impetus to ballistic missile
"'J
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S—
-
— made ,„ defense relate. technology, 5uch
"— -— -terns, c^nd.contro,comnun1cat1on! aM
—nisms. second stimulus is the political support
Administration as well as the assessment, on theP-t Of the Ministration, that the strategic balance has been moving
'
given BMD a solid military and oolitic „y a p litical purpose in U.S. strategic
-ear policy as never before. The cntica,
Administrations' politica, support for an alteration of U.S. strategic
deterrence policy in the direction of defense.
The original ABM debate in the :960s revolved around a set of
strategic and political conditions that no longer exist in the 198Us
The U.S. offensive nuclear arsenal was vast,, superior to Soviet nuclear
forces throughout this period in numbers of launch vehicles, missile
throw weights, and their accuracy. This combination of capabilities
generally was considered more than sufficient to deter Soviet
aggression, dearly, U.S. nuclear forces were capable of carrying out a
retaliatory strike against Sov,et military, poiitical, and population
targets in the event of a war. Both the Uohnson and Nixon
Administrations concluded, in turn, that a U.S. deployment of greater
numbers of offensive nuclear weapons at that time was unnecessary to
maintain a confident deterrent posture. Addit.onal Minuteman ICBMs and
Polaris SLBMs would not have increased U.S. deterrent capabilities
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significantly. U.S. already possessed an adequate number of
,960s. the U.S. has ,ost Us advantage in „ umbers relat1ve tQ the
Soviet Union.
A second concern of Secretary McNamara and President Johnson was
the impact of a U.S. ABM on Soviet offensive forces. Both feared that a
U.S. ABM dep.oy.ent m i ght create incentives for the Soviet Union to
accelerate their efforts to achieve strategic equa,ity with the United
States. In anticipation of these possible outco.es, the Johnson
Administration sought arms control talks with the Soviets.
Thirdly, technical drawbacks to an effective ABM defense in the
1960s
-
large vulnerable radar installations and the potential ease
with which the Safeguard system could be saturated or confused by dummy
warheads
- firmly convinced most analysts that offensive nuclear
weapons would retain their strategic leverage over defenses. The
probability that an enemy's ballistic missile reentry vehicles could
penetrate the Sentinel and Safeguard systems was considered high thereby
lowering the overall value of these ABM systems for U.S. security.
Another factor that influenced the final ABM decision was the
essentially invulnerability of U.S. nuclear forces to a Soviet surprise
attack. While there were some concerns over the Soviet SS-9 ICBM as a
possible counterforce threat to U.S. forces, the U.S. was reasonably
confident that its strategic nuclear arsenal could execute a crushing
retaliatory blow after any initial Soviet attack.
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These factors were critic, in the 1960s debate of whether or not
to ,o forward on the ABM. The interaction hetween offensive and
defensive forces was considered crucial to maintaining a stable nuclear
balance. A stable balance for the 11 q »t U.S. entailed restraint on the growth
of Soviet nuclear forces as mil *c «.uwell as their international ambitions
Equally compelling for U.S. policy makers was the threat of a vigorous
nuclear anms race in both the offensive and defensive arenas. Concern
that defense deployments might ignite such a race led a number of arms
control advocates to suggest that a treaty restricting defenses might
preclude an offensive arms race and thereby enhance strategic stability.
That is, the U.S. sought to bind the Soviets to the concept of a stable
balance of offensive nuclear power in which mutually vulnerable
populations would temper the need to expand offensive forces.
Offensive nuclear forces, as suggested by the concept, could be
lowered to a level where each superpower still retained an assured
destruction capability. The ABM Treaty specified that each nation
agreed not to deploy ABMs above the prescribed number while seeking
offensive arms control negotiations. This would preclude the need, it
was thought, to continue an arms race. The linkage postulated by arms
control advocates figured strongly in the Senate ratification debates
over the ABM Treaty. A principle argument was that the Soviet offensive
deployment might be restrained by restraining defense deployments,
namely ABMs.
The prospects of an active defensive component to U.S. strategic
nuclear policy greatly diminished upon ratification of the ABM Treaty.
A decade and a half of research and testing various defense concepts and
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system
- frOT C 1vi, defense to ABMs - ended
conviction in ma1ntaining an offensjve ^
—
is seen by Us advocates as a means to degrade a much more
thereby strengthen deterrence.
J, The Strategic Nuclear Raw.. thr m„.
The strategic nuclear balance has undergone a number of
conditions described above no longer prevail. Both nations have
contl nued either to deploy new and more deadly offensive nuclear forces
or upgrade their existing forces in a similar manner. Both superpowers
have attempted to exp!oit their relative strategic advantages. The u.S
has maintained its advantage in missile accuracy, although recent
reports suggest that the Soviets have matched U.S. missile accuracy with
their new generation of mobile ICBMs (SS-25 and SS-X-24). The Soviets,
for their part, have continued to exploit their advantage in missile
throw weight and as a result, the number of warheads on their land-based
strategic forces. In addition, the Soviets continue to maintain a
greater number of ICBMs and appear to emphasize war-fighting
capabilities. The average yield of Soviet warheads, while falling,
stands at 60U kilotons and is four times the average 150 kilotons of
U.S. warheads. 4
The relative positions of the superpowers within the strategic
balance has shifted since the signing of the ABM Treaty. The U.S. no
longer holds an overwhelming lead in most categories of weapons. The
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7 ^^— - - "SMS a„d SLBMs and thousands
tte
—— new classes of ICBMs and tntroduced s ;
maj0rn,°dif ' Cati0nS t0
—--I- l™; they include the ss, 8
««. SS-26
,
and ss-U(an experimental system potentially w1th
"
-e operational capahmty,.* The Soviets also have deployed seventy
new strategic submarines and tour new tve, nf . kypes of submarine launched
ballistic missiles s1nce the , ate 1960s
_ The Soviets ape cont
-pan. their land-based strateu1c forces wUh the deve|opment ^ ^
^ers equipped with long r,„ge cruise
.issues.
is continuing with the development of two new , C BMs, two SLBMs as we,,
as air, ground, and sea-based cruise missiles. 6
The U.S., for its part, whi.e it has deployed a new fleet of SLBMs
(the Poseidon an d Trident), has deployed no ICBMs, and has actu a ,, y
reduced the total number of warheads
,„ its strategic arsenal by
reducing the tota, number of strategic bombers carrying gravity bombs.
However, the U.S. has upgraded the Minuteman m warhead accuracy and
Us nuclear yield.
,
n addition, the U.S. h as deployed air-,aunched
cruise missiles on its fleet of strategic bombers and has a number of
strategic weapons either reody for deployment or under development. 7
Table 2. displays the rough number of reentry vehicles deployed on U.S.
and Soviet ballistic missi.es. While the Soviet Union has deployed a
few .ore reentry vehicles than the U.S. since 1970. the total number of
deliverable warheads available to the U.S. is actually greater as the
U.S. bomber force is larger and capable of carrying more weapons.
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ICBMs
U.S.
U.S.S.R.
: 197U-19HH
12a 1975 1980 1985
12U0 2100 2100 2050
1100 1900 52oo 6300
SLBMs
U-S
-
1000 3000 5100 5700
U
- S
- S>R
-
20U 850 2100 2600
Source: SjbvietMilitary Power 1986 n i r£J2wer_i9B , U.S. Government Printing Office:
Washington D.C., 1985, pp. 30 8 33.
The threat posed by new Soviet weapons to the credibility of the
U.S. deterrent combined with ever more sophisticated command and contro,
elements for mounting offensive attacks has made strategic defenses an
appealing option to the Reagan Administration. AUhough the popular
description of a 'rough equivalency' for the nuclear balance has been
used since the mid 1970s and neither superpower has developed the
capacity to truly threaten a dis-arming strike, many U.S. analysts fear
that the Soviet Union actively is seeking this capabiiity ,„ an effort
to shift the strategic balance permanently in its favor.
A de-ca P itating first strike is theoretically possible. However,
with a
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-.te3 1c analysts bel , eve that either side „„, achieve
^ * ™ - "Perts do point to the apparent
-erve fo.es translate Into mil itary or po, 1tica , advantages is™— «" nt on the
forces, their types, and the attackers' confidence that they had done
eqU" e dama9e
"
rea11
" - This kind of atuck cou]d
'eave the U.S. with the choice between launching a large scale
r-.11.t1on with Us remaking 1CBHs, SLBMs
, and st rateg ic bomber forC e
or doing very little Interns of a warding option,
this argument 1 S that U.S. forces refining after a Soviet first strike,
namely SLBMs and bombers currently »n= i, are less capable of destroying
hardened Soviet military sites than ICBMs.
'n light of these trends, the Reagan Administration has decided to
explore the possibility of using strategic defenses to redress some of
genera, objective is to transcend current conditions by wh,ch deterrence
is maintained, namely an offensive balance of nuclear force between the
superpowers. Three ma.or concerns have convinced a number of
strategists that missile defenses are worth seeking. One of the more
highly debated issues has been the argument that the Soviet Union is
acquiring advantages over U.S. nuclear capabilities which threaten to
destabilize the strategic balance. A second factor has been a general
review of U.S. deterrence theory and nuclear strategy since President
Reagan's election in IQftn T^11 Iri J-you. This review nartMiP artl ally was instigated by
7 17 ia ' 59 which the Reagan Administration inn,,,
;
P9ed
^
d™ ««* *P«"*™ with past U.S. strategic
policy. 3
A"na, factor has b ee„ the perceived faHure of the arms^
not achieved s,gnificant reductions in offensive nuclear forces as
ejected after the signing of the ABM Treaty. Both superpowers have
cont,nued to produce offensive forces almost unahated, y . From the
Keagan Administration's perspective, the SALT a g reements have restrained
example, the Soviets generally nave not deployed belivery vehicles ie
ICBMs. beyond the numbers the. possessed at the signing of the SALT
,
accords when they mi ght have in the absence of the agreements.
"For
rears the ri ght bad feared a 'window of strate 9 ic vulnerability. More
recently, the left had come to fear a genera, breakdown of the nuclear
Peace. In broaching bis idea of a strategic defense initiative,
Resident Reagan was responding to a pervasive discontent with the
viability of the theory of mutual deterrence."* However,
"a crisis of
arms control, a perceived erosion of deterrence, and the march of
technology: this is how we got where we are today with" the SOI. 9
II. Deterrence
Given the march of time and the changes in the strategic nuclear
balance ever the past decade, what are tbe implications for deterrence
of pursuing a ballistic missile defense? There are two key features
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1 ChdrdCter,2e
—— , on the one hand
, js cMposed
™— When doubt exists as to the success
which an attack can achieve aswe]ias the impact froma
t^t they could execute a lifted nuclear strike against specific
-Utary targets with c^ete success. Missiles
.ay fa„ at any stage
- their flight
, reentryveh1cles maynot theirwapheads
properly, and the missiles may not achieve accuracies sufficient to
destroy their targets. Clearly, it is in the II < • *15 l i U.S. s interest to take
steps which create uncertainty in Soviet r*<r i
•
't s calculations for an attack on
the United States.
The issue of uncertainty surrounding Soviet attack calculations has
centered on the problem of U.S. ICBM vu. nerabi
, i ty since the mid lg 70s
A vulnerable ICBM force
.ay reduce the level of uncertainty in Soviet
attack plans thereby potentially lessening the ability of the U.S. to
deter the Soviets in a crisis. The U.S. has debated a number of means
to enhance the survivability of its ICBM forces. The mobile MX ICBM in
various 'race track' schemes has been proposed. However, as the MX
remains controversial, the U.S. has considered other measures such as
moving a larger percentage of its strategic forces to sea aboard
submarines and placing ICBMs on strategic bombers or Boeing 747
aircraft. While these various schemes continue to be debated, the U.S.
has hardened its ICBM launch silos and increased the force's capability
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launch on warning of a Soviet attack or from under attack
The credibilttyofdeterrence
_
^ ^^^
perta,ns to the—— •'««.,.„„., the status quoofthe
t
S ratS9iC
*
' aUnCh
- ^— —e works whenhe expected outcome costs of such a challannn ge are greater than those of
accepting the current balance. " iu These cost, ,me s generally have been
equated with a detection of the capacities of a superpower's
n-lear forces to cause
'unacceptable damage' in response to an ,„,,,.,
attack.
The ,eve, of damage required to satisfy an 'unacceptable damage'
-asure was first considered by Secretary McNamara. As a„uded to in
Chapter One, he established the ,eve,s of da,na 9 e at sixty five percent
or Soviet industria, capacity and roughly thirty percent of the Soviet
population. Today this would represent roughly seventy-five miUion
Soviet dead and, for comparison, would equate to about one thiro of the
U.S. industrial capacity destroyed.
,„ recent years, U.S. targeting
requirements have shifted in favor of a less massive level of
destruction. However,
"deterrence may fai, if the threat to bring about
these costs is not credible or is direct** i„ m„ed in the wrong way or at the
wrong values". 11
Further, the credibility of a U.S. retaliation may weaken if the
Soviets are led to believe that the U.S. will not or can not retaliate.
The U.S. maintains that it would retaliate against a Soviet nuclear
attack and clearly it possesses the nuclear forces capable of launching
a retaliation. A single U.S. Trident SSBN could launch attacks on 192
81
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deterrent by prepar1ng damage limitation^ ^ ^^
-fenses and counterforce weapon systems. Wnereas the U.S. had some
and an ABM defense in the early 1970, tha c .n , s, the Soviets have always been more
serious ahout defense. Currently, the Soviets maintain nearly ! m
f19hter interceptor aircraft and 10,000 surface-to-air launchers
heated to protect the Soviet air space.^ The Soviets also maintain
a ring of ABMs around Moscow which are being u Pg raded to 100 launchers
Permitted by the ABM Treaty. Soviet strate9 ic offensive forces today
possess a considerable counterforce caoabilitv Th a ,u p y. The deployment of new
mobile ICBMs, the SS-25 and s<; y oa^ SS-X-24, may add to the Soviet's overall
damage limitation capabilities.
In order to prevent a significant loss of credibility, the U.S.
might strengthen or augment its offensive nuclear forces with new
offensive weapons such as mobile ICBMs and advanced stealth cruise
missiles or by deploying strategic defenses such as a ballistic missile
defense.
These conditions traditional ly have been grounded in the tenets of
Mutual Assured Destruction theory. Although the policy for assured
destruction as well as other policy dimensions of the U.S. strategic
nuclear policy mix will be discussed in Chapter 3, a general overview of
the policy will provide a basis for discussing individual BMD models.
Mutual Assured Destruction depends on the perceptions and their backing
nuclear forces to maintain a balance of terror. Although MAD and
"deterrence appear to present a paradox - preserve peace through a
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^7—- ^oappears intolerab]ej Uhas ^
—e-3 critical problem with MAD and hence deterrence ingeneral, is that while the terror is certain
,, so long as nations possess
nuclear weapons, "the halance is apt to disappear depending on the
erforts of tne contestants ,^ One of the greatest threats to
deterrence is an unstable balance between the two superpowers. The
the last fifteen years - i ncreased m1ssile ^ ^
Htlpl. warheads
- have profound,, 1 n fluenced tne stab„ Uy gf ^
strategic balance. These changes may lead to a lessening
faith in its nudear force to carry out its missions. A secono impact
-9ht be a change in the Soviet's percep tl ons of the U.S. nuclear
posture's credibility.
The centra, question is: what wi „ continue to pass today and into
the future as acceptable deterrence? A question raised by Edward
Teller, an advocate of a strategic defense, is: "Can the U.S. maintain
an effective deterrence without a true defense as well as a retaliatory
policy? Hill the U.S. need both in the emerging strategic
envi rorment?"
The preceeding comments illustrate the breadth of issues in the
current debate over strategic defenses and highlight the ongoing debate
over U.S. strategic deterrence policy. Chapter 3 wi 1 1 examine more
closely the impact defenses may have on U.S. strategic nuclear policy.
However, it is relevant to the discussion of defense missions to address
the policy context in which BMU has been proposed. For example, the
U.S. policy community "is certain to be debating the roles for BMD while
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aebatin9 the
— f -, nachana(ng strateg1c en „ 16
WalteP HCDOU9811 h
" "«««"'—
=h a condition of
"
«-.! assure, destruction „ m^ ^^ ^ ^
»«•
—est *„.,. secur1ty if the Soy1ets ^
b6y0nd
^ ,eV6,Sat— policy ,„ 5upport ofmutua]
assured destruction suggests the, build"." strateg1c^
needs but that their efforts threaten the stability of d.ti Din deterrence within
The stability of the strategic nuclear balance „ cruc(a
, t0 ^
maintenance of ueterrence. in a destaoHized haiance, deterrence is
less t0 prevent the Qutbreak of a nuc)ear ^ bQth
I9ht perceive the nuclear threat to have heen heightened and possih ly
launch to prevent being caught off guard.
What conditions make the nuclear balance
.ess stable? Both
advocates and critics of BMD agree that a stable balance is a more
secure balance and any measures wh,ch threaten its stability is
dangerous. It fs the means for re-dressing the destabilizing
conditions, in part, which separates the two parties in the debate. One
of the central points made by BMD advocates, particularly advocates of a
limited counterforce defense, is that the Soviets have attempted to
develop an extremely threatening counterforce capability. The pertinent
question is: "are the Soviets less deterred because they possess or may
possess a counterforce capability in a crisis?". 18
The Reagan Admin, stration, in calling for a strategic defense for
the U.S., "rejects the idea of continued sole dependence on the threat
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retaliation to deter the Soviets an. the idea that
— remainstab
, because deterrence> ^ cu_ t
»*•«.»
ce „ defense stems frM ;
" r SMft inU
' S
- — «* -^ to quest,on the
«l«-Of assure, Auction pol1 cy. A number of policy makers in the
comment have come to believe more firm,, »that
POSS, b ,e, that the Soviets appear to be preparing for a nuclear war
, and
TMs trans,t,on to a more defined war-fighting pol1cyand^ J
Peen made possible by technological improvements in such areas as
missile accuracy and
co^and-control-communication battle management
eiements. These components, poiicy and weapons hardware, combine to
produce a bas,c shift in favor of a counterva,
, 1 ng/war-f ight,
n
9 policy
for U.S. nuclear forces.
Although it appears to have been a logical progression in U.S.
policy to go from assured destruction to a countervai 1 i ng/war-f ighti ng
policy to maintain a stable deterrence, there also appears to be a new
deterrence in the emerging strategic env^onment. Some analysts have
argued that the logic of nuclear weapons developments - C3 and defense
improvements
- is toward a nuclear war-fighting policy in order to
ensure deterrence against U.S. enemies, but it is in the nature of these
capabilities to threaten deterrence further.
A relevant question is: Can the U.S. enhance its security and how
can it reduce the threat of an attack or the potential damage that would
result from a Soviet attack? A logical step would be to seek
reductions in the numbers and capabilities of nuclear forces of the
MS
superpowers. Short of t-Mc u+th,s. deterrence may be enhanced thr„ u(Jh tha im
contro, process and po„1 bl
,
by the ()ep|oyment
,f^^
capable o, ,nhafle1ng deteprence
. ^^
"
COntr
°'
" S
— -"lateral disarmament is dangerous
-
ro..1,h, and that strategic defenses offer a more secure path torPaving U.S. security and mtt flt.1 ff,n9 a stab,. ha,ance than
continuing along the current offensive deterrence path. More
importantly arSu. the same advocates, it may he more rational in an
-creasing,, destabi,i zed strategic world to defend the nation rather
than retaliate and remain vulnerable to a devastating attack.
McDougal, states that the defensive response to the decline of MAD
-
due to the changing strategic environ,„ent - (, that it may provide a
lower risk of war than in a MAD world. Secondly, BMDs do not
necessarily conflict with ar,„s reductions a, the end to the balance of
terror is the primary goal of each. Thirdly, according to some defense
Advocates, there may be better control of strategic anns in a BMD world
as new avenues tor anns control emerge. Lastly. BMD can augment a
credible deterrent because a stable balance derives from the certain
failure of a first strike rather than the certain success of retaliation
Which would be precluded by a successful first Strike. 21
Assuming that some form of BMD will be deployed by the U.S. or the
Soviet Union within the next few decades, it is important to review the
alternative models proposed by advocates Of HMD. Clearly, "one's
position on HMD depends on the goals and purposes linked to the system.
And secondly, the proper question in this context is can the system work
to achieve a specified strategic goal? What is the criteria for a BMD
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^ P— e current defense
fanSbetWeSn
^— f0 r proton of populations and the
protection of nuclear forces.
Ration, u,s a peculiar facet of the mutua ,_
t^eor, which has dom , nated u>s
. deterrence po|Uy m ^ ^
populations is a destabi 1 izi na effort rmg , m addition, it is an enormous
technical problem for the defender.
HI. Ballistic Missile PPfonse Missis „n,
A. Counterforce Defense
The focus of the first and often least contentious mission for a
U.S. ballistic missile defense is 'Counterforce Defense'. The key
objective of this mission is defense against a counterforce attack on
U.S. strategic nuclear forces. For example, a counterforce defense
might be deployed to redress the so-called 'window of vulnerability',
that period in which U.S. strategic nuclear forces will be vulnerable to
a Soviet first strike as charged by holders of this concept.
The counterforce defense tradit,onal ly has been associated with the
defense of 1CBM silos and/or their launch control sites. Theoretically,
a perfectly executed counterforce attack by the Soviet Union on U.S.
ICBMs could destroy a large portion of the force. In the event of such
an attack, the U.S. could retaliate with less accurate countervalue
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~. A U.S. reta]inion of ^ ^
hS,dby
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C0UnterVa
' Ue
—— leav1„g 1t We heavn, damaged than
prior to its retaliation. The Scrowcroft- m •b wcroft Commission, established by the
eagan Adm1nistratio„ t „^ ^^^^
*•—1» «-U.S. nuclear arsenal
, concluded that the . w1ndow Qf
vulnerability' did not in fact exist Th„ r, . The Comm,ss,on reported that the
Soviets were unlikely to risk a counterforce strike on U.S. ICBMs so
'on 9 as the U.S. possessed weapons that it could reta, iate with, name,ySLBMS and strategic bombers. Additionally the Mission conceded
«* the U.S.'s assured destruction capab^ity could not he radical,,
degraded in the near term by a Soviet strike.
A counterforce defense also could provide protection for U.S.
Strategic Air Command bomber bases, Strategic Ballistic Missile
Submarine bases, and U.S. command-control-communication assets. 23 in
essense, a counterforce defense would be deployed to preserve the
that is similar to that envisioned by the deployed Safeguard ABM. A
counterforce ballistic missile defense today also might incorporate
defensive weapons very similar to the Safeguard ABM. A defense of this
kind could include exoatmospheri c and endoatmosphenc interceptors. 24
These defenses would be deployed to defend specific sites or targets. A
number of Department of Defense programs have been exploring modern
versions of a Sprint-type interceptor to perform endoatmospheric
defense. For example, hypersonic missiles, using on-board
millimeterwave radar seekers to home in on targets for a direct kinetic
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energykiU, have been developed. ^^ m^ ^
~---'es atanaltitudeofl0tol5k1]OTeterSi
^
D-0.0. has expired a number of new weapons technologies for a
hl9h SUrr°Und1
^ targets being defended as wen as
'shotgun' tyP e systems employing sma,, projectiles such as ^
proposal
.
While the counterforce defense is somewhat Petter understood from a
techn,ca, perspective than other defense missions due to past ABM
Program it is not without its own proofs. The Pasic interceptor
defense has not progressed much beyond the Safeguard ABM program.
Current interceptors possess greater accuracy as demonstrated by the
Homing Overlay Experiment and thereby the requirements for nuclear
warheads as the operative kill mechanism has diminished. Conventionai
warheads and direct intercept is now more feasible. However, the number
bf interceptors required to execute effective counterforce defense may
reach into the thousands as the problem of offensive profusion regains
during the terminal phase. While ballistic missile tracking and target
prediction technology has improved and some of these components may be
made mobile thereby reducing their vulnerability, effective battle
management remains a difficult problem. For example, target prediction
is based on the trajectory of the ballistic missile, when in fact an
effective endoatmospheri c defense requires knowledge of warhead
trajectories during the terminal phase. Therefore, manueverable or
eluding reentry vehicles can create tremendous problems for the defense.
Allan Oin characterizes these problems as one of battle management.
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have become much more complex.
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S°1Vea '^— of problems, as we,, as theinherent Stations of interceptor velocity
, the
traditional terminal defense can not be expected to be sufficient" "
Another problem for a counterforce defense is th„o r e possible deployment of
penaids on Soviet ballistic
.,„„.,. The dep , Qyment Qf^ ^
Prior to reentry currently can co„fuse trackjng radars md^ ^
targets bein y attached and shorten the defenders response time.
A counterforce threat exists if both counterforce weapons are
possessed by one party and a second party has a vulnerable target. Much
of the debate surrounding U.S. deterrence policy and its nuclear forces
m the 1U7Us concerned the issue of a counterforce threat to U.S. ,CB M s.
United States intelligence analysts concluded in the mid 1970s that
Soviet ,CBMs were approaching levels of accuracy sufficient to put a
large portion of the U.S. ICBM force at risk. At the same time, the
U.S. began debating how it might modernize its Minuteman ICBM force or
replace it with the MX ICBM in order to reduce the force's
vulnerability. Secondly, a counterforce threat is credible only if a
sufficient number of counterforce weapons exist which can place in
jeopardy a considerable numoer of the enemy's forces such that an attack
on them would nullify the deterrent and military value of those forces.
An understanding of the counterforce defense and its associated
technology requires a review of the target set to be defended. The
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" ICBMals—^ - mos t ,UInerable 5trategic synem jn th ;
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_
a h ly h value target.
"High alert rat** ,„hy i es and supporting communication
systems make ICBMs the most responsive element of the TRIAD."*'
Reliability is d^finpH jc t-t,~enned as the operat,ona, ability to launch the weapon
>« the event of war, whereas time-urgency, flexibility, and
effectiveness relate to the variety of attack missions the ICBM is
capable of performing. An ICBM can be used to carry very Urge nuclear
weapons in a tradi tiona, ly assured destruction mode or to carry
relatively small and highly accurate warheads designed for selective
counterforce stri.es. The U.S. Minuter III ,CBM, for instance, is
capable of direct, real-time attacks on Soviet nuclear forces. While
the ICBM has been rated the most effective deterrent in the U.S.
arsenal, its present mode of deployment makes it vulnerable and as a
result reduces its overall deterrent credibility.
The Carter Administration attempted to address the problem of the
Minuteman's vulnerability by promoting deployment of a mobile MX ICBM.
Mobile basing, race track deceptive basing, and other measures to
enhance survivability, Including silo hardening, were criticized by
advocates of counterforce defenses as insufficient. They charge that an
active defense is required to maintain the credibility of the U.S.
nuclear force in the face of growing numbers of Soviet counterforce
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force and counterforce defend t>,„fense. The vulnerability of U.S. ICBMs is
documented by Albert Carnesal and Charles Glaser Ca.n ,
- r esal and Ulaser
estimate that the Soviet's current f„s force of 303 SS-18 can destroy better
than 3M of the Minuteman force if needed. 28
A number of U.S. strategic air command and strategic nuclear
serine bases are vulnerable to Soviet submarines patro„i„ g
coasts. United States strategic nuclear submarines might reguire hours
to disperse from their bases while only s^e SAC bombers are on alert
aprons and capable of esraninn ,,nii nc p g while a surprise nuclear attack is in
Progress. A Soviet strike using SLBMs and cruise missiles could place
weapons on U.S. coastal bases within minutes of launch. A Soviet
U.S. forces on base. However, the U.S. generally keeps 50 percent of
its strategic submarines at sea effectively precluding the complete
destruction of these forces. In addition, a number of SAC bases are
well inland of U.S. coasts thereby providing additional warning time for
bombers to escape.
The primary objective of a U.S. counterforce defense would be to
assure the survival of an effective portion of U.S. strategic nuclear
forces. While a counterforce defense might be deployed to protect
bomber and submarine bases, a defense of these assets is considerably
more demanding than a defense of ICBMs. The critical factor in this
regard is the amount of warning time till impact of Soviet warheads. As
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-s quickly than ICBMS
. A second consideration is the
softness of these bases. While a Soviet SLBM6 or cr^se missile might do
considerable damage against a submarine or SAC b*« *hb ase
> they could not
destroy U.S. ICBM silos with a Mnh ^WU hl y h d egree of confidence.
Given these constraints a n c, a U.S. counterforce defense is more likely
to be deployed around U.S. ICBM fields ThoMeld . The portion of ICBMs which the
continue to serve as a useful deterrent as we „ as carry out wartime
prosecuting Hmited stri.es aga,nst Soviet ICBHs and other major Soviet
mil Uary targets such as command bunkers and critical
conmand-control-communication
nodes. The U.S. might want to
preferentially defend these hard target kill force s in order to maintain
their unique capability to destroy Soviet hardened military targets. In
a counterforce defense must be sufficient to "require the attacker
to expend more weapons tn hopes of achieving the destruction of a
29target." This raises the notion of an attack price.
An attack price is the cost in nuclear weapons expended to destroy
a target. In this case, the target most likely to be a hardened and
defended is an ,C8M silo. When a silo is not defended by either pass,ve
or active ballistic missile defenses, the attacker need only launch the
fewest number of weapons - usually two deliverable weapons for each
target
- needed to destroy the silo assuming some margin of error. The
Soviet Union may perceive that it has a straightforward calculation to
determine the necessary number of counterforce weapons to target the
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leased strategic deterrent. 30
^ P0U9h Ml^t1««n display the significance that a
C°~
-e.or the surViva] of , s .^
a Sov let attack on U.S. Minuteman forces current!S tly would require 200HBMs based on a two warhead per silo atturi,P ack g lve n that Soviet SS-18
;
CBMS CSrry
^ WartMdS P ™e Soviets presently have some
restricted to U warheads by the salt u agreements. The Oepartment „
Defense has assessed the SS-18 Mod d k18 4 to have been designed specifically
to attack and destroy tCBMs and other hardened targets in the U S
while D.O.D. has recently downgraded its assessment of the Soviet SS-19
ICBM for hard target k,l, capability, (t ha$ conc]uded ^ ^^
Mod 4 force has the capability to destroy between 65 and 80 percent of
U.S. ICBM silos using two nuclear warheads against each. 31 The
deploys of a counterforce defense around U.S. Minuter sHos with
the capability to destroy 50 percent of mcoming warheads would require
the Soviets to double the number of ICBMs launched to 400 in this attack
to achieve similar results. However, if D.Q.D.'s current assessment of
the SS-19 is accurate, the Soviets would be unable to prosecute a
counterforce attack on O.S. Minuteman ICBMs where the O.S. had deployed
this kind of defense.
Although hypothetical, this scenario illustrates the capability of
a counterforce defense for degrad,ng a Sov,et strike. A Soviet general
would have to take into account similar calculations before deciding
whether such an attack could achieve military objectives adequate to
ending a war in a favorable position relative to the United States.
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UC,6ar The nudear balance
T^t ,s. both superpowers possess roUg „,y matched nucleap^ ^
-n, the baiance is considered stable so long as neither superpower
nations strive to offset the dements of the other superpower with
<ep>oyments of its own and through the negation of arms control
measures designed to maintain the balance within certain definable
boundaries. A counterforce defense can contribute to this objective by
Priding the U.S. another means of balancing its forces against those
of the Soviet Union. ,„ th1i fash1on> , counterfQrce^^
contribute to the U.S. deterrent by assuring th.t the U.S. would nave
adequate forces surviving to deter future Soviet attacks even after a
Soviet attack that left the U.S. heavily damaged.
B. Countervailing Defense
A second goal is "Countervailing Defense" in which ballistic
missile defense would he employed to protect strategic assets including
U.S. nuclear forces as well as other military targets (OMTs). These
targets include the U.S. command-control-communication network which is
critical to the U.S. deterrent posture and its war-fighting
capabilities. The comcnand-control-commun, cation network is comprised of
systems designed to warn the U.S. of a nuclear attack, to provide
prediction of an attack size and probable target points, and to relay
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- assets that the U.S. deems
necessary to prosecuting a war. The princina, „h- ."1K p l objective of this
mission, like that of counterforce defense i« t „ .t
-
15 t0 de t<f a nuclear attack
--united states. Yet, 1t differs from counterforce defense In thatH Cairns that nuclear weapons have a hroader deterrent role than
envisioned in a minimum deterrence
p0 l 1cy wnicn reljes Qn ^
maintenance of a retaliatory force and assured destruction policy
Proponents of countervai
, i„ 9 defense tend to favor the protection of
-mt.r, targets against a wider range of attacks. That is, increasing
the survivability of these military targets is seen as a means of
reducing an adversary's ability to achieve his oojectives, thereby
strengthening deterrence. 32
A primary concern of countervailing defense proponents is that
minimum deterrence is not adequate to deter the range of possible
nuclear wars. For the countervailing school of thought, "the principal
method of deterrence is to foster within the Soviet leadersnip serious
uncertainties regarding their ability to achieve, by the use or threat
of force, any political or military objective that jeopardizes important
U.S. interests." 33
,„ this context, the U.S. must be capable of
inflicting substantial damage on Soviet military forces and strategic
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^ Se'^-— -anucear attack ,„ order t0foster a Sov,et percept.on that the deterrent could oe employed "35Wd that end. U.S. C3, fac1Ht1es - of which there are r0Ugnly m
cntKa, fixed sites
- an. ICBM torces must have some endurance. The
-aor role of missile defenses
faculties and ,C3Ms in order to preserve the deterrent value and
war-fi ghtingcapahi,ities of these assets.
defense could he,p ensure the survival 1 ity of these assets which are
ertt,c.l in a countervail strategy for creating uncertainty in the
™1nds of Soviet ieaders about the potentia, success of a nuclear attack
on the United States. However, the countering strategy „ dom,„ated
by offensive forces: defenses would oe dep,oyed . . . pnmarily t0
strengthen the survivabi 1 i ty of the deterrent force and its related C3I
facilities. 36
Secondly, a countervailing defense might be central to the denial
of Soviet war aims should war break out. This objective is closely
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AUhoug, a wa,f1yhtin9^^ §^U aU0 ^ ht
—-e.es to protect
centers an. other key economic
,nfrastructU re. [n addltion
, . true
war-fighting strategy might entail a uHha* ign a wide array of passive defense
"
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C3 bunkers, dispersing SAC
bombers, and procuring redundances in
.„ major strateg1c „^
A counterva„,ng defense used to enhance a war-n ghti„g stratetJy
^ the U.S. extends the countervailing strategic policy pronounced by
Pres,dent,a, Directive
,9 during the Carter A«„1stration t0 Us
broadest interpretation. That is. whereas a countering policy seeks
to enhance the deterrence credibi„ty of U.S. nuc.ear forces first it
also recognizes the need to support dedicated United nuclear options in
the form of counterforce capable weapons. Countervailing defense
advocates, such as Colin Gray, seek to integrate defenses with the
countervailing policy in order to "permit the U.S. to ™erge from a
nuclear conflict in a relatively favorable power position." 39 Defenses,
in this context, might assume a particularly
,mportant role in defeating
a Soviet nuclear attack against U.S. military and strategic assets
considered critical to prosecuting a war.
A countervailing defense could be expected to exploit similar BMD
98
systems as the counterforce defenses orevio,,,, w
— sslons wouldi^^ru^^^J[~ and- -—
-
-
-
nt,ts along with ;:;eexot,c weapons such as the electromagnetic nailgun
The Defense Advanced P,eseanch Pnojects Administnation (DARpA)
U.S. A,n Force have heen develops the Va1, gu „.
^-course defense. Fhe system can acce,enate pno.ee, ,es wei ghing only
a tew gnams to tnemendous speed* i= * ,s,
, e
.
ten kilometers pen second. 40 At
-..«« on neentny vehicles wou,d eithen destroy the. on sufficient,,
deflect them fnom thein course tn r=„o. n.n o cause them to bunn up on reentny into
the atmosphene on miss thein tangets. A nail gun might wonk in
conjunction with a tanget designaton such as a low powened iasen
However, the powen genenation and pointing technology rema,n major
stumbling blocks to an effective nailgun.
Although a countervail ing defense might use many of the same
systems as a countenforce defense, its objectives would be more
demanding. That is, the defense would be expected to ach,eve highen
kill levels (lowen penetnation levels) against incoming ballistic
ssiles in onden to preserve the U.S. capability to continue fighting a
mi
war.
Mid-course defenses, while they may have the longest time span to
destnoy attacking ballistic missiles, also might have tnemendous
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difficulty in distinguish the
.none threatensedter n 9 missiles anddeterm, ni ng which are d „, iy ari ses because the ballistir
'."I. booster burns oUt prion to ^-course and it ,
weakens
C ° UrS a Us '"^ared s,gnature
—warheads and penalds during the twenty
very sensitive and sophisticated survei Hance sy stems w, „ .7'- „„ 1nBU1ih1ny and track1ng tasks
_
tyof these systems to interference, both act,ve and passive
effectively preclude the, r achieving high, evels ofMll.
C Countervalue Defense
Anna, model is
"Countervalue uefense" in wh,ch the U.S. m,ght
se- to shift the bas,sof deterrence from reUance on offens,ve nuclear
forces for retaliating aga.nst a nuclear attack to defensive forces
on the hope that strategic defenses to include ballistic missile
defenses can dominate the offense. The countervalue defense is most
closely associated with the romanticized
"Star Wars" defense portrayed
oy the media. A countervalue defense is effectively the gpa, that
President Reagan called for in his defense speech of March, 1983. whi,e
a countervalue defense has intense political and military appea,, it is
clearly the most difficult defense to achieve.
The countervalue defense focuses on 'area-wide' defenses and the
idea of national survivability. The basic ballistic missile defense
system envisioned for this mode, might be a multi-tiered space-based
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Af,rst Uyer rai9ht
—oost.Phase defenses and 1s
~e weapons, or part1cle^ ^^
::;;:;
,e
:
because
°
ftheir—
!"e n,!U! ,nU,a
' "——e boost phase ,nto space
,n9 heboostpha
--'--- s-sarevulnerable>hav1ng
;
;;;
ed si~ f^
ddta
-
H~
•
«" can see, t0 reduce th1sSl~e. byus1ng fast bur „ booster rowts orbysMeid]ng ^
masking the booster flame.
Oirected energy weapons such as ,^ jf
- e Xert dead„ energy Qn 00jecu ^ great djstances
_ Q^ J
laser wave length, such a defense
-'impuUe' „,,.« Equally compelling i s the ability of a, ase/or
particle beam to reach its target i„ fractions of a second thereby
rendering the speed of a bristle
.,„„., roughly 15j000^ ^
hour, insignificant.
However, some of the most promising DEW systems have serious
technological hurdles to overcome. The chemica, laser which has been
the focus of U.S. OEw research since the early 19 70s has difficulty
attaining adequate power output levels, thereby requiring longer 'dwell'
time on a ballistic missile in order to achieve a Ml,. Also, the size
of a space-based laser station at present would preclude an effective
system as tons of fuel would be required to produce adequate power
levels. Sydney Drell estimated a space-based defense system might
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ng
I!" "!
USSr b"t,e St,t,0nS
^ ^ «~ «•"« ^„ewould require 2bO space shuttle trips.
A" additional advantage of the boost phase defense
,s that itP-ide the greatest leverage against
deP'~ warheads. A successful boost phase
6nSe
— ""ratio of up t0 tenwarheads
against the Soviet SS-18 Mod 4 ICBM.
Passes into the post-boost phase when the „..„.., W(post boost vehicle PBV) bpnincWVJ eg s dispensing warheads and penaids on their
ballistic trajectory. That is, once the W h i
. bus deploys its warheads or
decoys the targeting task multiplies very rao^dlv f h k ,P 1 'y thereby lowering the
Mil ratio. While DEW techno,og,es appear to offer tremendous hope for
a strategic defense, the, have a number of hurdles to overcome. Uin
argues that while no major obstacles have appeared which wou,d preclude
a DEW eventual,, being bu.lt. "the rea, question
. . . 1s whethPr the
performance levels and system integration required for effective nlsslle
oefense can ever be attained" .« Wh11e the ,.5. ^^^
output levels by increasing the 'dwell' tine on a ballistic missile,
this avenue has implications for overall battle management. The
tracking and assessment systems would have to be very precise in order
to achieve a kill. However, increased 'dwell' time may in turn limit
the number of targets each HEW platform can handle during an attack in
turn requiring more platforms.
The only other means to exert similar destructive leverage against
ballistic missiles is an attack on their silos. However, an 'offensive'
attack of this nature designed to limit the damage remaining Soviet
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forces could cause to the US has * „ k
ex,mn ,
6r
°
f maj ° r ^oblems. Fora ple, a counterfort att^trtorce attack may not work effectively thereby 1~ 7-
-
- «- stta;t;r;:i:
av1 "9
«.«. counterforce attack> thereby neaatjng attaais
usefulness.
A second tier woulri onf^ild entail an early mid . course defen$e ^
,nV
;
WednUmber ° f
~*'—
-
^netlc ene rgy k1ll weapons
:
C,Udtn9
^
hi9M
'— s. concepts. The so-caned
-rt roc^ concept env,s,ons a numoer of highly dcce|erated
projectiles each fitted with a seeker (ootidi K ptical or radar) that can
~ to Impact W,tH a Panistlc
.issue or warhead. Another User
employment method could include ground-based systems. A proposed design
would he to fire lasers fountain top stations through the
atmosphere off ref,ectin g errors against attacking naissiles. While the
basic concept is seemingly less complex than deploying an entire defense
system in space, the combination of ground and space-based components
could increase the battle management complexity.
,„ addition the
probation of lasers through the earth's atmosphere has been a problem
for scientists. Lasers tend to dissipate and lose their concentration
wh„e encountering clouds and other atmospheric conditions. Reports in
1984 suggest that scientists at Lawrence Livennore Laboratory have been
able to overcome these problems but only under highly controlled
conditions. The ground-based laser facility might be less vulnerable
than the space-based components and would not be hindered in size by
adequate power sources. However, the system's dependency on space-based
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wi th
mirrors would create a number of operational k,P d l0 d P^blems. The mirrors
which grange 1n size from f1 ve to twelve neters and as >"'CLer , yet can not
" P a
' ^ ^«"^M.sltlve to any msrk1ng on the1p
nMrby0r inth
—
° f
-
-
- to degree the „ r ,face adequately to preclude effective laser reflection
In ^-1"8 these shortccln^. User weepons edvocetes such es
— advisor George A. Keyworth „ and LowellWood
-
Lawrence Uvennore Laboratory, have ar9ued that some Mnd of >p.up ,
"irror system m , ght circumscrlbe the d , sadva „ ta ,jes ^ §
-fleet a laser on target would be so severe as to rebate the defense
useful only in late mid-course.
Kinetic energy weapons such as ^ ^ ^
electrcagnetlc raiigun concept where small pellets are accelerated at
incredible speeds." The thjrd^ ^ ^ ^^ ^^
involve a number of kinetic energy weapons including a system similar to
the defense employed in the 'Homing Overlay Experiment' (nut } wh,ch
successfully detroyed a Minuteman ICBM In June. 1984. The Army
Ballistic Missile Defense Systems Command has begun a follow-on effort
to HOE labeled Exoatmospheric Reentry Vehicle Interceptor Subsystem
(EMS). The objective is to demonstrate the effectiveness of a
non-nuclear kinetic kill defense for the late mid-course. 44 Another
mid-course defense, labeled 'Uraduski 1 1
'
, has been described as "a
revolutionary new type of rocket interceptor which combines the best of
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ve an
around and space-based weapons. It essentia,,l ly would invol,,
; 7
M
"' miSS,ledeS<
-—^ space and renders andfly alongside a Soviet warhead while firing projectiles at 1t until vtwas destroyed « «H1,e a number of these defense concepts use
^tivel, ,ess sop h ,st,cated tech„o,ogy than boost phase and ear, y
--course defenses, they a.so have problems. fhey are dependent ontracking and pointing technology which remaina ^ mcn unproven.
The terminal defend nh« Q tense phase
,„ a countervalue defense could include
a number of point defenses around u S n„r,„ «U. . uclear forces, command centers
and critical Industrial and Dolitirai .p c l targets. These defenses might
involve ground-based lasers or shnt„„„ <n o gun ty pe projectiles such as the
'swarmjet' proposal as we,, as Sprint-type interceptors.
The basic objective of a counterva.ue defense is to exert such
ureat defensive
,everage over an attaching nuclear force as to great, ydegrade its capab,„ty by destroy ing ballistic missiles before they are
a greater threat while remaining
,ayers could destroy remaining
warheads. Hence, the centra, goal of this defense 1s to alter the basis
of deterrence and the conditions of national vu, nerahi 1 i
t
y by providing
a means for assured survivabi
I ity. However, assured survivabi„ty can
not be guaranteed by a ballistic missile defense alone. A determined
enemy could shift his means of delivering an attack to SLBMs, cruise
missiles, and strategic bombers. In order for the U.S. to achieve a
truly effective counterva.ue defense it might not on, y have to dep,oy a
ballistic missile defense but a strategic air defense to protect against
cruise missile and bombers as well as civil defense programs to protect
the population from 'leakage'.
* 11. the defense missions outl1ned above have^
_
——eSUl research program, they are faced wHh ,
remend0US
' y
—
-
threat. Offensive nuclear forces
are growing in size, which itself present,s a problem for defenses, and
are becoming more difficult to defend against f. For example, the U.S
eXPl0r6d manUeVSrab,e
~* «Mel« for its ,C BM and sL8M forces
and has begun dep,oy ing thousands of ALCMs and SLC Ms. Both of these
'«er two weapons systems are capable of penetrate Soviet air defenses
current,, dep,oyed ano are projected to penetrate future Soviet air
defense systems. The Soviets may follow very similar offensive nuclear
weapons development paths, therehy enhancing the ir ahi llty to assure
retaliation in the event of a war.
While the concept of a defense against offensive warfare and
nuclear weapons in particular is m new
, as dl
-
scussed ^ ^
the seeming,, fantastic defense methods current,, being explored are
new. However, this research focus does not represent a radical
departure from past activities with respect to the proposition of
space-based deployments. The U.S. and Soviet Union have re„ed on
space-based p,atforms for man, years. United States ,aunch detection
satellites, communication satellites, and surveillance satellites have
been deployed since the 1960s. Hence the concept of 'Star Wars' is
somewhat inaccurate.
What the new program does seek to shift is neither the mode of
military operations nor their place as such. However, the SDI program
may provide some means of reversing the U.S.'s dependence on the threat
of nuclear retaliation. This dependence may be lesse^ a whether the
106
U.S. chooses a counterforce defense fho k
that US
the^ P^ding so,e assurancen .S. retaliatory forcps w-i 1 1 <•
1 SUrV1V6; whethe
' the U.S. seeks tobalance a nnxture of defense and offense with a cn tS Wl countervailing defense-
or whether the U.S. chooses to relv on *y a countervalue defense to
:;;;
,uae the need for ret—
•
-—
,
the SUI Pr09.mW" lreqU,rean°therdeCade
-P-tHe moreexot1cweaponsand
techno,o9y ,«.,„,.. «ea„wh 1,e, the offens1 ve nucear forces or the
superpowers will continue to i.prove 3 nd grow.
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CHAPTER THREE
U.S. STRATEGIC NUCLEAR POLICY
... 0, 1cy makers are charged wfthpreserving the security of the nation c. For more than 40 years U Sstrategy security has depended on policies that ha
,
,c ve emphasized the
—
•— < s the respons1b1ljty of he0Ver™ent t0 C
— ponces that help preventserious encroachment on the nuclear fh u ,
Th f
UC ' threSh0,d b«ween the superpowers.
"
f°CUSOf thatemrt
"•«"»•«— strategic nuclear policy
~ the folding option:
-
can the ,S. best deter
, t s enem,es
from launchinq a nuclear att,^9 attack on the continental U.S. or its allies
today and in the future? The answer to this ques tion Hes in u S
strategy nuclear
'deterrence' policy.
the Reagan Administration has asked if deterrence can be more
effectively served Oy a defense position or a combination of the two,
Vet, these policies by themselves do not ensure that deterrence wi 1
1
always work. Rather, deterrence, taken to mean the prevention of a
nuclear war or a war that might lead to the use of nuclear weapons
depends on a multiplicity of conditions defined as a whole as the
nuclear balance between the superpowers. Deterrence works as a result
of various interdependent factors co^only defined under the rubric of a
nuclear balance. These factors include the policies and strategies
which would guide the use or U.S. nuclear weapons, the nuclear arsenals
Ill
of the superpowers, and the arms control r
e"ort to bound the threat of
The balance of nuclear power between ^
" °"—
- *
-— an appre^on h 'J
"
0V,etUn,0n ' S,«—est rUct1Ve potent,, of ,
. clSarweapons and the U S 's wi 1 1 ^
nu e
b
*
S Wl ln 9ness to unleash this power if r* •3 u t required
r
;7— - can not he measure, rather, ft js . J. „ "
"•'«"« oetween two nations. A pr1ncipal charactensUc „
nUC ' ear b3,anCe iS ^ «'«tt«M1p IS never statu, hut is
~„y stable. That is, the strategic relationship hetween the
superpowers is „„« such that changes in po, icy and dep, oyments of
weapons often a,ter perceptions concern,„ g the ha,ance. However the
ba ' anCe
"
C °nSldered
*« neither superpower can guickly
obta,n a preponderance of power nor is the ha.ance current,, subject to
condition of strategic
'stability' is critical to th»the preservation of
deterrence in the eves nf u <;y. o U.S. strategic theorists and policy makers
Strategic stability is a condition where the nuclear balance does
not currently favor either superpower and is less likely to collapse
under strain. An important issue that poHcy makers must contend with
is determining the critica, events of strategic stability and the
"eans of ensuring that they are preserved. I„ the most genera, sense
strategic stability
"concerns the ,eve, of risk of a nuclear war
occurring at a given point in time". 1 The basis of that risk is the
threat of massive national destruction from a nuclear attack.
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The preceding chapters have provided an
<">th for and against defense as we!, as the
- *
—
-
:::;
,
:::.::::;:~;r;
r »-
—
tm° re recent
-^ents in support as we,, as aaa -
-aracter of the new debate centers around a powerfu, polUica|
C
f7
tUUenCy
" ^ """" *dm 'nistration which favors the notion that0 f6nS,Ve
— «* - ,onger pro.de an effective
deterrent against Soviet aggression Rp,n .a . Reagan's defense proposal
-rent,, embod,ed in the strategic defense initiative, a,so suggests
«»| - threat of a nuclear war mi ght be transcended,
,n practice, by a
-hole array of new defense technologies that m ,ht place a defense
system in a favorable position reiative to offensive forces
^is notion of a defense donated strategic nuclear balance is not
new. "Since the advent of nuclear weapons, presidents
. .
. ,ave sought
an alternative to a strategy of deterrence hased on the threat of
-ssive retaliation and to a situation where the U.S. is vulnerable to
catastrophic destruction." 2 Vet, each president beginning with
Eisenhower, having considered substituting defenses, has rejected them
and has subsequent!, revised U.S. strategic nuclear policy, (with)
flexible response, lifted nuclear options, and the countervai
, i ng
strategy being the most prominent additions. 3 Distinct fro. previous
periods of consideration, strategic defenses currently enjoy both
political and policy support at the highest levels of the government and
the Department of Defense. However, not only do defenses enjoy greater
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suppo,, but th, strategic defense 1nttiatiye ^ charactepized ^
— strate9ic doctr
, ne and the strategjc
relationship of the superpowers". 4
— «? ^logical results o f the SDI research program
decades
-
Theu
- s
-
i5
- e'-—tmeg , cdefenseweaponrymor
:
^H1o„, space could become an essential sphere
for other than intelligence gathering and emotion ,1„k s. The new
strategic defense debate
,s three years old and many agents Pave Pee„
««<e both p r0 an d con whl ch wou.d Pave Peen expected at this point
However, much of the focus of the debate has Peen on pantile aspects
of the propose. system or on the genera, conceptua, defense sch OTe For
e*amp,e, the Reagan Admin ls tration emphasizes a strategic defense for
countervalue purposes while other officials, both in and out of
government, discuss the appeal of a counterforce or countervailing
defense. See defense critics focus on specific technology, stuping
blocks such as the develops of sophisticated battle manag«„ent
software for a multi-tiered, space-based, countervalue defense system.
Other analysts pose a number of difficult quest,ons to the overall
conceptual value of a strategic defense. 5 while the debate continues to
rage between opponents and proponents of strategic defenses, a number of
political and strategic policy implications of a strategic defense are
ignored. Neither the Reagan Administration's Department of Defense nor
any of the major opposing organi zatinns
, such as the Union of Concerned
Scientists or The Coalition to Save the ABM Treaty, have produced major
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studies addressing the imp! i cati ons of a IM ,° 3 U * S
-
^rategic defense for U S
--ce policy.
N
'
raPHCati0nS U
- S
-
—
-
future of U.S. nuclearforces, and U.S. arms control policy.
I. U.S. NUCLEAR POLICY TN pf\/
T FW;
An understanding of the possible plications of strategic defenses
can beg,n with a review of U.S. strategic nuclear policy Us
Principles, Us evolution over the past three decades, and its current
composition. During this period U S st
'
u,i>
-
rategic nuclear policy evolved
fro. 'essentia, deterrence' to a 'sophisticated deterrence' policy.
United States strategic nuclear forces have been progressively charged
with increasingly more difficult and complex objectives as defined by
U.S. policy. This evolutionary process has been influenced by two major
trends. On the one hand, the conditions about which the nuclear balance
is defined have changed. United States nuclear superiority has been
overcome by rough strategic nuclear equality; the superpowers possess
roughly equal capabilities to threaten the other with massive levels of
destruction by executing a nuclear attack.
The U.S. also has sought to preserve its national security in the
face of a changing strategic balance by adjusting its nuclear policy and
developing strategic weapons to support new policies. However, for
various political, economic, and strategic reasons, the U.S. has
emphasized restructuring its nuclear policy rather than procuring new
weapons. The Reagan Administration's strategic defense proposal is
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rrent u
- s
- 10 sn effect1ve damage
— ,ng strategy. fln effect1ye^^ ^
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_
topt
, onsa5we „ asnew
^r«i« and tensive weapons. In addition, the U.S. might have to
capabilities to support and execute a damage luting strategy
Gwen the possible implications for U.S. nuclear policy, this
Chapter win e * P ,ore the components of U.S. strategic nuclear policy and
the direction in which it may be headed as a result of the current
debate over strategic defenses As s„rh ,k. u. uc , the chapter will outline and
-view the major elements of current U.S. strategic nuclear policy and
ana!yze whether strategic defenses conform with each policy's
objectives. An additional objective of the chapter is to describe what
a U.S. strategic defense policy might look like should defensive
technoiogies prove useful and should the U.S. deploy a defensive system.
Finally, the question of strategic nuclear stability will be ra,sed in
the context of a defensive transition. In order to assess possible
implications for U.S. policy, both U.S. domestic political and strategic
constraints as well as Soviet efforts to deny the U.S. an effective
defense wi 1 1 be outl ined.
U.S. strategic nuclear employment policy - the strategies and
plans which might guide U.S. attacks during a nuclear war - is
currently informed by elements from three distinct strategic nuclear
policies: an assured destruction/retaliation poiicy, a counted 1 i ng
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PO
^.ndanudeanwar-fi^m.po,^.
The per , ods
'"dividual poMc.es have donated are
^ Incorporation of a
.Strategic Defense'
p0l1cy may dl(er ^
present nuclear policy „1 X 1n favor
^nated deterrence. rhe scope and purpose „^ ^ ^ ^
Policy hy a strategic defense are dependent on the technoiogies and
tHe1r m1,s100S that maybe proven usefu! foe a defense. A second factor
•"fluency changes to U.S. nuCear policy nay he the level of
nu.her of uncertainties involved in answering these two guestions
the U.S is likely to retain many
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TABLE 3
*
T^HimjMPte
i^LJiUCLEAR POLICY
Massi ve
Retal i at ion
Assured
Destruction
Countervai 1 i ng/
Counterforce
Prevai 1 i ng/
War-Fighting
Strategic
Defense
'45 '50 '55 '60 '65 '70 '75 '70 '75 '80 '85 '90 '95
Key: . U>Si Nuc i ear PoMcy currently in effea
Possible Direction for U.S. Nuclear Policy
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elements of its current nuclear policy mix both hr u 1 y~y during a defense
transition and dunng the 1nUia)^ rf §^
Tatis, the U.S. isu „,i kely to d,scard its offensive nudear forces,
the prlncpa, objectives of their employment strategies for fear that
Soviets m1 ght develop effective coonter.eas.es to a U.S. strategic
defense. In action, the development of a perfect defense against
ballistic n-lsslles, one that would uestroy m pm Qf ^ ^.^
mil- unleashed in an attach does not preclude the delivery of
nuciear weapons by other means such as strategic bombers, cruise
Missiles, or clandestine placement lB the absence Qf an
defense to combat these delivery options, such as strategic air
defenses, the U.S. is unlikely to dismantle its offensive nuclear
forces. United States offens,ve nuclear forces are Mkely to continue
to act as an effective deterrent against a possible Soviet nuclear
attack at least during the defense transition phase. In conclusion,
policy guidance for offensive nuclear forces that are retained by the
U.S. could be informed by current nuclear policy as well as by a newly
implemented strategic defense policy.
United States strategic nuclear policy is derived from U.S.
deterrence theory which represents the way in which U.S. theorists and
strategists view the nuclear threat against the U.S. and its allies. A
basic principle of U.S. deterrence theory since the l 94Us is that
nuclear weapons only can be used to deter their use by another nation.
This principle stems from the tremendous respect U.S. political and
military leaders have for the destructive capability of nuclear weapons.
As observed by U.S. policy makers of the 194Us
, nuclear weapons were a
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Passive economic growth and its attendm benems
_ ^
"
the0nStS
* —abstract, that the (nU1at1or
n"CWWrHS «"th1*.M.
.nd unlikely to ever happen
However,
.
second pri „cip,e requ ,res that the threat to use nuclear
weapons be credible in the P» Dnt „feve of an attack on the United States
maintenance of a credible threat subsequently has reared that war
P'ans be developed to allow the U.S. to execute a response to an attack
These pr1nc1p,es only speak t„ ^ ^ ^
That vis,on isolated nuclear weapons such that they are usefu, only to
deter their use. The expansion of U.S. nationa, security recrements
in the 1,40s ana 1960s was supported, in part
.
wlth the expansjQn
,f ^
role nuclear weapons might play in assuring U.S. security. The
Eisenhower Administration drastically reduced conventional arms
procurement in favor of relying on U.S. nuclear forces to deter
aggression below the strategic nuclear level. This evolution in
deterrence thought represents the central tension in U.S. deterrence
theory for the past four decades. That tension can be represented by
the following question; what is the most effective way to deter a
nuclear war? Is it the result of an ultimate threat to punish an
attacker, to threaten a potential attacker with the possibility of
defeat at any level of warfare, limited or massive, or the ability to
defend effectively against a nuclear attack?
A.__ Assured Destruction Policy
:
The U.S. has depended on a policy of assured destruction to deter a
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— wan for m0st of the past 25 years
.
assure, destruction p„, icy is that aeterre „ ce (j
^ ^
t^eat of unacceptaMe'
„at,o„a, destruction in the event of a nuclear
war. The threat of national destruction exist* hl s because the superpowers
are vulnerable to a nuclear art-an.t ack and possess nuclear forces capable of
causing tremendous levels of destruct,on.
,„ addition> whj
, e the „ $
and Soviet Union have activel, explored strategic defense against
nuclear weapons neither nation has yet developed an effective means to
defend against a nuclear attack. yet, a condition of national
vulnerability does not of itself preclude a nuclear attack. ,„ fact
traditional military thought would suggest that vulnerability to attack
is more of an invitation to attack than a deterrent to it. The critical
component of assured destruction policy is that the threat of
unacceptable damage can he maintained hy possession of an invulnerable
strategic nuclear force. That is, the deterrent credibility of assured
destruction policy relies on the invulnerability of the nuclear forces
backing the policy. The label 'mutual' was attached to assured
destruction, hence the acronym MAD, in an effort on the part of the U.S.
to gain recognition by the Soviet Union that national vulnerability is a
'fact' of the nuclear era that applies to all nations and one that
cannot be avoided or changed.
The doctrinal basis of the assured destruction policy school is
that nuclear weapons have rendered traditional ideas about the
relationship between military forces, national defense, and the politics
of war obsolete and dangerous. 7 Therefore, the most important objective
for assured destruction policy is to prevent the use of nuclear weapons
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theory suggest, thit nuclear weapons are usefuisQ|eiy ^
nucl «a, 6arfi„u esu„HruedthCTOwWdbyasMred
destruction theorists with respect to nuclear weapons as the means to
ensure that nuclear weapons are not used by
^
Power between the nuclear superpower, wh,ch rests on . pQugh
ot risk known as deterrence, or the mutual vulnerability to a nudear
attack".
The risk posed by each superpower to the other is the threat of
unimaginable destruction from a nuclear retaliation to an aggressor's
attack. The leve, of destruction generally has been cloaked in terms of
the number of deaths/casuaUles and the degree of econ«»„ic destruct.on
that would be caused by attacks on cities and industrial centers. ,„
effect, the two superpowers possess the capacity to threaten and punish
the other with massive urban-industrial destruction such that recovery
fro. this attack might only be measured In years if ,„easured at all.
The central strategic character of assured destruction policy can
he described as a threat to 'punish' an enemy in the event that an enemy
attacks the U.S. or its allies with nuclear weapons. An assured
destruction threat essentially served as the basis of U.S. deterrence
policy throughout the 1950s, the 1960s and early 1970s. A key element
in U.S. employment strategy designed to Implement a threat of pun.shment
as alluded to above is known as countervalue targeting, or the
deliberate targeting of Soviet population and industrial centers.
Countervalue targeting in U.S. war plans began shortly after World
War II when the U.S. began searching for a policy to guide the use of
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new,y found mimary power
.
-corporate nuclear weapons, such as FLEETW00D>^ ^
on Soviet
.,«.. The targets of . , s . counterva]ue
would have been Soviet population centers as well as some portion of theSovet union's industrial hase.
considerable value to the Soviet
,eadersh,p and thereby the threat of
follow-on war plan, ,abe,ed DROPSHOT, resulted from a review of the
FLEETWOOD plan by the Harmon Committee established in 1949 rt
communist world. The DROPSHOT war p,an provided the president with a
single attack option and did not require the military to withhold any
nuc.ear forces in reserve for subsequent attacks. The number of deaths
expected from the unleashing of DROPSHOT was esti.ated between 360 and
b2b million throughout the communist world. 10 Together, these war plans
and others came to be known throughout the 1950s as a policy for massive
retaliation. The basis for massive retaliate - the destruction of a
considerable portion of the Soviet Union's urban-industrial base -
served to confirm the foundation upon which U.S. assured destruction
policy has been based.
An important factor constraining the targeting complexity of U.S.
war plans in this period was the weapons technology available to the
United States. The delivery systems of the 1940s and 1950s, namely B-36
and B-52 strategic bombers, were not very accurate and thus were not
particularly useful for targeting specific military assets. For
example, the U.S. could not confidently target and destroy Soviet
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.esse,
s
at bomber or nava, baS es, respective,,
nuclear weapons that would likely result in n< i y in damage to aircraft and ships
« well as surrounding areas. The level of coll,. ,
,
,
° ^eral damage that wouldhave resulted from the targeting of military assets in thP <s m e Soviet Union
with the megaton yield weapons carried bv U s c*y
- s
-
strategic bombers in the
1*0, was essentia,,, just as great as direct population targetlng
The Eisenhower Adm inistration decjded
, n ^ ^ ^
«"«.
-clear war p,ans of the individua, arm sem, e^ ^
the S,n g ,e ,ntegrated Operation,, P„„, or SI0P
. The ^ ^ ^
allocate wea Pons .ore effective,, and preclude the potentia
, ^
targeting of a sin 9 ,e target b, the different
.ranches." The Kenned,
Administration furthered the centralizaUon of the war P ,ans under the
erection of Secretar, of Defense McNamara and also began an effort to
prov.de the Present with attack options other than a sing,e massive
retal iation.
ncNamara's initial public effort was to reject the massive
retaliation polic, and develop counterforce opt,ons such that the U.S.
cnuld attack Soviet strategic nuclear forces and other military assets
if it choose to do so before resorting to attacks on Soviet cities. The
idea behind this effort was to provide a 'controlled' means for keep,„g
the superpowers from escalating to all-out nuclear war too quick,,. 12
Attacks on mi liter, assets rather than civilian centers appeared to
McNamara to make more sense for deterrence; p, limiting the size of U.S.
retaliator, strikes, civilian populations might be spared somewhat. 13
The introduction of the 'no-cities' approach resulted in resounding
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Po,lt '" and economics also played a
cntica, role
,n McNamara's decision to shift ,n favor of assured
destruction po„cy . The A1 r Force
, jncreas1ng
,y ^ ^ ^had estimated that it would require 1U ,000 ,CBMs to imp.ement a true
"
counterforce targeting strategy. i„ effect th„ «•jy. , e cost of U.S. strategic
^umement.
-pons to perform a counterforce
,n , ssjon
_ ^ ^ ^
obstacle continued to be the capabilities of U.S. nuclear forces The
-st advanced U.S. weapons of the early 196Us, carried on Titan „ and
Mlnuteman I ICBMs, were fairly inaccurate and of sizeable yields.
Clearly, these forces were unsuited for discriminate surg,ca, strikes of
the kind required by a counterforce strategy. The U.S. would have been
unable to confidently target Sov,et
.CBMs and bomber bases with its
strategic force without causing considerable collateral damage. While
McNamara publicly downplayed the counterforce and damage limiting
aspects of U.S. nuclear policy his annual budget statements continued to
reflect their roles until 1967 Rw iqa7iyo/. By 1967, assured destruction policy was
formally and solidly in place. 14
The U.S. continued to develop the notion of 'flexible response',
especially in the NATO arena, and attempted to prov.de a greater number
of attack options in the SIOP. 15 A new SIOP, introduced in 1961,
incorporated the 'flexible response' concept into U.S. targeting
strategy. It provided the President with a greater number of attack
options, the final category and option representing an all-out
attach on both military and urban . jndustna] „
•n aithough the U.S. began to prov, de options
,„ the S,0P the
"
notion of deterr1ng the Soviets cont,nued to ne, y pri mar i,y on
'
a
strategic posture to unleash raass ive destruction.
,„ addition as
Soviet heUlstic m,ss,le fences grew throughout the 1960s the ab1, ity „t^ U.S. to canny out an effective countenfonce a„d damage l1nl1t1ng
Strike began to dwindle correspondingly.
I" suppont of the shift to assured destnuction po,,cy, McNamara
ar 3ued "that the enemy's certa,n knowledge that it would he destnoye d in
a wan pnevented one from breaking out"." Hence, the donation of
assured destruction Po,icy was not strict,, for public consumption hut
Practice, it was the only cred,b,e threat the U.S. was capabie of
carrying out. The targeting reu.uire.ents for an assure, destruction
po„cy were defined by HcUa.nara in 1965 as the capabi,ity to destnoy one
quarter to one third of the Soviet Union's population and two thirds of
Us industria, capacity. la In effect, McNamara envisioned a policy to
threaten to punish the Soviet Union should it attack the U.S by
destroying assets ofW and concluded mt tMf^ ^ ^^
effective and credible deterrent. 19
The U.S. has retained elements of its assured destruction policy
and associated capabilities since the mid 1960s. Each succeeding
administration since the Kennedy Administration has continued to
emphasize a U.S. assured destruction deterrent. The policy has been
refined as the focus for targeting has shifted from populations to
'economic recovery resources' such as key economic infrastructures and
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«-,ng massive Action to the Soviet Union by a U.S. retaliation
has already come under scrutiny by the firct *"y °y s few months of the Nixon
ministration.
,ts doctrine for strategic sufficiency, while
establishing strategic parity as a basis of the nuclear balance, began
the process of revising U.S. S,0P employment options which led to
Lilted Nuclear Options, Presldentla, Oirective 59, and the Reagan
Administration's war-fighting policy.
A variation of the assured destruction/retaiiation policy school
often referred to as the •mini™. deterrence' school, has become m0 re
vocal in recent years as the U.S. has moved away from assured
destruction in favor of more selective and limited nuclear options. ,ts
proponents suggest that both superpowers possess more than sufficient
strategic forces to 'destroy' each other's nation and. therefore,
neither side needs to deploy greater numhers nor more capable nuclear
forces. Minimal deterrence theorists argue that both sides, in fact,
could unilaterally dismantle hundreds of weapons without degrading their
deterrent posture. A popular proposition with minimum deterrent
advocates is for the U.S. to dismantle all but a few Poseidon or Trident
Submarines, each capable of attacking an average of 160 and 192 Soviet
cities respectively.™ President-elect Carter initially favored a
return to a minimum deterrent and suggested that a U.S. submarine fleet
of 2U0 warheads would be sufficient to deter a Soviet attack. 21
Louis Beres, a leading proponent of the minimum deterrence school,
has suggested the U.S. seek to implement three general steps to achieve
a minimum deterrence posture while maintaining an assured destruction
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weapons, and finally, Beres calls for the U s t„r n .S. to renunciate the 'first
use' option by strengthening conventional deterrence.?? Tne basis of
t^se argents is that assure, destruction capab, lities, possessed by
both superpowers, is a reality that can not he avoided.
,„ addit1on
Beres suggests that possess,on of ever more capable nuclear weapons does
not translate into an effective means for terminating a nuclear war on
acceptable terms as some proponents of limited nuCear options suggest
The assured destruction schoo. charges that the centra, function of
nuclear weapons is to deter an enemy's attack and a measure by which
deterrence can he weighed is the stability of the strategic balance.
That is, deterrence can work effectively when the balance is stable and
is susceptib.e to breaking down when the balance becomes destabilized.
Harmful to the stability of the balance are actions wnicb undermine the
parity of forces between the superpowers. Principal among these actions
are attempts to erode the other superpower's confidence in their assured
destruction and assured retaliation capability. Hence, all counterforce
targeting strategies and weapon systems are inherently destabilizing
according to assured destruction theorists.
Among the more destabilizing activities is the development and
deployment of defenses against nuclear weapons, both passive and active.
Passive defenses are destabilizing because they seek to limit the damage
an enemy can inflict on a particular target, thereby degrading the
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' M^ ^or •"•'"pie, elvl] defenses
«n1ch ere des1 9„ed t0 proteet el¥ll1i> popuUtions
~ tHe attacks
, ntended tspg9t
. Wh1l9c1v1ldefenmJP-tect some p„rtion of a population fro* the direct effects of d „
"tack, i.e. overpressure and thermal destruction <, •C ,
-
n 'S not considered
Jn effective defense by U.S offiri^u cy u-i. icials. Soviet missiles might be
-Urgeted to hit areas where U.S. civi.ians bad been relocated
Additions,,,, the Soviets could employ more weapons or
yields to accomplish some level of destruction.
"ore important,, for President Plan's defense propose,, assured
destruction policy suggests that active defenses are radically
CestSbn,^ for a number of reasons.
"A conse quence of this view is
that only offensive forces can directly contribute to deterrence."^
Finally, for an assured destruction advocate
'•anything that interferes
m any measure with the other side's ability to inflict assured
destruction is destabilizing
- in crises it is supposed to induce
premptive attack and, in the long term, military competition becomes a
spiral,
ng nuclear arms race with unlimited increases in the potential
for indiscriminate destruction on both sides". 24 Therefore, al, efforts
to incorporate defenses and ABMs in mrtio.i^°"u ™>m , particular, are opposed by assured
destruction theorists.
While assured destruction policy suggests that defenses are
dangerously destabilizing, the deployment of missile defenses by the
superpowers my make countervalue targeting as prescribed by assured
destruction policy the only practical option for offensive forces.
Missile defenses will degrade the superpowers' abilities to execute
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P-ise counterforce attach thereby lessening the, P congee of
-cess. Hence. the requ1rements „ ^^ ^
'ess precise,, defined in terms of weapons accuracy and damage
expectancies could serve useful Iv « fhr ly as the employment objectives for
offensive nuclear forces in a defense dominant world.
B. United wuclwr Option. r..^
rm111|||| nn^
American nuclear policy has evolved over the past 4 0 years
although some would argue that what has really happened is that a series
of radical shifts have occured
,n the face of technological pr0gress
The foundation of the assured destruction policy of the ,g6Us and l970s
has been guestioned recently by a number of nuclear strategists. These
strategists, such as Paul Nitze and Colin Gray, do not view assured
destruction policy or posture as adequately credible to preserve U.S.
security in the coming decades. Nitze, a government nuclear policy
advisor for the past thirty years, has charged that the U.S. has needed
"ore flexible and 'rational' nuclear policies for most of those years.
Gray, an advisor to the Peagan Administration, has charged that a
growing Soviet war-fighting capability could pose a serious and
dangerous threat to the ability of the U.S. to deter a nuclear war in
the future.
Both Nitze and Gray have argued that the U.S. needs to promote U.S.
war-Hghting options and capabilities. While few Presents publicly
emphasize these conclusions, there has been a progression toward more
limited nuclear employment options since the late 196Us and especially
since the early 1970s. Secretary of Defense Schlesinger for the Nixon
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^ «" '-nation of se.ea.ea,,,,^
-ear options (LNOs,
,„ the S ,0P as a means of enhancing u S
deterrence credibi lity and to H™n a „ucl ear war sh0uld it 5^.
The Nixon Administration's nuclear policy review ,ed to the
promulgation of LNOs in n <; iU.S. war pians. National Security Decision
Memorandum 242 s1gned by ^ (- ^ ..^ ^^Pi- for HmHed employment options which enable the U.S. to conduct
selected nuclear operations he developed and formally incorporated into
"•SI.-" An additional focus of the new Po„cy was target^ of
Soviet post-war recovery assets to include poiitical. economic, and
military resources.
The centra, concept of LNOs was 'escalation control'. Desmond Bal,
describes this as provision of the NCA "with the ability to execute
selected options in a deliberate and controlled fashion thoughout the
progress of a strategic nuclear exchange". 26 The idea was to hold
certain enemy targets at risk for later destruction in order to provide
an enemy time to consider action. Additionally, certain targets would
be withheld from destruction such as populations. That is, populations
would not be a direct target although massive collateral damage to
Soviet population centers was still likely to occur from a U.S. attack.
Ultimately, the U.S. was seeking to impart the notion of intra-war
deterrence into the strategic equation.
Much of the recent policy debate has been structured by concerns
raised by the LNO development process. The decision and enactments
pursuant to Presidential Directive 59, which engraved 'countervailing
nuclear policy' in U.S. deterrence theory, marks the formal era of a
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massive attack plans.
The evolution of U.S. strategic nuclear policy toward T1.1t*
attack options presented the moSt ,mportant development in U ,
•Mledbylt, nan,, a countervailing PoM cy suggests that the u s
Prepare to right and fight a nuclear war to deny an enemy's wart 1M
Objectives ,n order to pursuade hi, to back down from the conflict The
not.on of preparing for a nuclear wan fundamentally different fron,
the traditionally accepted means of deterrence espoused by assured
destruction theorists and assured retaliation policy. Whereas ass d
destruction theorists argue that deterrence works hecause the threat of
overwhelming punishment is cred.ble, countervailing policy theorists
to deter Soviet ieaders in all instances. Even though the U.S. had
incorporated flexible and limited nuclear options in the SIOP prior to
1980, it had not sought to procure effective., specific weapons systems
in a dedicated mannen that would match U.S. policy, targeting strategy,
and weapons.
Much of the debate surrounding Presidential Directive 69 centers on
the following question: How will the U.S. use its nuclear weapons in
the event of a nuclear war? Although the U.S. has always maintained
specific employment policies for using its nuclear forces-traditional ly
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targets such as population centers and ,„dustr1al plants
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„
The
tar9et,n 9 consideration that relate to counterforce strate9 ies are
different" as regents to destroy mi litary installations or
"
specific weapons are in practice mu ch more difficult." A number of
actors may have begun ca,,i ng into question the deterrence guarantee'
of U.S. strategic nuclear policy and has ,ed U.S. policy planners to
yravnate toward more demanding nuclear strategies.
The first of these factors is the ever increasing sophistication
and capacities of both U.S. and Soviet nuclear forces. That is some
truth exists in the proposition that technology often ,eads policy.
While the U.S. actually sought to restrain fnr+hj u sni further improvements in the
accuracy of its forces after the SALT I accords, the increase in Soviet
capabilities eventually convinced a numder of U.S. policy makers that
the U.S. required more advanced weapons. The most controversial example
has been the MX ICBM.
Some nuclear weapons today and ICBMs in particular can be extremely
effective weapons for attacking a variety of taruPt* in , a-a i i u ur ye s in a discriminate
manner. The issue of attack discrimination and its meaning for U.S.
strategic nuclear policy will be addressed later in the chapter. The
improvements in the U.S.'s abi.ity to discriminate in an attack
1 I i
(generally defined as the differences b«t uC e ween massive col lateral
destruction and selective strikes) h»c ,Sun c
)
,
as largely been the result of
technological Improvements In nuclear weaponry iP
*
,or example, the U s
Mlnuteman III ICBM deployed with the Mark 12A warn t
'
'
d head and NS-20 guidancepackage has a circular error probability (m>)
,
,r
-y ICEI ), equivalent to l/iuth of
a nautical mile bO oercpni- n* hi* *.*
hlrt ,
P«««"t of th. ««.. If soviet ICBM launch sllos erea dened to withstand 2UUU osi .« >h .PS1. as they have been assessed by some
analysts, the Minuteman III is fhonno+n ntheoretically capable of destroying
roughly 750 Soviet tCBMs In * *,1U5P1S ,n (1 two warheads uer si Inp lo attack representing
Soviet icbm force,
^
•ccurec, and
,.th,Hty
.Uow the U.S. and Soviet Un,on to use nuCe.r
-Pon.1n. mor.tr.d it1on., miiit,ryfMh1on> 29
^ use, to destroy much „,,„ milltdry^ than^ $ ^ ^
an effort to prevent an ene,„y from achieving Ms mil.tary objective,.
A second factor which potentially weakens the notion of a
deterrence
'guarantee' is a weakening o, the idea that neither
superpower can truly possess a strategic advantage and that
consequently, the superpowers are destined to re,„ain under the balance
of terror until both disarm,. rh,s notion, wedded to the assured
destruction theory, suggests that the balance is an unavoidable fact of
the nuclear era which can not be changed and in which neither superpower
can achieve meaningful advantages. Presidential Directive Sg is
predicated on the idea that the Soviet Union has probably never accepted
this view and has clearly never based Us weapons development on a
strict interpretation of the assured destruction theory. [ n fact, PD59
suggests that the Soviets have not only never espoused this view of
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aP9Ue~^ng poHc,
, roponents
, has ]eft u s
open to a dangerous weakening of its deterrent capability
"1111- Odom and Zb , g „ jew BreZ 1nsk 1
, major architects
„ f pD5g ^
argued that assured destruction theory is not consistent with Sov.et
strategic nuclear doctrine which has always seen nuclear weapons as
weapons in the conventional sense Odnm a „d a. o and Brezinski also have claimed
that the Soviets were impressed during the Cuban missile crisis that
nuclear weapons were useful to the U.S. and as good students of
Claus«1tz, the Soviets believe nuclear weapons are a too, of power,
albeit a dangerous tool, in support of their politics.
Attendant to a countervailing poHcy is the necessity of heing
prepared to fight a nuclear war due In part to the emergence of a
passive Soviet effort to deploy a war-fighting capability. A number of
theorists suggested during the 1970s that the Soviet leadership was
composed of a group of 'realists' and that it would not base decisions
on initiating or fighting a nuclear war solely through Marxism-Leninist
lenses. However, it is unlikely that the current Soviet nuclear force
was procured strictly to support a policy of deterrence. Public
statements of policy by Soviet leaders could !ead U.S. policy makers to
believe that Soviet nuclear forces exist only to deter an aggressive
western alliance, dominated by the United States, and that these weapons
have no other function. Yet, a careful review of the size and
capabilities of Soviet nuclear forces provides a better understanding of
Soviet doctrine and strategies. The Soviet SS-18 ICBM, while clearly
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- ofapoHcy Mother the,pure deterrence" rhst othap^ ^^
stnateg.es, is an effort to pnepane to fight
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,
an recover from a
nuclear war with the United States.
The cognation of technological pUSh and Soviet
fcfl acquipe
-
elective nuclear wan-fi,jht ing capab,,ity have led U.S. ,i„t„ and
Policy communities to question the validity of basic assumptions in U.S.
employment policies That- 1Chat Is, in view of the pneceeding factors', can
the U.S. continue to base its secunity on the thneat of an assuned
destruction nesponse to a nuclean attack when that attack may leave the
U.S. few choices between losihg the wan and massive destnuction? lt
was this dilemma that dnove HcNamana and Schles.ngen to propose more
flexible and limited options fon the SIOP. The punpose was to preclude
a choice between sunnenden and ,„assive destnuct,on. today, the U.S. can
choose a,„ong a number of options to nespond to a Soviet attack. These
responses can be limited in size and selective In the target set so as
to preclude widespread destruction. As such, the U.S. is no longen
faced with accepting sunnenden on massive destnuction. However, a
nu,nben of stnategists continue to fear that the U.S. may be faced with a
problem of sel f-detennence. The U.S. might believe that It should not
on cannot retaliate against a Soviet nuclean attack because the size of
a U.S. netaliation, being dictated by the nuclean forces it possesses,
would be so massive as to bring about a similar follow-on attack by the
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soviet union. while success^
,d str.tlons since the K.„„e*
A«n1str,t1on have reviewed U.S. nucleer pcicy ,nd added more ftex
, 1)| ,
—ns to thes.OP, these effort, d , d „ot
Which prepared the U.S. for fighting a protracted
„ uc ,ear war.
An important constraint on the U S »hm. u f"is u.5. ability to prepare itself tor
Protracted war has heen the U.S.
command-control-communication
network
designed primari ly to warn the U.S. of an attack andaMowitto
retaliate. Not until the Carter Administration had the U.S. C3 network
been reviewed for anything approaching a war-fig nt ing capability.
The basic objective of Presidentia, Directive 59 was to enhance
deterrence and also to alter the terms upon which deterrence is
maintained. According to the Directive, it may he necessary to prepare
to use nuclear weapons In order to maintain a credible deterrent.
United States nuclear policy as informed by PD59 stresses the possible
use Of nuclear weapons In a war between the superpowers and suggests
that the best means to deter aggression is to prepare to defeat an enemy
rather than threaten punishment that may not be credible in the eyes of
the enemy, in other words, the U.S. could be self-deterred during a
crisis or war and thereby severely harm U.S. security if the U.S. does
not maintain options to assured destruction attacks.
The purpose and structure of the countervailing policy is as
follows: its main objective is to deter a nuclear war and thereby
further the security of the U.S. and its allies. The central question
addressed by the Carter Administration's review of U.S. nuclear policy
that led to Presidential Directive bg was whether the U.S. could
continue to deter a nuclear war in the face of Soviet challenges that
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-countervailing strategy
—he ».S.,ost nuclear superiority 1n the early 1970s> ^ ^
' nf,iCt ab °V '2and^^ W«« but had to begin focusing
on howwenu.s. forces would fai r in a nuclear war where^
were roughly capab,e of the same levels of damage.
"
was important to Carter Administration theorists to advance U S
POHC, in a cred,b,e manner that could deter the Soviets. The method
"
deeded upon was to show the Soviets that the U.S. was capable of
Hating a nuclear war and possessed opt,ons in the S.OP to ma.e this
capability credihie. United States assured destruction policy up to
this pent had not required an expansion in the s,ze or sophistication
of U.S. nuclear forces sn innn ac-iu o lo g as they remained invulnerable. The
deployment of more capable forces by eitber superpower was believed only
capable of upsetting the nuclear balance. The U.S. choose to upgrade
its nuclear forces during the ig7Us and began to dep,oy new systems only
in the 1980s. These decisions were influenced by the technological
advancements in nuclear weaponry. Soviet strategic efforts, and domestic
political factors as well as requirements of PD59.
In essence, the Carter Admi ni strati on began to bring U.S. nuclear
policy in line with the progress of technology, m addition, the
Administration accepted arguments that the Soviets never truly accepted
deterrence theory based on assured destruction. The assured destruction
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-ear ba.ance on,, works If both superpowers base^^
"-lea, f0 rce postures on a simi,ar understand1ng of ^ n
has pointed out that the United Stares ,3t S had al "^ been organized under
the massive retaliation policy of the 1%0s and^
Clawed that once the U.S. had organized 1tse,f for a qu1ck massive
there maybe some truth to this proposition, U.S. political, ecpnomic
ahd strategic constraints are H ke,y to influence policy makers to
consider other ,ess apocalyptic avenues. It is not altogether
P01U1C.1,, appealing to maintain that a U.S. nuclear retaliation will
he massive as such an attack is Hkel, to invite an equally massive
strike on the United States. Odom a!so understood that the military
finds it difficult to change its view of the strategic world. Once a
particular strategic perspective has become embedded in the military's
psyche, it may require a number of years to change those views and
implement a new pol icy.
Presidential Directive 59 formally codified a set of targeting
studies that are at the heart of the countervailing policy. While PD59
was not a new doctrine and did not alter NSUM 242, it did contain tnree
new features. First, U.S. policy would no longer emphasize targeting to
prevent Soviet economic recovery but would focus on war supporting
infrastructure. Secondly, the preplanned S10P options were to be
supplemented by the ability to select new targets and destroy them
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systens to support a poli cy of extended nuclear war fi ght1ng .34 ^
centra, obJe«ive of the targeting stu.es was "to , dintlfy sma]
, er
—t sets and reUted targets that might be se)ectjve
, y
the early stages of a nuclear war". 35 The initial r»m reviews concluded
that Soviet strategic defense measures such a, th» h hi s e hardening of missile
silos and command hungers as well as civi, de fense efforts were
considered more effective than previously thought. The Carter
Administration concluded that the U.S. might not he able to Oestroy 60
Percent of Soviet 'recovery asset,' as preserved by U.S. nuclear Po,icy
enshrine. In l91<* An addjtional conc]us , on^ ^ ^^
was that the biggest U.S. weakness rested in its
co^and-control-communication and intelligence (C3I) networks. These
deficiencies were seen by the Carter Administration's analysts as
critical because of the Perceived neeo to be able to control the war and
negotiate while conoucting a nuclear war in hopes that the war could be
ended prior to it reaching spasm attacks on cities. 37
While U.S. C3 systems were adequate by most assessments for
launching a retaliation to a Soviet nuclear attack, only f n the case
where P rotracted warfare is envisioned does enduring C3I capabilities
™ke sense. Nitze, Gray, and others also claim that war-tenmination
requires enduring C3I capaoi 1 ities. However, C3I of the kind envisioned
by the Carter Administration review are more closely associated with
escalation dominance. The U.S. may require enduring and redundant C3
capabilities to prosecute a nuclear war in a so-called 'controlled'
fashion. Escalation dominance is commonly thought of as the ability to
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controi the course of a nuclear war in a certain mmanner by raising the
possible level of conflict,
"tensity where hundreds „ not thousands of weapons are used in each
strike, escalation has already pressed out of contro, and the wan is
then often tended
'spas.' warfare. For countervailing theorists
controlling a nuclear war is synods with escaiation dominance.
The operational strategy that has emerged from PD59 has a
distinctly traditiona. miiitary cast to it. united States
countervailing policy p,aces heavy emphasis on se,ected, Hexible, and
United nuclear options in the MOP, counterforce weapons, and on the
C3I capabilities that would be needed to fight a nuclear war over an
extended period.
The Carter Administration immediately set out to provide U.S.
forces with the means for incorporating PD59 recommendations into actual
war plans. War plans were developed and implemented in the SI0P by way
of the nuclear weapons employment policy (NUWEP) first established in
the early 1970s in conjunction with LNOs
. The new NUWEP increased the
number of targets the U.S. could attack from 15,000 to roughly 40,000. 38
Carter also called for full development of a mobile race track
employable MX ICBM in order to provide the U.S. a less vulnerable hard
target kill capable weapon than the Minuteman III. Finally, Carter
called for a substantial upgrade to U.S. C3 capabilities.
United States C3 assets were believed to be incapable of effective
performance beyond the initial phases of a nuclear war. A recent report
written for Congress on the vulnerability of U.S. C3 assets in a crisis
141
warns that the U.S. system could very easilv h« „ „y be knocked out in the first
rounds of a nuclear u»a r, Tu
th .„
"UC,earWr
- ^ "thor of the report argued elsewhere thate "depth of commitment to C3 remain, in „s in doubt and the weaknesses of
6 SyStM C °U,d
* ^<*> -action ouring a crisis"^ That is
-tra-war strikes in addition to deeded communication systems could
influence the national command authorities to retaliafe „ ," 10 i t more heavily in
"opes of |,„,iti„g further damage tQ ^^
n-lear attrition and promised Soviet headers that the, would he placed
'« Jeopard, by U.S. missiles if a nuclear war continued beyond initia,
attacks. The focus of U.S. employment strategy would be to attack the
Hit.* sources of Soviet strategic strength, thel r strategic nuclear
weapons, and, in particular, counterforce weapons and their force
control infrastructure rather than urban-industrial targets. 4" In
effect, » PD5g proposed a military campaign in the traditional sense,
targeting sources of an enemy's ability to fight, not an attempt to
cripple him the first day which would likely result in an all-out
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war".
Unlike the assured destruction school, PD59 authors believed that a
nuclear war might be limited and prolonged. While making these ideas
known, they were careful to note that it is not the same as saying that
a nuclear war will be limited. A number of critics of the
countervailing policy have suggested that its supporters have come to
believe that a nuclear war can be kept limited and fought to a logical,
rational, military/political end in which a victor will emerge.
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;
9h th,sk,nd°—~ rule def1njtion raight be
°"— «« tH. Carter Adm1nistration smed
—
Kan, that the Administration neither believed a nuclear war
would necessarily start * c a n^tar as a hmted war nor did they be!, eve that it
-u
-y regain Critics, such as Beres> charge^ pD5g
on the assumption that the Soviets are more 11ta„ t0 bedeterred by the threat of limited ,„ . «6
• • •
counterforce reprisals than the
threat of overwheiming
,
total retaliation- .« He further argues ^
PDW and the countervailing po, icy are clouded by the pervasive doubts
Of U.S. theorists and government strategists concerning the control of a
nuclear conflict. Secretary B ro„n stated ,n h,s fiscal Vear A„„ua ,
Peport to the Conqress that "in ^„ ..u in adopting and implementing" the
countervail policy, the U.S. had "no more Illusions than our
predecessors that a nuclear war could be closely and surgically
control led". 43
Beres's comments In Parameters 1981 brought about a quick reaction
from pro-PD5g theorists. Gray, writing in the same journal in reaction
to Beres, charged that a number of Beres's critir icmcereb s c s s were inaccurate.
oray stated that proponents of PDb9 only believe that a nuclear war
».i 3ht be limited and that PD59 offers some possibility for limitation
whereas assured destruction policy does not. 44 He a,so asserted that
P059 proponents do not assume that the Soviets will be restrained in its
targeting but that the U.S. should try to provide incentives for the
Soviets to restrain their targeting and should these efforts fail, the
U.S. should enforce restraints. 45 While the U.S. cannot know whether
the Soviets will restrain their targeting, the concept of enforcing
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restraint is much more uncertain an. might lead t„ , fa]se^ Qf
optimism in the U.S. 's war-fighting capabilities.
The Beres/Uray deoate fails to address an additiona, element
introduced into U.S. strategic theory by PD69 . The ev0)ut1on ^
Secretary Brown discussed
,„ his unveillng Qf ?059 jp ^^ ^
>n the sense that the U.S. had heen gradually adding flexible and
selects options to its poiicies and strategies. whereas the Kennedy
and N,xon Administrations hoth discussed these kinds of war pians and
pronounced new poiicies in support of a flexible SiUP. namely McN»,ra's
no-cn,es' approach and the Nixon Administration's
'limited nuclear
options', no adm,nistration until President Carter's, radically altered
the U.S. view that a nuclear war would be short and massive. The
radical departure pronounced by PD5g was that a nuclear war may be
lifted to military or military related targets and protracted and that
the U.S. would requ,re the forces to fight that kind of war. The policy
debate should focus not so much on whether the U.S. desires a
countervailing policy, as the development of technology has seem,ngly
pushed the U.S. in that direction, but whether and how it should
implement that policy. The question the U.S. needs to address is: What
combination of nuclear forces and C3 assets are required that can
survive and function for perhaps as long as six months?46 United States
nuclear forces in the eyes of countervailing theorists lacked enduring
and survivable C3I as well as plans and support infrastructure for
post-war reconstitution. 47 These kinds of assets are only necessary
once the U.S. accepts the view that a nuclear war may be limited and
prolonged.
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Br°Wn publ1<"— «- counte„am„9 P0l1cy at the
-
W r ConeSe 0
„
„ gust 20
,
1980
. „ h1s
.peech. B.own state, thitthe goa of PDSm u,.c t-~ •y r KUby Wds to convince the Soviets »+h a+0V1 thdt no use of nuclear
weapons
-on any scale of attack an, at a ny stage of
lead to victor,, however they may Uefine victory" « p^,^
D,r9Ct,Ve59 bPM«" "e HP between a COUntervalue po ,i cy such as
-one, destruction and a true wer-f,g„t1 ng pol1cy
,
PoMcy advocates recognized thet the assured destruction policy could
only wor, if ooth superpowers accepted Us tenets.
superpower perceives that strategic advantages snort of decis,ve nuclear
superiority ,s useful (a hi gn,y de-stab, Hzing condit,on g,ven the
Strategic competition between the U.S. and Soviet Union,, then the other
superpower
,» ob„g ated to prevent the otner from attending to exploit
such an advantage, real or illusiory.
Secondly, assured destruction is not sufficient in Itself, as a
massive retaliation against countervail targets ,nay not be appropriate
nor wil! its prospects always be sufficiently credible to deter the full
range of action the U.S. seeks to prevent on the part of the Soviets. 4*
Countervailing policy cont.nues to maintain the 'ultimate' threat of a
massive countervalue attack as a final option while refining U.S.
strategies for limited and selected attacks des.gned to deny military
victory. A true war-fighting policy, on the other hand, advocates
strategies that seek not only to deny victory to an enemy but would seek
the preparations to fight and 'win' a nuclear war. A war-fighting
policy accepts nuclear weapons as weapons for the purpose of achieving
selected political as well as military goals.
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The implications of countervailing policv fnn *m y or a strategic defense
are fairly logical. Certain types of missilp h fe defenses are acceptable to
countervailing policy advocates in that thev ran k < ,cn y c be deployed to bolster
the deterrence credibility of U.S. nuclear forces an. related assets A
counterforce defense of U.S. nuclear forces generally „ yarded
consistent with countervailing policy These H„ foy
-
l defenses could be assigned
to augment the survivability of U.S. nuclear forces and thereby enhance
their deterrence va, U e. A major concern of the Carter Administrate
While conducting its policy rev,ew was the grow.ng war-fighting
capability of the Soviet nuciear arsenal. Soviet doctrine has ,ong
emphasized an offensive strategy to include counterforce attacks on U S
« If* assests. A potentially effective and politically accepts
role for a U.S. defense, then. cou,d he to thwart a Soviet attack by
denying the Soviets their wartime objectives. Hence, in addition to
coutervailing poiicy, the U.S. .ay seek to integrate a BMU to perform a
similar deterrent ro.e as offensive forces. In fact, an effective BMD,
namely preferential defenses of key military assets which the Soviets
night seek to destroy as part of their wartime objectives, may prove as
useful as present plans to deny the Soviets victory through an offensive
strategy conducted with counterforce weapons and upgraded C31 systems.
Ballistic missile defenses capable of more advanced defense
missions would be regarded as unnecessary and potentially provocative to
the Soviets if they threatened to degrade significantly the Soviet's
retaliatory capabilities. For example, an area wide countervail
defense of the boost phase type might be regarded by the Soviets as an
effort to deploy a victory seeking capability rather than a victory
146
den ' a
'
P °StUre
^ «"t1«l«. an an»s race or destabi lize the
-ear balance. Countervail theorists make .^
between preservation of retaHatory forC es by dep,oy,„g counterforce
"IssHe defenses and defense portions wh,ch threaten to decade an
enemy's retaliatory capability.
in conclusion, countervailing policy seeks the deployment of
Offensive and poss,b,y tensive weapons that pr^ote the deterrence
-edibility of U.S. nuclear forces but that do not threaten the
-ability of the strategic balance. Such force, in accordance with the
policy, should provide a survivabie counterforce threat to Soviet
-r-fUhtln, capability. The purpose of theSe deployments would be to
pursuade an enemy that the initiation of a nuclear war would be futile
at any level and that in the event of a nuclear war, the enemy shou,d
back away from more damaging attacks. A U.S. ballistic missile defense
could act to enhance U.S. force survivability such that the U.S. could
continue to threaten the Soviets with an effective counterforce attack
either in a trans-attack or post-attack environment according to
countervai 1 ing pol icy.
C. War-Fiyhti ng Pol icy :
A final component of the current U.S. nuclear policy mix is the
so-called nuclear war-fighting policy. This policy school has achieved
greater prominence as a result of criticisms leveled against
Presidential Directive 59 and countervailing policy. A basis of that
criticism has been that PD59 did not go far enough in criticizing
assured destruction policy and did not adequately address the threats
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a des1 9nea to execute a nuclear wa ch the same fashjon
,
conve« 10„ any fought war , snot approached l1ghtly> jn ^ sensenjs
logical step for U.S. nuclear policy. War . flghting
nicies suggest that the U.S. not on,, take seriously the poss1 b1,1ty
of nuclear war, but that the u>s
. should prepare to^ ^
-us event. That ,s, nuclear war-fighting pol icy suggest$^ ^
U.S. augment a 'victor, denial' poTicy (as emphasized in PD5g> with
.
Policy for 'prevailing' with anemphasjson the restorat . on ^
deterrence at the lowest level of violence possible. 50
War-fighting theorists argue that there is ,ess need to he
concerned about tne oercent-innc n f ,p ept o s of an enemy who might feel pressure to
attack as the enemy becomes inferior a nd are more concerned with a
nation that might think it is superior and attack for these reasons. 51
in a sense, war-fighting theorists emphasize deterrence perceptions
a bout the military influence nf mrti n,i„" l or particular weapons and strategies rather
than perceptions about the stability of the nuclear balance. A
war-fighting policy could be implemented by requiring that all weapons
be justified on a militarily useful basis. In other words, all nuclear
weapons must serve a rational military function. However, Desmond Ball
has reported that population targeting, a militarily non-traditional
target, h aS always been an inherent part of our targeting strategy. 52
This kind of attack executed against Soviet urban-industrial recovery
assets would result in millions of deaths from prompt collateral damage
and radioactive fallout. However, population targeting is no longer
'rational' or necessary in a nuclear war-fighting policy. United States
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-leerdeHvery systems have become more accurate
,11 owing for a
reduction in the si 70 n f +t,m ze or their nuclear viplHcea y e ds while preserving their
destructive potentia, against a specific target. As a result
«1scrlmi„ate targeting of Soviet mi I itary forces and installnions as
we- as selected economic assets is cons,dered Increasingly posslb)e
.
D l scr1 IMnat1on Action of the accuracy of the weapon, i ts
yield, and the hardness of the tarnot u .ge . Most targets are not hardened
against nuclear h,ast overpressure and, therefore, a yield weapon
deployed on an accurate system can adequate,y damage or destroy thesekl- of targets. The level of collateral damage to surrounding
populations generally decreases as the yield of a weapon is reduced
That is, the radius of damage around the impact point (ground zero)
decreases as the yield of a nuclear weapon decreases. Hence, the advent
of accurate weapons may allow the U.S. to use nuclear weapons in a
fashion that discriminates between a specific military target and
population areas. While this discrimination targeting function can he
worked out mathematically, it is impossible to assess at what level of
collateral damage and dead - lOO.OUO; 1 million; 2 million - the
Soviets would no longer consider a U.S. attack limited. The goal of
discrimination is only valid when limited and selective nuclear strikes
are envisioned as large attacks are likely to generate considerable
levels of collateral damage. Even in a limited attack scenario, the
scale of destruction is so much creater than all other types of warfare
currently known that war-fighting theorists must question the value of
nuclear weapons for warfare as traditionally envisioned. That is, the
scale of destruction and the uncertainties inherent in nuclear warfare
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ten, to rebate nud ear weapon t0 the role of
U
- S
-
d °eS n0t
"
eed t0 he «"«rned with
,„ai„ta,ni„9 the
"-taint, of p«„, shmeirt prescrlbed by the assured destruction po|]^ ^
retain* hy the countervailing Po„ Cy according to „ar-fight,ng pol1cy
tneorlsta. Rather the U.S. needs to be concerned with
'rationalizing'
the U.S. deterrent if war-fight,ng poMcy „ envis , oned „
or the nuclear war-fighting policy's view of deterrence is Leon
"eiseit.er's characterization that »,t is not uncontroHed violence hut
controlled nuclear violence that the Soviet Union will real,, ftip . M
War-fighting policies seek to make nuclear weapons useful tools to
has given war-fighti „g p0 , jcjes thejr^ ^.^
of Uefense Weinberger, the Administration's fod point for war-fighting
advocacy, has advanced the notion that the U.S. can 'prevail' in a
nuclear war fought over a protracted period of time." Weinberger
suggested that the U.S. emphasize the decapitation or destruction of
Soviet military and political authority in a
counterforce/countermeasures mode. 56 A countermeasures attack could
encompass the destruction of Soviet key coinnand and control
installations as well as selected leadership bunkers. The focus of a
'prevailing' war-fighting policy would he to sever the Soviet Union's
ability to prosecute a nuclear war while also avoiding attacks on
thousands of Soviet nuclear weapons thereby potentially reducing the
level of collateral damage. Howevnr. the destruction of the Soviet
Union's leadership or critical lines of communication may only make a
negotiated end to the war more difficult to achieve. While
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:e
ing
countervail^ policy has focused Q „ ^^
«- -en strategic forces directly, war . f , ghtlng theQpy^
the destruction of key ,i nks ,„ the Soviet war-fi ghting capablljtyto
nclude the leadership is essential. While intra-„ar deterrenc
ultimately is the elective of ooth countervail and war-f, ghti ...
policy, neither has address t-h„ idressed the
,mpl,catlons of destroying the Soviet
national command authority for deterrence „j u i . For example, once lines of
communication have been severed SmH=t i, k, Soviet launch posts and submarines may
still nave the capacity to individually re.ease their weapons
Negotiations in this environment are l, ke ,y to prove ineffective.
Although both Carter's PD59 and Weinberger emphasize counterforce
capabilities, the war-fighting schoo, suggests that the U.S. respond to
a Soviet attack by seeking an end to the conflict on favorable terms.
In effect, Weinberger and war-fighting theorists posit that the U.S be
concerned with 'winning' a nuclear war. James Fallows, in solarizing
the war-fighting policy, states that "it argues that nuclear warfare
should be regarded not as materia) annihilation but rather as an
exchange from which one side might emerge with significantly less damage
than the other." 57
A critical assumption in the war-fighting theory is that a nuclear
war can remain limited and can be ended before escalation to
countervalue attacks has begun. In effect, war-fighting policy expands
the role of nuclear weapons to the deterrence of war at all levels in a
fashion similar to the countervailing policy. The major difference
between the two policies is that the war-fighting theory places emphasis
on 'winning' the war whereas the countervailing policy seeks an end to
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^ war which prevents a Sov1et vlctopy<
« war-fighting theorjsts c , aim )t mjght u ^ fQught
rationally an, efforts must be made to keep destruction at the lowest
Possible level, indentation of a Wa r - fightlng pol1cy WQu)d
require the deployment of weapons that provide a ,«„ range of
war-fighting options, In part1cular
, hard target kill capable forces
-h as the MX ICBM and Trident U SUM. A part of such a rational
war-fighting posture, in accordance with the policy, would be a
war-surviva, capab.lity. That is, "the concept of war-winning requires
not only effective offensive counterforce capabilities, but effective
defenses in order to maintain military dom , nance after war. teminatjon
and effect post-war recovery." 58
A true nuclear war-fighting policy is likely to require the full
integration of ballistic missile defenses as an effective means of
limiting damage to U.S. nuclear forces and war prosecuting and recovery
capabilities to include some population centers. The relationship of
offense and defense is such that defences might be needed to reduce the
threat of unacceptable damage.
"Vulnerability to unacceptable damage is
not desirable for political and military stability" in a war-fighting
policy. 59 The war-fighting policy calls for a true damage limitation
strategy. Both offensive and defensive forces would be expected to
contribute to the success of such a strategy. However, the feasibility
of a truly effective damage limiting area defense is likely to be too
low to convince war-fighting theorists that they can depend on defenses
to limit damage to the United States. As a result, the size of a
war-fighting strike against the Soviet strategic assets may be increased
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or*r to „.1t damage by jnitially denroyjng ^ SQviet^
and assets as poss,ble.
millions of soviet deaths and casualties thereby contradicting the
desire to keep the war „., t.d. As alluded t„^ ^^ ^
argued at length that United nuCear war is not possible and that .ore
passive nuclear attacks are li kely to follow any lifted U.S. strike
Given their proclivity for this view of nuclear war and the collateral
damage that would result fro. a U.S. limited attack on Soviet forces
the Sov,ets are likely to respond with a massive strike on the United
States. The U.S. could suffer millions of deaths and casualties in
return even if it was defended by a missile defense capable of
intercepting 50 percent of the attack, ng reentry vehicles.
Ballistic missile defense from counterforce to countervalue are
compatible with a war-fighting policy. Both a silo defense and
mid-course defense designed specifically to enhance the survi vaoi 1 i ty of
U.S. counterforce systems and national command authorities would be
obvious choices. A multi-tiered countervalue defense also could serve
to complement a war-fighting policy as a means of limiting the level of
damage to U.S. cities and industrial centers thereby enhancing the
chances of a quicker post-war recovery.
Hi IMPLICATIONS OF A U.S. STRATEGIC DEFENSE
The strategic policies, outlined above, have a common background
and set of principles. This background is characterized as offensively
based deterrence which has played the dominant role in U.S. strategic
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"udear th0U9ht sfnee 1945
. A1though th. ^
defense
,„ the 1960s, offensive nudear weapons have a,ways been relied
maintain U.S. strategic security.
Of Defense We,nberger has prov.ded an appropriate perspective of why the
«eagan Adn1n1 strati on strategic defense Initiative was started and
where it might lead:
"When the Reagan Administration entered office in 1981, a ,engthy
debate could have been he,d on the question: which was in worse
shape: our military hardware or our strategic concepts?
indeed, most of the concepts that shape our thinking ahout what
forces we need and how they would be used were formulated in the
195US and early lg6Us. This adm,nistration's boldest departure
fro* the dogma of the past is the president's strategic defense
initiative, a radical rejection of acquiescence in mutual assured
destruction." 60
The rejection of the past described by Weinberger is pointedly
concerned with offensively based deterrence. Whereas each successive
president from Eisenhower to Carter had been sure that offensive
deterrence could always prevent a nuclear war, President Reagan
apparently is not. The U.S. held a wide margin of nuclear superiority
during the ly5Us and 1960s which eroded during the Nixon to Carter
years. The U.S. dealt with this erosion through a multifaceted effort
to restrain Soviet strategic efforts while expanding the capacity and
mission objectives of U.S. nuclear forces. That is, the U.S. attempted
to enhance deterrence while accepting a less advantageous position than
it had been used to. The U.S. conducted these efforts by revising its
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nuclear policy, upgrading its nuclear force ami, Cl
•
«nd promoting arms control.
inCred5iniJ,y« -re sophisticated an, e«p,„
capability to perform these missions. Vet. U.S. forces rare,, have been
capable of meeting the most demanding objectives required by „ S
nuclear policy. For example, the U.S. developed poiicies in the 1970,
•nd discriminate attack, while failing to procure weapons of this
capability. These efforts
- from National Security Decision Memorandum
242 in 1,74 through Presidential Directive 5g in igao - have attempted
to squeeze the greatest deterrence value out of an ear,y L970s era
strategic arsenal. The U.S. a,so sought to hold the Soviet buildup
within specified limits by promoting arms control accords. Overall,
these efforts have come under increasing criticism for being unableto
cure the ills of a 'weakening' strategic balance.
A point often forgotten by advocates of offensively based
deterrence is that the U.S. did enjoy a period of nuclear superiority.
Having failed to adjust from that position to one of rough equality or
Soviet advantage in a militarily rational fashion, according to the
Reagan Administration, the U.S. now faces a decision between building
vast new offensive weapons to catch up with the Soviets or seeking a new
means to assure the deterrence of Soviet aggression. This represents
the essential platform upon which the Reagan Administration criticized
U.S. nuclear policy and forces in 1980.
The Reagan Administration has argued that the U.S. should seek a
defense dominated deterrence posture and policy. The central question
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in this context, however, is what are the imp ,i cations
strategic nuclear policy? A principai e,ement of U.S. nuclear
swift ano certain relation. The composit,on of the retaliation in
the S,UP has varied from Passive' countervail attacks on Sov,et cities
to selective counterforce strikes on Soviet strategic weapons.
Retaliation has been considered essentia, to a credit policy of
deterrence.
In a defense dominated balance, a policy for retaliation may no
longer play as critical a role In effect th* a *•ui . i , the need for retaliation
will have a diminished value whereas a policy for retaliation is
considered essential to deter an attack in an undefended balance. The
Soviets are believed to be deterred under current strategic conditions
because the United States possesses a capability to retaliate and has
stated its intention to do so in the event of a Soviet attack. In a
defensive balance, the logic of deterrence is as follows: the Soviets
might be deterred because of the potential failure of an attack rather
than affecting a certain reprisal which could cause a war to escalate
and result in severe levels of damage to both superpowers.
The revisions to U.S. strategic nuclear policy as a result of a
defense deployment are unlikely to preclude the maintenance of some form
of an offensive threat. Yet, in a world with both offensive and
defensive forces, U.S. selective limited attack options become
increasingly less viable. For example, a Soviet preferential defense,
wnich conforms with Soviet strategic doctrine, might degrade a limited
U.S. strike on Soviet C3 installations as to render such an attack
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efenSe <defense s—'.~tlyMlthit5 offensi¥e attack o ,
-reasethe size and sophistication of Us counte raeasures attack.
Both avenues are likelv tr, f a -n *y to fan to meet the overall mission objectives
a crmca,' level of countermeasure damage, while also increasing the'
Potential collateral damage to surrounding areas.
to ^press the Sov,ets that the U.S. had not conducted a „mited strike
as mended, hence failing to transmit a message for restraint
The scenario above is frought with speculation but points up some
Of the policy problems that could emerge in a defense dom.nated nuclear
«or,d. It may be that the Reagan Administration already has recognized
these inherent policy problems. One indication is Reagan's insistence
that the transition to a defensive balance be acc^panied by a reduction
m offensive nuclear forces. Although some Administration officials
have tried to portray Reagan's proposal as <Sum,„,t talk', Reagan has
emphasized the idea of a reduction in the sizes of offensive forces as
well as a scheme on 'technology sharing'. 61 Both ideas are often
ignored as mere political posturing - efforts to gain support in
Congress and with the public for the SDI. However, ideas such as these
may provide a possible avenue for implementing a stable transition
phase. The success of these avenues may be tied to a U.S. and Soviet
arms agreement which could prove more difficult to accomplish as the
U.S. reaches a defense deployment stage. Given the possible pressures
on U.S. nuclear policy, it becomes interesting to speculate on what a
U.S. offensive nuclear policy might look like in a defense dominated
world.
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know
s
^— level ness. While 1t is too ear,y t0
model effectiveness. Table 4. 1„ ustrates the i mpact of
^^,„g ,eve 1S of effectiveness on the penetration nates for an
enemy's reentry vehicles.
F0P PUPP0SeS
°
f diSCUSSi ». » «* assumed that a U.S. defense
n-er of reentry vehicles that would penetnate a U.S. miS si,e defense
- would be relative,, »„ g1ven the number Qf Rv$ jn ^
attack. Under these conditions, the emphasis might shift fro.
calculations of the ,evel of prompt damage the superpowers could unleash
aua,nst each other to estimates of the number of dead prevented. In
this context, the U.S. may have a decreased need to retain a sizable
counterforce arsenal as well as associated countermeasures to assure
that its forces can penetrate. As such, these defenses could be relied
upon to deter a Soviet attack on the U.S or its allies. However, the
U.S may choose to retain counterforce weapons should it opt for a true
war-fighting posture while also deploying a defense.
The issue of defense effectiveness is confused as there are several
possible ways to measure the effectiveness of a defense. Measures of
effectless can include Rv- penetration levels (leakage), numbers of
Table 4. Warhead Penetration Levels.
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Number of
Warheads in i pupl nf . -
Attack
1,000 1000 656 410 240 130 67^6 a \ ~Q
~
5,000 6000 3280 2048 1200 ,48 312 128 40 8 \ oJ^9i_im__«6i_i096_^^ 256 81 16 1 0
*The numbers of warheads able to penetrate the defense is
calculated accordin g to the effectiveness of a four-tiered ballistic
defense. For example, each of four defense layers might destroy
10 percent of the RVs in an attack thereby reducing an attack of 1,000
KVs to 656.
targets ki„ed, and the number of fatalities resulting from an attack.
While it is well understood that any nuclear war is likely to cause
millions of deaths and casualties, the impact of a missile defense on
the numbers of deaths and casualt.es has not been fully addressed. The
National Academy of Science has estimated that one percent of either
superpowers' nuclear arsenal targeted against each other's cities would
cause between 35 and 55 million dead and an additional tens of millions
would die from later events resulting from the attack. 62 If these
percentages and numbers are accurate - calculations of this nature are
highly subject to debate - roughly luo Soviet reentry vehicles exploded
over O.S. cities would be enough to cause this level of devastation
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s
ike 99
(given that 100 RVs pnusieq PerC6nt 0f ^ roughly 10,000 reentry
vehTcles in each superpowers' nuclear aresenal) .«
Senator Wi,,i am ProXm,re Pas pointed out that current,. Hi
inconceivable
miss, ,e defense could prevent anything L,
Percent o, an enemy's warheads from penetrating that defense." Hence
defenses ™ay Intercept see percentage of an enen/s
'
attacking warheads, a ,ess than perfect countervalue defense appears tobenefit the very little In the event of a massive nuclear attac k
However, „.,. strategic^ ^^ §^^ ^
a
-ssive scale, hut on a lilted sca,e as we,,
, particular,, aga,nst
U.S. ,CBMs. The
.ore liraited numbers „ f reentpy vehjcles ^
such an attack may in turn be more manageable for a U.S. missile
defense. Secretary of Defense Schlesinger estimated that a Sov,et
counterforce attack on U.S. strategic nuclear delivery systems wou,d
cause 8UU.0OU fatalities and an additional 1.6 million casualties from
radiation sickness. 65 These numbers were crit,cized as being far too
optimistic and a new study by the Department of Defense estimated 3.4
million prompt deaths in the least devastating attack on U.S. 1CBM
silos. 66 A current study has been completed and is displayed in Table
5. While the modeling is problematical, the numbers of casualties are
staggering in any scenario. The attacks modeled in Table 5. are based
on 100 megatons reaching their designated targets. A U.S. missile
defense capable of destroying roughly 96 percent of Soviet reentry
vehicles in a limited attack on U.S. strategic delivery systems (often
estimated around 3000 warheads) still would not prevent millions of
deaths
.
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Attacks.
Model
Attack:
Worst-case
City-centers
Mi 1-industrial
Strategic-nuclear
Casualties
25-66
14-22
11-29
3-11
36-71
32-51
23-35
10-16
Source: William Daugherty, Barbara Levi, and Frank Von Hippel,
"The Consequences of 'Limited' Nuclear Attacks on the United
States '" IntejviallpjTaJ^ 10 (Spring 1986): 5.
That is, four percent of 3,000 Soviet reentry vehicles (120 warheads)
could cause between 10 and 16 million total casualties to the U.S.
populate base according to this modeling. 67 It would be unthinkable
for the U.S. to abandon its offensive deterrence policy in favor of
defenses in the face of these estimates.
The U.S may be capable of a meaningful damage limitation strategy
under certain circumstances - presupposing that the Soviet Union has not
deployed effective countermeasures to a U.S. BMO and a more capable
counterforce arsenal in its own effort to develop a war-fighting and
damage limitation force. However, the U.S. can only implement a
meaningful damage limiting strategy today by incorporating a first
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stme Into its nuclear strategy. h the event ^ ^^^
^ missile defenses, the abilUy of U.S. offensive fences to 1, m1t
-age to the U.S. would be correspondingly reduced
. what t „, $^
IS that a con,p,e* calculas exists fon offensive and defensive fence
interactions.
Anothen cnitica, facton impinging on , „.,. dec1sjon of^ ^
not to maintain a strictly offensive detennent policy is the possible
natune of a defense tnansition peniod. The U.S. win be faced with a
number of issues by the eanly lya os when the SOI has achieved a level of
development, with regard to some defense techno,o9 ies, from which a
deployment decision could be made. Depending on the level of
development, the U.S. is likely to go ahead with some kind of ballistic
miss,le defense. Once the decisions on the systen structure and
deployment arena are made, the U.S. will need to consider an important
issue
- stability. That is, can the U.S. assure that Soviet confidence
in victory will continue to be denied by posing adequate risks in the
form of defense denial or the threat of offensive retaliation during a
transition phase?
The issue of stability actually encompasses three separate problems
which the U.S will be concerned with during a transition period:
strategic stability, crisis stability, and arms race stability. The
stability of the nuclear balance is not a new issue as strategic
theorists have been concerned with stability since the late 1940s.
Strategic stability has been defined as the condition where the
superpowers calculate that the risks outweigh the potential gains from
initiating a nuclear war. Strategic stabiltiy exists, in practice, when
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tHe superpowers
, n the knQwi6dge ^ ^ a
StrikeCaPabn,>
- ^ ^ori-nSeCuringstrateg1cstsb1lu
- that both are confldent that their stMke ^
a- capable of threatening
^acceptable damage ^ ^^ ^
Howard, an eminent historian of the nuclear age, nas added that
stability is a result of a suht,e psychological re,ationsh,p between
forces rather than gross numbers. In any iyaBt> ^ u>s „,„ need ^
-tain an invulnerable retaliatory force in order to ma i„tain the threat
of assured destruction and preclude a shift in Sov,et calculations that
looks favorably about the possible risks and gains of a nuclear war
Opponents of defense charge that defense depi events will
the strategic balance, whereas proponents claim that it may help
preserve strategic stability by increasing the survi vabi 1 i ty of U.S.
retaliatory forces. In addition, defense proponents seek to shift the
onus of stability to the defense such that stability is assured when the
superpowers are secure in the knowledge that each can defend against a
nuclear attack.
Crisis stability reasonably could be said to exist "when neither
superpower has reason to fear a preemptive strike during a crisis". 69
However, it must be said that crisis stability ultimately rests on
perceptions about the vulnerability of one's nuclear forces. When the
issue of Minuteman vulnerability began to appear in the mid-1970s as a
result of Soviet ICBM accuracy improvements, the issue of crisis
stability reappeared. The issue of crisis stability had been addressed
subsequent to the 1962 Cuban missile crisis and in conjunction with
arguments against the ABM in the late 1960s. Si gal provides an
ty
insightful description of the conditions under wh,ch crisis stability
can be questioned.
"in a crisis in which nuclear war seems imminent and unavoidable
the side worried about its own vulnerability might see some
advantage in preemptive attack. ,f either side sees itself
,„
such a predicament, then both sides are
.ess secure for fear of
preemption. Moreover, once nuclear war seems indent and
unavoidable
-
and only then - each side has some incentive to
shoot first even if it can not completely disarm the other side,
in order to limit the damage it wi 1, suffer when the inevitable'
happens." 70
Gray and Payne have argued that it will be necessary to protect
against instabilities during the transition phase when it will be
particulary easy to ignore U.S. offensive forces. 71 As the U.S.
land-based deterrent has become increasingly vulnerable to a Soviet
first strike, the other legs of the TRIAD will require upgrades and
improvements to undertake wartime missions for which the ICBM force is
currently responsible. However, the Scowcroft Commission concluded that
U.S nuclear forces are not vulnerable to a Soviet first strike that
would leave the U.S. unable to respond. The Commission concluded a
study on the force vulnerability 1S sue by stating that the Soviet Union
is unable to disarm the U.S. in a first strike and that most U.S. SSBNs
and some strategic bombers and ICBMs would survive an attack and would
continue to pose an adequate assured destruction threat. The Commission
also concluded that this situation would not change appreciably for most
of the 1980s and 1990s. While it may be appealing to seek an offensive
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arms reduction agreement during the early nart nf a *a
'«
i p o a defense transition
Phase as President Reagan has suited, G ray and Payne argue that it
will he particuiarly i mp0rtant to ™a,ntain an effective offensive
deterrent whiie integrating a missi,e defense in order to precede a
Soviet strike during a crisis. However Grav »nH »,unc , u y and Payne ignore the
potential destahi
,
i 2 i ng infiuence that a U.S. defense night have
should the U.S. also maintain and improve its counterforce arsena, as
currently planned.
The final category concerns arms race stability. "Arms race
Stability prevails when neither side is concerned that its enemy is
trying to build weapons that endanger either strategic or crisis
stability." 72 A particularly effective argument against the ABM defense
in the 1960s, as alluded to in Chapter 1, was the potential for
accelerating the arms race and expanding it to both offensive and
defensive arenas. The Soviet Union has charged that the U.S. strategic
defense initiative program has the potential to instigate a more
dangerous and broader arms race both on earth and in space. In
addition, the Soviet Union has stated that among the possible responses
it could undertake to the SDI is an increase in offensive systems,
penetration aids for warheads, and a strategic missile defense of its
73
own. The stability of a defense transition might be hampered as
offensive arsenals expand in size and capability if the arms race is not
constrained or a more vigorous race commences. As a result, the
effectiveness of an initial U.S. missile defense might be degraded,
especially a more limited land-based counterforce defense, thereby
weakening the overall stability of the transition period.
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United States concern for 'stability' has often stymied its
Vitiating steps to preserve its security. Stephen Rosen has explored
the issue of stability and its impact on U.S. strategic n U c,ear
doctrine. He concludes that there is evidence that nuclear
instabilities, of the ki nd that would be created by certain Kinds of
weapons systems, have existed and have not led inexorably to war. 7* For
example, Rosen concludes that political factors and not weapons produced
a peace after World War „ and it is political factors that make a war
possible now. 7i Hence, the propensity to observe every new weapon as
either destab, 1 izi ng or stabilizing may over emphasize the impact they
actually have on the nuclear balance of power. However, the perceptions
of 'stability' created as a result of certain weapons systems to include
a U.S. defense do influence the political factors that make a war
possi ble.
Ultimately, the U.S. may shift in favor of some kind of defensive
posture to deter a nuclear war, assuming that the SDI provides the
technological base to build an effective defense. Under these
conditions and dependent on the mission objectives prescribed for the
defense, the U.S. may begin to downplay its offensive deterrent.
Offensive nuclear policy - assured destruction, countervailing, and
war-fighting policies - could play an increasingly less important role
in U.S. deterrence policy. However, a myriad of new issues will develop
in the wake of a defense deployment. Will a strategic defensive policy
encompass a true damaged limitation strategy to include civil defense
and air defense? How will the U.S. compose its nuclear arsenal during
the transition and once a defense is fully deployed? Finally, does the
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shift to the defense retire a new arms contro, effort to >otecf the
trans,t,on f rM a profusion of offensive weapons ano can a new an.
control regime emerge?
While ft is impossible to estimate the level of effectiveness that
a strategic defense could achieve there are a number of other strategic
and political implicates of deploying a system that need to be
addressed. One of these is the potential cost of a strategic defense
system and its cost to other strategic programs.
The strategic defense initiative program was projected to cost 25
billion dollars over the first five years of its research life. While
the actual budget expenditures for research have been scaled back by the
Congress, the deployment and maintenance costs of a multi-tiered
space-based ballistic missile defense could be many times greater than
the research phase. Former Secretary of Defense Harold Brown has
estimated that it could cost 100 billion dollars just to place the
defense systems
- weapons, sensors, stations - into space. In
addition, Brown estimates the continued research, development, and
maintenance costs of a deployed system could require an additional 100
to 200 billion dollars. General James Abrahamson, Director of the SDI
program, has admitted that these estimates are probably accurate given
the present costs of satellites, launch expenses, and maintenance
estimates. Abrahamson has stated that a dramatic reduction in the cost
of ail associated manufacturing and deployment technologies will have to
be achieved in order to justify a defense beyond the initial research
phase.
The Council on Economic Priorities issued a report in 1985 critical
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of t„e strategic defense Initiative. The Counci, concluded that wnl.e
the costs of the defense systems envisioned by Presldent Reagan ape
uncertain, because It is currently on,y a research program, a strategic
defense program could cost between 400 and 800 billion dollars 76 The
Department of Defense has not yet projected the costs of different
defense systems due. in part, to the 1,1 defined nature of a possib,e
deployab,e system. The very ,ac k of a defense objective concerns most
defense analysts as it leaves the total costs up in the air. For
instance, the cost of deploying a space-based defense could be
considerable. The O.S. does not currently have a space launch system
capable of placing in orbit mi, Hons of pounds of weaponry and support
infrastructure. The development of a launch vehicle and the cost of its
operations could mount into the billions of dollars as demonstrated by
the relatively small space shuttle program.
The strategic defense concept poses vast problems for nuclear
doctrine, strategy, technological development, and battle management
(namely C3) to include areas such as computer programming. The cost of
resolving each of these problems is truly incalculable at this time.
However, without a defined system or even a technolgical focus the costs
could quickly grow. For example, the SDIO has contracted for overall
system designs over the past three years predicated on a centralized
battle management concept. A recent report by the Eastport Panel (the
SOIO's computer software study panel), suggested that a de-centra, i zed
battle management program may be more effective. 77 However, the R S D
and procurement costs of redundant systems are likely to increase in
this context. Congress has made it clear that it is unwilling to simply
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throw money into the strategic defense nroar™ ar p ogram and until a system desig,
is decided upon, throwing money at widely different technnlqueren o ogies makes
strategic or economic sense,
to operate and to meet the SOI regents projected at 4.4 m1U1„n
Pounos of space ardent each year would require hundreds „,^
fH9hts. For example, at present cost of 3,000 dollars a pound to
replace material in orbit thp u k
'
S U
- S
'
would s Pend 13.2 billion dollars a
year just launchinq defensp- r^i P>t Q H ~y a r e related equipment. The SDIO already has
proposed a new unmanned reusablp znxr*e space cargo system to support a U.S.
ballistic missile defense.
A related issue is the cost of strategic defense to other military
programs. while the SDIO continues to research missile defenses, the
U.S. has begun a multi-faceted modernization program for its strategic
offensive forces. The costs of tne MX and Midgetman ICBM programs, the
Bl and Stealth bombers, the 600 sh,p Navy and Trident programs, as well
as conventional force modernization are just beginn lng to be felt. Some
of these programs will only begin full funding in five to ten years at a
point when a strategic defense might be ready for initial deployment.
Which other programs might be cut in order to continue a strategic
defense program is likely to be the subject of intense political debate.
These decisions will depend on the level of effectiveness and hence the
contribution to O.S. deterrence capabilities that a strategic defense
will possess. While strategic defense advocates, such as Daniel Graham,
have argued that a deployed defense will allow the U.S. to dismantle
offensive forces and thereby reduce the costs of some strategic
programs, a conservative estimate would suggest that the U.S. will not
169
Mantle a proven deterrent too „„,*„. That is> the
to dismantle offensive nuclear fences until n is confjdm that u _
handle Soviet defense counter^easures and has proven the vaiue of a
strategic defense to U.S. security.
The cost of continuing with SDI relatea >un sui ated research eventually will be
felt on conventional arms. The U.S. has begun undertaking a massive
re-equipping of its conventional forces, m addition, the U.S. has tied
Us security interests more closely to the Middle East, Far East, and
Central America in the past few years. Shifting dollars from
conventional arms purchases, training, and foreign bases in order to
fund the SDI program may begin to hurt the U.S.'s ability to meet its
conventional security requirements. However, until a decision to deploy
a ballistic missile defense is made, cutbacks in defense dollars are
unlikely to oe leveled solely on the SDI or conventional arms programs.
It may be technologically and economically feasible for the U.S. to
go forward with some kind of counterforce defense. While this type of
defense may not buy the U.S. a defense capability of the kind envisioned
by President Reagan, it is not burdened by insurmountable technological
uncertainties. Former Secretary of Defense Brown recently concluded
that a near term defense appears technically cost-effective for some
kinds of retaliatory forces. 78 The Carter Administration's Pentagon
under Brown had been actively researching the concept of a point defense
for the MX ICBM.
In addition to the possible costs of deploying a missile defense is
the issue of addressing U.S. air defense gaps as the U.S. is vulnerable
to bomber and cruise missile attacks. As alluded to earlier, an
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effective means of circumscribing a bailie, ,9 d D ll s tic missile defense might
include advanced stealth bombers, cru,se missiles and depressed
trajectory The U.S. may be faced with 9 requirement for
effective nationa, air defenses to combat these threats as a result ofjoying a ballistic missile defense. Another related concern is the
role of civil defenses In a defense donated world. ,„ order to effect
a true nationa, defense, the U.S. might have to reassess its civ,,
defenses and begin a comprehensive nationa, program. The costs of these
programs are as yet comp,ete,y unknown. However, the U.S. does not now
have a nationa, air defense system or civil defense program of the kind
required by a true strategic defense program and therefore the costs of
these related programs are likely to reach billions of dollars.
While the SDI was originally billed as a non-nuclear solution to a
nuclear problem, SDIU program managers have begun to shift a
considerable amount of dollars and research time to the application of
nuclear power components wh,ch in turn raise a number of environmental
questions. The x-ray pumped laser proposal, designed by Edward Teller,
would rely on a small nuclear explosion to generate its kill mechanisms.
Deployment of thousands of small nuclear warheads in addition to those
already deployed either on submarines, ships, or on land is likely to
increase the chances of a nuclear accident. The U.S. has begun to
explore small nuclear reactors to power a space-based battle station and
sensors. The U.S. had explored their use In the early 1970s but
abandoned the program when it decided solar power was cheaper and less
dangerous. However, a principal concern of SUI0 planners is system
vulnerability. Solar panels would be highly susceptible to damage while
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on --
-"-,ear reactor maybemoreresilient
.
the issue of poss lb ,e hazards in using a nuclear reactor. The
scattering of rad,oactive deoris from a Soviet satellite's nuclear
b. .ore ,,„.„ if the y . s . deplQyed ^^^^ Qf ^^^^ ^^US space defense. Congressional in qu iry also has stimulated concern
that a ,aunch disaster
- similar to the Shuttle Challenger explosi
'f loaded with a nuc.ear powered defense component could contaminate
large areas of Florid, and harm hundreds of people. The Department of
defense has stated that all launches would have the reactors in a 'cold'
state and only start the. after deployment in space and that they would
be placed in high orbits to prevent a similiar accident as that of the
Soviet satellite. However, nuclear industry scientists agree that
considerable effort is required to ensure against an accident that could
poison the atmosphere or land around launch sites. In addi tion, concern
has been generated by the SDI program's focus on placing hundreds of
defense platforms in space and around the earth. While the less dense
'air' of space is advantageous for the transmission of laser beams and
other kill mechanisms, it also is susceptible to erosion and
contamination more easily than the thick 'air' within the earth's
atmosphere. Exhaust gases and tons of space junk from these platforms
could damage the atmosphere, in turn allowing more damaging cosmic
radiation to filter down through the atmosphere. 79
The promise of defenses against the nuclear threat is tremendously
appealing. However, offensive nuclear forces currently maintain a
preponderant advantage over defenses. United States deterrence policy
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has record this fact and has attested to engender Soviet
apprec,at,on of the nuclear balance of terror as we,, as the U S
deterrent capacity. «h1,e the Sov,ets c,ear,y predate the luCear
threat, demonstrated by their offensive and defensive programs, they do
not necessari, y accept U.S. deterrence theory and have repeated,,
rejected a number of U.S. deterrence theory revisions. For example, the
U.S. took the initiative to propose a ban on ABMs in 1968 and was
initially rebuffed by the Sov,ets who have a,„ay s considered defenses an
equally ,mportant component of their strategic doctrine. The Soviets
eventually signed the ABM Treaty, i„ part, to preclude the deployment of
a more capable ABM defense by the United States. In the event that
strategic defenses against ballistic miss,les prove effective, the U.S.
may be confronted with altering the basis of its current nuclear
policies. However, the shape and extent of changes to these policies is
dependent en a number of factors including the level of effectiveness of
a defense, the state of the offensive nuclear balance, Soviet efforts to
counter a U.S. defense, and the costs and Implications for other U.S.
strategic programs.
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CHAPTER FOUR
STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES
The development an, deployment of effective strategic m1ss1,e
defenses could have their mn«t fa-os far-reach,ng
i mpact on tne composUlQn
-— oftheu.s.stnate^cnuceanansena,.
^ective of a U.S. strategic defense, as stated by the President and
nUmber
°
f H*"**™™ oWclals, is to foreclose on the era of
offensive nuclear weapons finance.
feasibiHty of a strategic defense remains unproven and Us strategic
-its are not altogether clear, the Keagan Administration intends to
explore the composition of U.S. offensive forces in a defensive world
To that end, the U.S. will be faced with choosing from a range of
options for composing its nuclear arsenal. ,„ the event that strateg,
defenses are highly effective thp n <: u,tL l
>
ne U.S. could choose to dismantle a
portion of its offensive forces, alter the force composition while
integrating defenses, or further upgrade the size and capabilities of
the arsenal. While the U.S. may see. to alter its offensive forces to
some extent once a defensive system oecomes feasible, the U.S. win
continue to rely on its offensive arsenal to deter a nuclear war at
least into the 1990s.
During the 1960s, strategic defenses ~ ABMs
, civil defense, etc.
became one of a number of important factors in the debate over the
future direction for U.S. deterrence policy. The anti-ballistic missil
represented one option among the various technologies developed in the
1950s and 1960s to enhance the U.S. deterrent position. At the same
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time, the 1CBM matured into the principal ,tr,t
, ho .
P'-mc s ategy delivery system fort e superpowers while SLBMs hecame more reliable and therefore
eventually were deployed. As a result „f
,. .
SUU 0t th«e technological advances,
deC,dM t0^ «~ Triad of nuclear forces. The
overall scope of these developments was part of a response to
requirements to fit forces tn n c
„ ,
°
U
- S
-
nUC ' ear fondly, to the
development of a Soviet ABM system.
One of the most important factors in the ABM debate in the 1960s
was the tremendous technology, advance in offensive nuclear weapons
T^t is, the U.S. decided to explore strategic defenses because of the
tremendous threat of destruction posed Py nuclear anmed ballistic
".ISSiles as compared to the strategic bombers available at the time
«hi!e the threat of a baUistic missile attacL
,nst,gated ABM research
the ability of an offense to overcome the ABMs developed in the 1960s
was relatively great. However, the development of the ABM also led the
U.S. to make changes in the capabilities of its offensive forces. For
example, the multiple independently targeted reentry vehicle (MIRV), was
developed as a means of countering a Soviet ABM defense. By 1970 the
U.S. began deploying MIRVed iCBMs and SLBMs and was actively researching
the possibility of incorporating penetration aids for its ballistic
missiles. While there was a number of other equally important factors,
the ABM greatly influenced the direction of O.S. offensive force
development. Not unlike this past experience, the development of
strategic defenses in the 1930s and 1990s may influence the composition
of O.S. nuclear forces. In addition, current offensive technological
developments could influence the feasibility of a strategic defense
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against Soviet ballistic missiles.
Thet
~°^«'Pen.u, um
, whichperiodicanyshi. ftsfromoffense
s- 9 nin 9 of the ABM Treaty confirm tht do, nance „ ^
^ nuclear balance at that time and was expected to hinder the
deveiopment o f defenses which were perceived to he destabilizing. Mhj1e
it is conceivable that a t-miw .a truly effective missile defense could alter the
Principal hasis of the U.S. deterrent, that be,ng offens,ve nuCear
forces, ,t win have to overcome a tr^endous advantage current!, he,d
by offensive forces.
The focus of U.S. strategic nuclear policy is to deter a nuclear
attac* on the U.S. and its allies. These po,ic1es are effective to the
extent to which any potential enemy is dissuaded from attacking the U.S.
w-th nuclear weapons. ,„ practice
, this means ^ any
aggressor must Oe persuaded to believe that the U.S. will use its
nuclear weapons in response to an attack and has the capability to back
up its policy in the event of war Herp-in Hoc fh«. e lies the purpose and dynamic
of nuclear weapons development. As U.S. strategic nuclear policy has
become ever more refined, in part as a result of the ever increasing
technological sophistication in nuclear weapons, the U.S. has procured
specific nuclear forces in support of these policies.
One of the objectives of U.S. nuclear policy with respect to its
nuclear weapons has been to maintain both the real and perceived
strengths of these forces. Secretary of Defense Brown has argued that
one of "our highest military priorities includes
. . . maintaining the
perception
... and the reality that U.S. forces are as capable as
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th°Se0f
- «« there ,s no level of nuclear confHct at
^^"•3.S.R.ca„ ga1nam1l1taryorapolnical
^ ^
need forces of size an, character so that
. . . the Sov ,m
Perce.e that we can not he coerce, or intimidated 6y , arger „^
capab,e Sov,et forces".! Th , s stata„ent sugaests ^
^tary strength can be measured in some fashion
when compared to the Soviet strategic strengths wh,ch help deter a
nuclear war. «hi ,e 1tis nearly
,mp0ss1b,e to measure the perceived
strength of U.S. nuclear forces, it may be possihie to measure their
'real' strength.
maxwell Taylor has stated that rea, strategic strength refers to
"that form of military powe r characterized by our ability to destroy
"ajor Soviet targets, military and civilian, with nuclear weapons at
intercontinental ranges". 2 The oestructive power of U.S. strategic
forces depends on the performance and survivability of these forces and
associated equipment, the character of U.S. leaders, and the reliability
and survivability of command-control-communication systems linking
national command authorities to weapons. 3 The simple taoulation of
strategic weapons does not provide an adequate measure of strategic
strength. Rather, a measure of true strength would factor in the
accuracy, reliability, and survivability of the system. The combination
of these factors are considered by military planners when estimating the
relative strengths of the superpower forces and will be considered when
a decision to go forward on a missile defense can be made.
1. U.S. Nuclear Forces
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An analysis of the implications of strateair h fg c defenses for the U S
nuc ear arsenal must begin with a description of thpipu r e current U S
arS6nal
^ US »•». offense nude.
-rent,, is composed of weapons systems primarily based on technology
from the late 1950s and 1960s, namely the strateair h hy Ln g c bomber, the ICBM
-
«»»- reentry vehic,es. Tne o.S. has implemented a number of
'
Wade programs to inoorporate newer technology and has maintain a R
*
D program to explore various weapons systems tor possible future
deployment. For example, twenty-five year o,d borers are being fitted
•nth the Utest cruise missile technology while a number of U.S. ICBMs
nave received accuracy and yield upgrades. In addition, the U.S. has
explored advanced technologies such as the maneuverable reentry vehicle
(MARV) concept which was designed to evade Soviet ABM defenses. The
U.S. decided against the MARV as the technology did not appear to add
significantly to U.S. penetration capabilities.
These forces also are deployed in support of various nuclear
policies
- assured destruction, countervailing, and war fighting.
,„
general, the current U.S. nuclear stockpile is a decade older than the
latest polices and strategies it is charged with carrying out. This
condition is partly the result of the development and deployment time
between policy pronouncements and composition of a supporting force, but
also is the result of the decision making process which has sought to
secure peace by means other than through the posturing of nuclear
weapons. The U.S. depends on a variety of means other than nuclear
weapons to help deter nuclear war, namely strategic deterrence policy
and strategy as well as arms control efforts. While the U.S. inventory
nwere
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-
has nW
—
d
—,, s . nuclear po]icyand
_
control efforts have d1splayed consjdera6ie [nfact>theus
actual,, restricted Us weapons ueve,opment process i„ the la7Us
,
order to encourage restraint by the Soviet Union. These efforts
-dement of the original ABM Treaty and SALT I accords
The interaction of the strategic policy formation process the
ams control process, anu U.S. Nestle political constraints has a
tremendous innoence on the rin.1 composition of U.S. nuclear forces-
"•S.
.lilt.* pinners assess the Soviet nuclear threat to the U S
today and in the future; based on the results of these assesses, the
Department of Defense records policy and strategy to deter a Soviet
attack. While this is one of the avenues in which U.S. nuclear policy
-
Oer,ved, other actors have c™e into play in the past. Congressiona,
influence on U.S. nuclear policy, while somewhat less precise on
strategy and tactics, is generally recognized as important. For
example, Congress played an important role in the confirmation of the
U.S. shift toward limited nuclear options in the 1970s. Congress also
has criticized efforts on the part of some Reagan Administration
officials to move the U.S. more closely to a nuclear war-fighting
policy. The final outcome of these deliberations is a set of policies
which would guide the U.S. in a war and seek to enhance its deterrent
capabi I ity
.
The focus of these policies, be it assured destruction or
war-fignting policy, defines the requirements for the U.S. nuclear
arsenal. The mutual assured destruction model, more than any other set
of strategic ideas, has provided the principal structural basis for the
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development of U.S. nuclear forces tm. a ,. Th 1S development has taken the form
ot a series of improvements in U S retail,,J.^. aliatory capabilities - that is
the ability of thp 1 1
'
rie u.b. to survive a nuclpar ^^l.ie attack and still inflict
unacceptable damage on the Sov1et urban . ^ ^ ^ ^
only in the past decade or so that the U.S. has serious,, considered
effective counterforce weaoons «„ip and only recently has begun to field
weapons with some counterforce capabilities. The Carter
Administration's most important policy pronouncement was to confirm the
finance of counterforce opt.ons in its countervailing poli cy. Whi,e
the U.S. had explored limited and selective options for the SIOP in the
past, Presidential U,rective ,9 made them the focus of U.S. policy. The
result of this shift was a concerted effort hy the Department of Defense
to procure counterforce capable weapons, namely the MX 1CBM, as we., as
improvements for the U.S. C3 system.
Congress also holds the power of the purse. As such. Congress
greatly influences the actual composition of U.S. forces. The cost of
the MX ICBM versus the Trident il SLBM, both counterforce weapons, had
been a widely debated issue. While the MX is not yet deployed, the
Trident system is going forward on schedule. Congress has questioned
the survivability of the MX and while a viable deployment mode has not
been agreed upon, it refuses to authorize procurement of all the MX
missiles asked for by the Department of Defense.
The arms control process clearly is an important influence on the
composition of U.S. nuclear forces. The various treaties wh,ch the U.S.
has become a party to constrain the size and capabilities of U.S.
nuclear forces. The SALT 1 and 1 1 accords are the most important
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treaties to date in this reaarri c, 9a d. For example thp n <; cM
»
ne u
- b
-
and Soviet Union
are allowed to deploy n0 more than 2m ^
an(j st rategic bombers,
.„ addition, there are
various sublimits on the number of MIRVed systems as well as the number
°f strategic bombers allowed to carry cruis e missiles. Whi,e treat,
imitations clearly constrain U.S. force developments, domestic arms
control pressures a,so impact the U.S. force composition. c™ Pet,ng
political groups debate the im ,,t „ fn impact of various weapons programs on the
arms control regime. For example, MX critics have charged that the
system will provoke the Soviets to move toward mobile ICBMs and thereby
preclude effective control of these systems. The Reagan Administration
has criticized past arms control accords and has favored a new approach
incorporating proposals to cut deep ly into the superpowers' strategic
arsenals. These efforts weigh heavily on the types of systems the U.S.
deploys as well as its research programs for future weapons systems, Un
the defense side, the arms control debate is likely to have profound
influence on the possible role and composition of a U.S. strategic
defense.
A considerable portion of the most capable weapons in the U.S
inventory today was developed, in part, as a result of the ABM debate of
the 1960s. For example, the initial versions of the Minuteman III and
Poseidon/C-3 systems were specifically designed to incorporate MIRV
technology. Similarly, the current defense debate is likely to have
profound implications for the role, composition, and size of the U.S.
strategic nuclear offensive arsenal.
A brief review of the major weapons systems in the current U.S.
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—oryandad, scussion of them roles and capabi
, ities as presentiy
configured follows.
A^^JJ^JCBJ^c^ces
The current land-based
,eg of the Triad - Us ZCBM forces - is
-posed of two maJO r weapons systems: the Minuteman „ and M , nuteman
I CBMs
.
small number of Titan II ICBMs that are
current!, being deactivated at a rate of one per month. This system is
essentia,,, twenty-five years old and re,ies on dated technology such as
liquid fue,ed boosters. For economic, maintenance, and safety reasons
all Titan lis wi ,
,
be comp,ete, y removed from the active inventor, by
1987/
The Minuteman II ICBM is the U.S.", main prompt assured destruction
weapon. The Minuteman II became operational in 1966 as a follow-on to
the Minuteman I ICBM. The principal mission of the Minuteman II bas
been to pose a credible assured destruction threat to the Soviet Union.
It carries a single 1.2 megaton y ie,d nuclear warhead and is capable of
destroy ing very wide-area targets. That is, the Minuteman II is capable
of destroying moderately hard targets and soft large-area military or
industrial installations requiring high yields and less than pinpoint
accuracy. Once the remaining Titan lis have been removed from the
active arsenal, the Minuteman II will have the largest deliverable
warhead in the U.S. strategic arsenal other than a few very large bomber
del i vered gravity bombs.
The majority of the U.S. ICBM force is composed of 55U Minuteman
III ICBMs, a MIRVed solid fueled weapon essentially similar to the
Minuteman II. The latest of two Minuteman III versions represents a
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Phased upgrade to a portion of the forep a „nt0 Ce dnd Wds ^dertaken to provide
the U.S. with a more credible hard taraet killg weapon as a result of
Soviet efforts to harden their launch ,iinc isilos and command bunkers. Threehundred Minuteman III have received the Mark 12A h „n ~ warhead package which
increased their yield from 170 kilotons (kt) to 33^tJjbkt per warhead.
These weapons are the only current n <;y U U ' S
-
wea Pon capable of directly
threatening Soviet hardened ithm c-mICBM silos and command bunkers in a timely
fashion.
The U.S. will not add to Us arsenal of time-urgent hard target
kill forces until the MX ICBM is deployed in
, ate l986 and Tr , dent „
SLBMs are deployed in the late 1980s. The U.S. also has under
development a single warhead small 1CBM (SICBM)
, des,gnated Midgetman
which is scheduled for deployment in the iggUs. However. Poth the MX
and Midgetman ICBM program have run into a number of political
obstacles. The number of MX ICBMs to be deployed has been reduced from
an original deployment projection of 200 missiles to a current 100.
Additionally, congress has legislated a limit of bo MX ICBMs in
Minuteman silos until a survivable basing mode can be developed for the
other 50 MX ICBMs. The dedate over a bas.ng scheme for both the MX and
the Midgetman has hampered the U.S.'s effort to field a new ICBM since
the late 1970s.
The Midgetman is now facing greater scrutiny concerning its
strategic purpose and make-up. A number of Congressmen have suggested
that the Midgetman carry three warheads rather than one and that its
size be increased to provide for the inclusion of penaids in the event
of a Soviet nationwide BMD deployment in the 1990s. These efforts, if
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™u,,winobv1 ate the on,,, purpose for ^
The missile is being designed and was promoted by the Scrowcroft
Co-ssion as a small, mobile system and hence reUt,ve,y 1nvulnerable
weapon.
,„ addition, the M1dgetman^^ ^ ^ ^ ^
land-based deterrent. As a single warhead weapon the Midgetman is
Mk.l, to pose a .ore „mited threat to Soviet strategic forces than the
MIRVed MX ICBH. while Congress has deeded to bec«e more erUlc.,,,
-nvolved in the future exposition of the U.S. ICBM force, it has been
more favorabie toward the Navy's modern, zation program.
Bj_. U .S. SLBM Force s
The U.S. sea-based deterrent is currently composed of 43 strategic
nuclear submarines (SSBNs). including 18 Poseidon submarines each
carrying 16 Poseidon/C-3 missiles and 12 Pose,don submarines each
carrying !6 Trident I/C-4 missiles each. Seven Trident submarines also
have entered the U.S. strategic force since the late 1970s, each
carrying 24 Trident I/C-4 missiles. 9
The SLBM force is generally considered the U.S.'s most secure
assured destruction force as a portion of the force is always out to sea
and these submarines are difficult to locate and track for Soviet
anti-submarine warfare (ASW) forces. The ability of strategic
submarines to move quickly and quietly and at times lie still enhances
their prospects for higher rates of survivability than either land-based
missiles or bombers. A number of additional factors help prevent
successful destruction of SSBNs by Soviet ASW forces. Soviet attack
submarines and surface vessels must successfully track U.S. submarines
as they leave their ports in order to quickly attack them in a war. In
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addition, Soviet attack sublines must manuever to attack U S
strategic submarines thereby providing
„.,. shlps and
°f the,r location, united States strategic submarines can rana1n
Passive and thereby compete the attacking submarine's job. SSBNs
also havealarge percentage of the oceans 1„ which they can patro,
effectively stretching and hampering ASW detection and destruction
efforts. Fmany, for strategic anti-submarine warfare to be effective
•t ».t be ab,e to undertake an effective and coord.nated attack to
destroy a large portion of the enemy's SSBN f,eet in a very short period
of time. These constraints make it neariy impossible for the Soviets to
destroy the U.S. strategic submarine forces in a first strike. 10
Poseidon/C-3 SLBHs are fitted with a 40kt warhead whiie the Trident
I/C-4 is fitted with a lOOkt warhead and was provided with greater range
capability over the Poseidon allow,ng U.S. submarines carrying Tridents
to expand their areas of patroi. thereby adding to their survivability.
As the number of Trident I missiles are increased - as new Trident
submarines come on line subsequently requiring the ret.rement of
Poseidon Submarines
- Poseidon SLBMs have been select.vely refitted with
greater numbers of warheads to compensate for the fewer number of
warheads on average deployed on the Trident I missiles. 11 The U.S. will
begin deploying the Trident II/D-5 SLBM in the late ig8Us. Trident II
will be the first submarine launched strategic system with substant,al
hard target kill capability. This deployment will effectively provide
the U.S. with a credible counterforce strategic arsenal and greatly
reduce concern over the U.S.'s ability to pose a credible and flexible
deterrent in the event of a Soviet first strike.
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™e U.S. also is increasing its sea-based offensive nuclear fence
-1th the introduction of the Tomahawk subman ne- 1 aunched and
strategic cruise missile (SLCM). While the U.S. envisions
deployment of thousands of the Tomahawk cruise missile, all of the. are
not siated for a strategic role. Among the m, ssl ons envisioned for
these weapons are ant,-ship „arfare and suppopt ^ ^
-dude tactical land targeting as we!l as strategic targeting. The
Navy began deploying SLCMs in 1984 and projects a total deployment of
194 strategic cruise missiles on 74 attack submarines as well as 190
strategic versions on 30 surface ships by the ,ate 1980s. "The main
advantage
-
and at the same time the main disadvantage - of the Tomahawk
is the fact that it is not possible to distinguish it externally from
the tactical versions." 12 The U.S. will be able to effectively saturate
the Soviet Union's ocean surveillance and targeting systems. In the
event of increased tensions between the superpowers, the U.S. also could
deploy Tomahawk cruise missiles onboard non-naval vessels thereby
9reatly expanding the Soviet Union's targeting problem. Each strategic
Tomahawk can carry a 200kt warhead and has a range of ISUOnm. The
numbers and yield of these weapons will increase the overall capability
of the U.S.'s hard target kill force. 13 Another significant strategic
advantage of the cruise missile is its ability to hug the ground below
radar coverage and thereby penetrate Soviet air defenses in addition to
its ability to strike within 2UU feet of its target.
C. U.S. Strateg ic Bombers
The U.S. long-range bomber force is one of the most flexible legs
of the Triad. Strategic bombers can carry a more diverse nuclear
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-pons ,oW> can perform
. number of ^ ^ ^
-calied after being launcned
.
of contention for a „umber of years
.
a manned penetration bomber is no
, onger „ecessary due to the
development of cru.se m,ss,,es and because Soviet air defenses
potentially make this for. of attack extremely ineffective.
,„
addition, the last of tho a *+ ,.e B-62 strategy bombers, which represent the
bulk of the U.S. bomber deterrent, were built in the ear,, 1960s.
The active bomber inventory consists of 167 B-S2GS, 96 8-52HS and
an additional 60 FB-llls. The bomber force is no longer as capab.e of
penetrate Sov,et airspace and is, therefore, responsible for fewer
targets within the Sov let Union, where twenty-five years ago the bomber
force carried g7 percent of the U.S. nuclear weapons inventory, it
currently carries roughly 23 percent while still half of the
megatonnage.' 4 The bomber force has been modernized on a number of
occasions, most recently to begin carrying air-launched cruise missiles
(ALCMs)
.
The first squadron of 16 B-528 bombers equipped with the ALCM
became operational in December, 1982. The U.S. may eventually outfit
20U B-b2s to carry ALCMs with remaining bombers designated for a
combination of gravity bombs and short-range attack missiles (SRAMs )
.
In order to further modernize the bomber leg of the Triad, the U.S. has
begun to deploy the B-lb strategic bomber as the principal U.S. manned
penetrating bomber for the late 1980s and early 1990s when the advanced
technology bomber (AT8) - the so-called Stealth bomber - also will
begin to come on line and assume the penetration role. 15 In conjunction
with the introduction of the Bl-b bomber, the U.S. will begin
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r
ant,,n9o,derB ~ 52Bbombers
-
B°th * *• - *"*«c w1 „be deployed w1th crulse m1ss1les> presumabiy^ stMith ^
of the cruise, ana gravity bombs.
jl. Implications of a xtr.*^ *
rfrniL
The U.S. current,, seeks to deter Soviet aggression, in part by
the threat to use an, of the forces describe, above to retaliate against
a Soviet attack. Both opponents and Qf
have praised and criticized the
'deterrent value' of the U.S. strategic
nuciear arsena,. Defense advocates such as Secretary of Defense
Weinberger, perceive a need to continue strengthening U.S. strategic
forces while BMD are deveioped and possibly ,ater deployed. President
Reagan has continued President Carter's progra,,, to procure counterfort
weapons for the U.S. inventory and has made additions to the program.
For example, President Reagan has resurrected the Bl bomber, pushed
ahead the Trident II SLBM, and asked for the development of the
Mndgetman ICBM. While President Reagan has supported and initiated a
number of the current strategic force modernization programs, he has
alluded to the need for offensive arms reductions for a stable
implementation of a strategic defense system. Former Secretary of
Defense Brown, an opponent of the SDI in its current form, has charged
that the current U.S. nuclear arsenal is inadequate to carrying out its
counterforce missions. Brown has advocated the deployment of the MX
ICBM as well as the Trident II SLBM. Finally, the Union of Concerned
Scientists has charged that the current U.S. arsenal is more than
adequate to deter a Soviet nuclear attack today and in the future and
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does not perce,ve a need to upgrade or expand
, t . However, the uU.ate
Judgment as to "the capability of these forces depends on the m i SS ion
against which U.S. forces are measured"." That is, while the u s can
confident,, carry out an assured destruction retaliation against the
Soviet Union. U is prohahiy not well suited to protracted counterforce
warfare.
United States strategic forces are generally viewed by military
analysts as highly capable of carrying out a devastating retaliatory
strike against the Soviet Union after enduring an initial Soviet strike.
The office of Technology Assessment has estimated that 141 large (one
megaton) U.S. weapons could destroy over 50 percent of the total Soviet
industrial capacity. 17 However, "the overall U.S. counterforce
capability
-
the ability to destroy a significant portion of Soviet
retaliatory forces
- is minimal". 18 The Carter and Reagan
Administrations have pushed to acquire counterforce capable strategic
weapons in an effort to support U.S. counterforce nuclear policy, namely
embodied in Presidential Directive 59. If the U.S. begins to shift its
nuclear deterrence policy to incorporate strategic defenses, it may
alter the composition and mission of its offensive nuclear forces.
An important consideration for U.S. policy planners in a defensive
world will be the mission which U.S. offensive forces will be charged
with executing. Clearly, U.S. policy will continue to emphasize the
deterrence of Soviet aggression and U.S. strategic offensive forces will
be responsible for posing a credible deterrent to the Soviet leadership
along with defense forces that are deployed. However, the actual
wartime role of U.S. offensive forces will be dependent on a number of
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on or
'actors. The most ,mportant factor in this regard is the inters
balance of missions between the offensive and defensive forces in the
U.S. arsenal. U.S. pursues a robust strategic defense policy
offensive nuCear forces might relinguish their current ro,e of
deterring nuclear war by threatenlng to deny the Soviets a successfu,
attack, in effect, U.S. policy mi ght shift to emphasize
'defense' as a
deterrent. In this environment, the role of U.S. offensive nuclear
forces could he def,ned in a more traditional assured destruct.on mode
However, the currently promoted IWtl on a missile defense - Soviet
countermeasures, C3 problems, and the difficulties and costs of
maintaining the system
-will influence the extent to „h,ch the U.S.
revises its offensive force missions. The U.S would have the option of
continuing to rely on its offensive forces for limited counterforce
missions or to seek more demanding war-fighting roles for its offensive
forces. These options are displayed in the following tables.
Table #6 displays the projected gains in U.S. counterforce
capabilities in the early 1990s as a result of the deployment of the MX
IC8M and Trident II SLBM. The mission capab,lities of U.S. offensive
forces may then remain constant as a result of a cancellation of the
Midgetman ICBM and deployment of a strategic defense. The mission
capabilities of remaining U.S. offensive nuclear forces also will be
influenced by Soviet defensive deployments and in time might decline.
Table #7 displays an increase in U.S. counterforce capabilities
from MX and Trident II deployments as well as possible Midgetman
deployments. The offensive mission might then be expected to fall off
and an assured destruction posture to prevail as an effective missile
^ense was dep,oyeo and U.S. offensive forces were dlsmant,eo
Table #8 portrays the option to Increase constantly the u s
counterforce capabilities in an effort to achieve an effective
--fitting posture.
could oe expected to p,ay an integra, ro,e in addition to a robust
ballistic missile defense.
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TABLE #6 MAINTAIN LIMITED COUNTERFORCE ROLE
WAR
-FIGHTING
ROLE
COUNTERFORCE
ROLE
ASSURED DESTRUC-
TION ROLE
NO OFFENSIVE ROLE
1985 1990
Time Line
1995 2000
TABLE #7 PROVIDE ASSURED DESTRUCTION ROLE
WAR- FIGHTING
ROLE
COUNTERFORCE
ROLE
ASSURED DESTRUC-
TION ROLE
NO OFFENSIVE ROLE
1985 1990 T9"95 2000
Time Line
LE #8 ENHANCE TO WAR-FIGHTING
WAR-FIGHTING
ROLE
COUNTERFORCE
ROLE
ASSURED DESTRUC-
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NO OFFENSIVE ROLE
1985 1990
Time Line
Powers,
other factors will Influence the direction of
U.S. offensive force capebilltles and ro,es. The prospects for anns
control w,th the Soviet Union with respect to hoth offensive and
defensive forces could change the roles that nff<e i offensive forces would be
expected to play if , strate9
, c Ww|^ ^
HkeHhood of a Soviet missile defense and its corresponding leve, of
effectiveness w1„ great,, i„f,uence the future ro,e of U.S. offensive
forces. ,n addition, the costs and operationa, effectiveness of a U.S
strategic defense will i nfluen ce the requirements for offensive
deterrent forces as we,, as the size and composition of these forces
For e*amp ,e, U.S. offensive forces could continue to have a counterforce
warti,„e ro,e as a threat to deny the Soviets a victory by placing their
military forces at risk. As such, U.S. offensive forces could play a
co-equal deterrent role with a deployed strategic missile defense.
It is unlikely that the U.S. will completely dismantle its
offensive forces or seek to deploy them in a true war-„ghting role even
if ballistic missile defenses become a reality. There are a number of
strategic reasons for maintaining an offensive nuclear arsenal and
preserving their current deterrent role, namely a limited counterforce
strategy as displayed in Table 6. The procurement of additional
counterforce weapons while also procuring an effective missile defense
might appear to the Soviets to be a U.S. effort to create a first strike
capability. That is, a condition might arise where a defense protected
U.S. could strike against Soviet nuclear forces with near impunity,
sufficient to deny the Soviets a meaningful second strike retaliatory
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capability. Hence, offensive forces
,n th , s mode dlong wU „ , dep|oyed
-1M11. defense could appear to he provocative and potential
destabi 1 i zi ng.
There are indications that the Reagan Administration and, more
specifically, the Department of Defense have begun to address the issue
of offensive and defensive integration and the role for offensive
forces. A nuclear strategy review was initiated in 19«5 that focuses on
the integration of a U.S. strategic defense with its offensive forces.
The intent of the review is to "uDdat-P n <; „.„opdate U.S. nuclear employment plans and
provide guidance for the transition from offense to defense in the
1990s" should defenses prove feasible. 19 According to press reports,
the review envisions the integration of offensive and defensive forces
under a new nuclear war-fighting command structure. G 1V en the Reagan
Administration's plans to procure counterforce capable strategic weapons
-- Plans established prior to the initiation of the SOI ~ and their
associated C3I elements, it is not surprising that the Department of
Defense will proceed with its original modernization plans while
studying the integration of defenses.
The Soviets have repeatedly charged the Reagan Administration with
seeking offensive superiority and that a U.S. missile defense would act
as an offensive weapon system. Although the technological focus of the
SDI as described by President Reagan is clearly defensive, there are a
number of ways in which a U.S. missile defense could be used to augment
U.S. offensive forces and an offensive nuclear strategy. First, a
missile defense might be deployed to preserve an offense dominant force
and deterrent. That is, the U.S. would continue to rely on its
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offense nuclear forces to deter Soviet agression and a , s . ba|
, jsUc
™1«11e defense ecu,, augme„t the,n role
.
A point defense of U.S. ,CBH
SilOS WOUId fit Well in thic ™ithis role, as previously described in Chapter 2
Second, as alluded to above, a U.S. offensive strategy desi 9 ned to
"me f.rst to,i mi t the daMa9e Soviet forces could cause to the u s
^ g reatly enhanced by mjss , le defenses chapged^
'
Sov,et forces left undated by a U.S. counterforce attack. The Soviets
el.1- that the SDI in conjunction with the Rea g an Administrates
current plans to deploy ,„ore capaole counterforce weapons - the MX 1CBM
Trident
., SLBM, and the Bl-b and advanced techno]ogy ^
Provide the U.S. a first strike offensive force and therehy some d ama g e
limitation capability. These efforts, charge the Sov,ets, represent a
clear attempt to regain nuclear superiority and render the Soviet
nuclear force inferior.
Another issue largely ignored by the Reagan Administration to date
is the potential anti-satellite capability of a U.S. missile defense
system. While a laser defense against Soviet ballistic missiles may be
impossible, satellites are relatively passive targets that might be
easily destroyed by laser weapons. As such, these weapons could perform
an offensive role by destroying Soviet satellites prior to a U.S. attack
thereby degrading the Soviet Union's space-based surveillance and
communication capabilities.
A second reason why the U.S. is unlikely to dismantle its offensive
deterrent completely is the fear that in the absence of an arms control
agreement or mutual reductions the U.S. could be caught by surprise
without an offensive force sufficient to deter an attack in a crisis.
action, the U.S. wou.d want t0 reraai „ Qf ^
capability
,„ the event that the Soviets developed effective
counter-measures to a U.S. missile defense.
^e U.S. wi„ maintain, at the very, east, an assured destruction
retaliatory force as a means of protecting against countermeasure
advances against a U.S. defense and as a means of deterring third part,
of Its forces, dismantle some of its counterforce weapons, completely
nuclear arsenal. A number of defense advocates, such as Keith Payne
have argued against these options, at least during the initial phases of
a defense deployment. Payne has argued that the U.S. must remain
offensively prepared for war until an effective BMO could accept the
Hon's share of U.S. deterrence responsi bi 1 ity
.
2U
However, Payne fails
to appreciate the potentially destab, I i z, ng influence that dual
offensive improvements and defensive deployments may pose, in the
absence of some offensive arms reductions agreements, particularly
concerning counterforce weapons, the U.S. is likely to maintain some
counterforce capabilities as a means of threaten, ng Soviet strategic
assets and Soviet national command authorities (NCA).
Ultimately, the key factor concerning the future role and
composition of U.S. nuclear forces will be their expected wartime role.
In this regard, the U.S. may go beyond the current force modernization
programs described above which are being implemented to develop a more
capable counterforce strategic arsenal. 21 Among the forces likely to
exist by the mid-iggUs or the turn of the century when a decision to
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deploy missile defenses could hobe made are a nomber of MX and Midgetman
C8MS with some remaining Minuteman „, ^^
_ ^ ^
SLBMs, numerous oruise missiles on B-!b bombers as well as cruise
-ssiles and new gravity bombs on the ATB, and ,,„.,„ , number of
submarine- and ship-launched strategic cruise missiles now being
deployed. The combination of accuracy and lethality of these forces
will pose a credible hard taraet kill ^ktg kill capability to the Soviet Union's
strategic forces and their command and control infrastructure as
presently configured.
Each of these preceeding descriptions assumes to varying degrees
that ballistic missiles will continue to be a major, if not the most
important, component in the U.S. offensive arsenal. Assuming that seme
kind of strategic nuclear force is maintained oy the U.S., the mix
between ballistic missiles, namely ICBMs, SLBMs, and air breathing
forces, is likely to be widely debated in policy circles. Ballistic
missiles are likely to be increasingly less capable of performing their
current missions in a defensive balance. That is, ballistic missiles
may have less utility for specific counterforce and other war-fighting
roles. For example, a missile defense capable of a high percent kill
ratio could severely restrict, if not altogether preclude, the
attacker's ability to predict which targets were destroyed. However,
defenses will not completely degrade the ballistic missile's deterrent
value as these weapons could still pose a residual assured destruction
threat.
In order to execute a successful attack, many thousands more
ballistic missiles may be required in a defense dominated world. The
204
expansion of nuclear forces is likelv tn -in,nK
'y to increase the level of
collateral damage. The defense in turn win i
' » lower the attacker's
confidence for a successful attack. As a result an *t* u, attacker may seek
to destroy or degrade the defender's
.issile defense as another means of
securing a successful attack. Under these conditions the U.S. may seek
to transfer some, if not the maJO r portion, of its offensive forces to
SLBMs, although they may be vulnerable to some degradation in utility
from a Soviet missile defense. The advantage of using SLBMs is the
height of their tra.ectory and tta. from launch to target, which can be
significantly less than ICBMs and which can make the task of
.racking
and destruction for a missile defense more difficult. On the other
hand, depressed trajectories also lead to a degradation of missile
accuracy and thereby lessen the confidence of target destruction and
potentially increase the levels of collateral damage. 22
A potentially more effective option than SLBMs would be to shift
U.S. offensive forces to strategic bombers and cruise missiles (ALCM and
SLCM). The strategic advantages of a manned penetration bomber lie in
their ability to be retargeted at any time during their attack sequence
as well as their ability to attack multiple targets. Strategic bombers
may prove very useful against the new generation of Soviet mobile
nuclear systems which can relocate to hide from U.S. targeteers.
Strategic bombers can act as surveillance platforms to locate mobile
weapons and subsequently destroy them. However, U.S. strategic bombers
also must contend with an extremely dense Soviet air defense network and
as a result are less likely to survive once they deviate from planned
flight routes.
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The U.S. had begun explore the use of cruise missiles shortly
Sfter aCqUiHn9 Germa
"
t6Ch"01^ *rl- War „. „owever
, ^ims these weapons were abandoned i„ f avor of the ^ ^
they prove, cumbersome for ships and aircraft. Today the cruise miss„e
Offers a nu.oer of strategic advantages as spared to the ballistic
stewing frora the miniaturl2atfon Qf nuc]ear wapheads ^
efficient engines.
compelling disadvantages
-the missiles are relatively slow - the
cruise missile Is relatively small and can fly gre at distances at
extremely low altitudes. The range of the ALCM and SLC M designated for
strategic missions is roughly isoonm. ,„ the case of the^ ^
range allows the U.S. to attack roughly 85 percent of strategic targets
in the Soviet Union without bombers entering Soviet airspace. 23 The
missiles' guidance packages, called Tercom ass,sted inertial navigation
system (TAINS), allows the missiles to achieve great accuracy thus
making them potential hard-target kill weapons when equipped with
sizeable nuclear warheads. A final advantage of the cruise missile is
its procurement and maintenance cost. Thousands of cruise missiles can
be deployed at the cost of a few new ballistic missiles. The missile
requires minimal support facilities and a relatively simple launcher.
The cruise missile may be able to act as an insurance against the
deployment of a Soviet ballistic missile defense that degrades the
penetration advantages ballistic missiles currently have over
OA
aerodynamic forces. Given the potential for the cruise missile to
reach its target even in a highly defended environment, the U.S. will
need to be concerned with the expected deployment of Soviet sea-launched
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-ise missHes in the late 1980s, well before a U.S. BMD can be
deploy. such, the U.S. will either have to reconsider Its
>anist,c™iss,,e defense program or begin a strategic a, r defense
initiative to ha„d,e Soviet air breathing threats,
forward with ballistic missile defense and/or an a,r defense
system „i„ be dependent not on, y on their corresponding
,eve,s of
effectless against the threat but also the dollar expenses to develop
and deplo, these defenses at the same time and the relative costs to the
Soviets to circumscribe the defenses.
The U.S. is currently exploring an advanced cruise missile (ACM)
that might add to the overall effectiveness of these weapons. The ACM
will be carried by the Bl-b and ATB and will have greater range,
accuracy, and targeting flexibility than current cruise missiles and be
able to perform evasive maneuvers. In addition, the ACM will
incorporate stealth technology reducing its radar cross-section while a
new engine will lower its infrared signature. 25 The combination of
these improvements to the cruise missile will make it a more difficult
threat for the Soviet air defense focus to contend with and a
potentially more useful weapon for the U.S. to employ.
One major disadvantage of the cruise missile is its flight time to
target. Most cruise missiles will be carried on U.S. strategic bombers
which would fly up to the Soviet coasts and then release their missiles
for the second leg of the attack. One option for reducing the total
attack time could encompass the deployment of SLCMs on submarines that
would patrol close to the Soviet Union's coast. In addition, the TAINS
guidance system which depends on geographic height variations currently
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restricts the cruise missiU to certain penetration routes. 2 " The
-ise missile a,so Is s ubj ect to direct
Sov,et air defense weapons
,
1 „c , udi ng a, r defense Interceptor al rcraft
and strategic surface-to-air missiles (SAMs).
While these weapons systems can not provide the time urgent
-re survivab.e and ma, he able to penetrate Sov,et defenses
.ore eas„y
than ballistic missiles shou,d the Soviet Un,on a,so deploy a ballistic
defense, in fact, the addition of significant numbers of SLCHs
could provide the U.S. with an effective hard-target M„ weapon thereby
proving an important redundancy in this weapon category. However,
their introduction on a wide scale by the Soviets also could pose a
significant problem for the United States. Soviet submarines and ships
deployed just off the U.S. coast could destroy a portion of U.S.
military and economic assets within minutes of launching their cruise
missiles. A U.S. ballistic missile defense of the kind currently
envisioned might have almost no capability against these forces. The
U.S. would have to consider rebuilding a nationwide air defense net of
surface-to-air missiles and a fleet of fighter interceptor aircraft. 27
The U.S. also could seek to increase the numbers of its
intermediate range ballistic miss,les ( IRBMs) with strategic roles
stationed in Europe, namely the Pershing II. These weapons, which
currently total 108, are extremely accurate due to terminal guidance and
have hard-target kill capabilities. The Pershing II can arrive bn
Soviet targets within eight minutes from West Uerman launch points.
From another perspective, the U.S. may no longer require the capability
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sHould
.anutic ^ssne defense effective,, preclude counterforce
'
attack options .. dn effectjve BMB cQu]d preyent
W,,h ,CBMS
"*
SLBMS
" «— Action
would me^prevan. The success of counterforce and war- fighting
attacks is ,i kely t0 be severely degraded by ,^^
requiring either greater recces 1„ an attack on precluding these kinds
of attacks altogether. ,„ add,tion, reta „. atjon ^ ^^ ^
execution of an attack within m i„ utes of an Initial strike. Therefore
ICBMs and SLBMs may not be perceived as required any longer.
Finally, ballistic missile defenses are likely to lead to a
concerted effort by the U.S. and Soviet Union to develop and deploy
countermeasures to ballistic miss^e defenses. Although a number of
countermeasures have been previously developed, i.e. chaff and balloons
deployed by the ICBM 'bus' to confuse the defense's identification and
tracking subsystems, there may well be a tremendous expansion in
countermeasures technology. This expansion could erode the defense's
effectiveness and thereby enhance the offense's ability to penetrate.
Ballistic missile defense countermeasures can be categorized as both
active and passive. Passive countermeasures include changes to the
ball, stic missile, additions to its ability to avoid and penetrate a
defense, and tactics designed to confuse or overwhelm the system.
Active countermeasures to a U.S. BHD include ASAT weapons, space mines,
and electromagnetic pulse from the detonation of a nuclear weapon either
in space or in the atmosphere to blind or degrade the defense's sensors.
The Soviets probably are actively seeking effective countermeasures to
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* POtentla, U.S. strategic defense. They have repeat^^ ^t* wi„ perfect and deploy countermeasures to prevent a U.S. strategic
;
ef6nSe
^ CreStln9 aS~" «"— m i lit ary reUtlonshlp
between the superpowers.
Among the countermeasures often mentioned by the Soviets are
methods to attack and degrade or destroy space-based User stations
The Soviets have listed among these space m,nes and ground-based Users
The Soviets have pointed out that a ground-based User countenmeasure is
cheaper and easier to operate than a space system. In addition, the
power reared to disaoie a space platform is ,ess as the dwel, tim is
substantia, as satellites pass over the Soviet Union. The Sov,ets a,so
have stated their intention to upgrade their offensive forces should the
U.S. proceed with depioying a defense. Such measures include increases
in the numbers of missiles, warheads, and dummy reentry vehicles
creating difficulties for the detection systems of a U.S. defense. They
have spoken of depressing their SLBMs and adding cruise missiles in
different basing modes to their strategic arsenal. 28 These methods may
prove highly effective against a U.S. missile defense.
The U.S. strategic nuclear arsenal is in the midst of a major
modernization program. That program will be nearing completion by the
time the U.S. could decide to deploy a strategic missile defense. By
the mid 1990s, the U.S. will have new ICBMs, SLBMs, and two new
strategic bombers in its strategic force. These weapons will be far
more capable than the current force for carrying out counterforce
strikes on Soviet strategic forces and other critical war-supporting
assets. The introduction of strategic defenses of the kind envisioned
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^
PPeSident Reaga
" ™" the U.S. to debate the ro,e of its
offence forces. However, the tech„o,og ica ,
. strateg1c
, and^
Obstacles to an effective strategic defense are numerous an, may
Precede its eve, bein g dep,oyed. Given the number and nature of tnese
obstacles and the uncertainty oven the nature of the strategic haiance
'"the ,990s, it is „ k e,y that the U.S. wil, maintain Us offensive
deterrent. Any effort to radically aiter the coition and mission of
U.S. offensive nuclear forces nrinr t, „p o to or during a defense deployment is
11*1, to be considered premature. Finally, wh i.e strategic defense
technology appears to be gaining leverage on offensive forces, there is
little doubt that offensive countermeasures as we,, as new offensive
technology wi „ be deve,oped that may assure the offense's dominance in
the coming decades.
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CHAPTER FIVE
STRATEGIC DEFENSES AND STRATEGIC ARMS CONTROL
Strategic arms control has played an important role in 0 S
deterrence policy since the late 19,0s when U.S. officials be9 an to
appreciate that the U.S. was becoming increasing vulnerable to Sov,et
nuclear forces. As a result, the view of arms control as an effective
means of enhancing the deterrent relat,onsh,p between the superpowers
intensified. [„ addition, the signing and negotiation of an arms
control agreement ca.e to he perceived as one measure of the stability
of the strategic balance. While negotiations and agreements have been
difficult If not il.usive for the past six years, ams control remains a
critical measure of stability and key to the future of the strategic
bal ance
.
The objectives and roles promoted for strategic arms control have
expanded since the 1960s and resulted in the signing of a number of
agreements between the U.S. and Soviet Union. These agreements were
structured in a fashion as to regulate the strategic competition between
the superpowers and, in turn, to help reduce the risks of a nuclear war.
While strategic analysts and politicians have argued over the relative
merits and faults of the various standing agreements as well as the arms
control process, arms control continues to 0e an important component of
U.S. deterrence policy. A substantial part of the debate concerning
U.S. deterrence policy that emerged in the late 197us focused on the
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strategic value of arms control for U.S. security
Preset Keagan's strate g ic defense initiative is a conseguence
to so.e extent, of Ms Adninlstration-s
wlth ^ _
control agreements in force and the Ministration's perception of a
tUWed drmS C °ntr0
' »y »* a- strains. The Reagan
Ministration also is concerns with the pattern of ^ ^
the Soviet nuclear buildup and is part,cularl y interested ,„ the
emergence of new defense technoiogies and their potential role for
enhancing U.S. security. Regardless of thoy- K ai the justification for the SDI
that relates to arms control, it is difficult to ignore the i,„pact that
stand,ng agreercents and the arm s control process continue to have on
U.S. pol icy.
The U.S. has advocated arms control to help promote and maintain
its national security, in the broadest sense. The U.S. also has sought
to restrain Soviet aspirations to use nuclear weapons, either directly
on indirectly, to defeat the U.S. and its allies by tying the Soviets to
certain mutually accepted 'rules' of the game. In this case, these
rules concern the numbers, types, and capabilities of strategic nuclear
forces that the superpowers are allowed to develop and deploy.
Chapter One reviewed some of the various arguments made against ABM
systems in the 1960s, one of which charged that defensive weapons would
accelerate the arms race. In addition, critics of the ABM claimed that
a defensive arms control agreement could restrain an arms race between
the superpowers. Similar arguments have re-appeared since President
Reagan's initiation of the SDI and his call to "render ballistic
missiles obsolete". For example, the New York Bar Association's
««« on Internationa, Arms Contpfll M SKupity Afr^ s ^
u.s. prog™ o„ nationwide bsll1st1c ffl1ss1le defms
deration o f the Soviet Offensive buildup
... snd Wl|
, |(, dd ^
unregulated arms competition". 1
FOrmeP SeCreUry
" McNamara, an Sreh1tect of U.S. nuclear
policy 1n the 1960s that ultimately
,e.d to the control or defenses to
prevent an arms race, has active,, spoken against the SDI on the grounds
th«1tw1ll "sharp,, esca,ate the arms race because", as he states
"^Soviets will expend unlimited funds to invent weapons to defeat
It". ncNamara has argued that, although the SI) I ,„ay develop a
deployable missile defense system for the U.S.
, "the concept" of a
defensive balance "can not work because all of the (Reagan)
Administration's star wars plans
. . . „11 for the U.S. to continue to
rely on offensive weapons"/ The arms race critigue of the SDI is one
part of an ongoing debate concerning the very nature and role of arms
control in U.S. deterrence policy. That role, Illustrated by the
Signing of the ABM Treaty and SALT agreements, has been characterized by
efforts to preserve U.S. security while setting limits on the offensive
nuclear forces and defensive forces of both superpowers. The Reagan
Administration came to power criticizing both existing arms control
agreements, in particular the unratified SALT II Treaty and the arms
control process In general. The Administration's missile defense
proposal has heightened the arms control debate by questioning the basis
of the existing artns control regime. Ity establishing the goal or a
strategic defense aga,nst bal Hstic m ,ssi,es, the A^stration has
questioned the deterrence value of the ABM Treaty.
Ad,scuss 10 n of the i mp Mcat,ons of the SDI for arms control can b e
divided into two m a 0 or sections. The first section will ana ly ze the
role of arms contro, in a defense a U9TO nted or donated strategic
balance. The second section *,„ address locations for existing
treaties.
I. Strategic Defenses and the U.S. Arm. Cmtmi
The possibilities of an effective defense against a ballistic
missile attack pose a number of problems for strategic arms control
between the U.S. and Soviet Union including the potential violate of
existing treaties and the more fundamental issue concerning the future
of arms contro! as traditionally approached. Donald Snow goes as far as
to argue that "the introduction of BMD on any meaningful scale will
require some basic adjustments to our conceptions of deterrence, and
because arms control nas been based on these conceptions, it is likely
to be traumatic for arms control as well". 4
U.S. strategic arms control policy has been nearly coequal in
importance with other components of U.S. deterrence policy. Until the
Reagan Administration, arms control had played a more active role in
U.S. efforts to reduce the risks of war, reduce the potential damage
that might otherwise be suffered should war occur, and reduce the
burdens of peacetime defense preparations by slowing the nuclear arms
5
race. These objectives appear to be very similar on a strategic level
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th. associate, with the St rate9l c ,afense lnit 1at1 ve
, namelya,0Wenn9
"
"e M increase in crisis stability, and
neater incentive for reductions
,„ offensive nuclear weapons
_ ^
later goals were elated in the Hoffman Rep0 rt missioned by
control policies in the past and the defense initiative of the present
clash from a practical, if not philosophical, stand. A sol id
understanding of this conflict begins with a review of the foundations
upon which strategic arms control in tne U.S. has been built.
The primary purpose for which arms control has been sought by the
U.S. is a reduction in the risks of a nuclear war. The first official
consideration of an arms control policy by the U.S. came in 1954 with
the establishment of a Panel of Consultants on disarmament chaired by
Robert Oppenheimer. 5 The Oppenheimer Panel concluded that the U.S.
needed to pay particular attention to reducing the dangers of a surprise
nuclear attack on U.S. strategic nuclear forces. The issue of force
vulnerability was later grafted onto the concept of crisis and strategic
stability and has been a part of the nuclear debate since this time.
The threat to U.S. strategic forces, namely U.S. bomber bases, was under
review by Albert Wolhsetter at the Rand Corporation when the Panel's
Report was issued. The combination of these studies highlighted the
problems associated with reducing the threat of a surprise attack on
U.S. forces and provided an impetus to a number of academic discussions
on arms control. The development of theories concerning the role that
arms control could play in U.S. deterrence policy followed shortly
thereafter. In effect, these studies asked the question: can strategic
•« -tro, provide
. usefu
, means fop stabi]j2ing
balance and enhancing U.S. security? 7
Jtu.es ~ted by analysts such asMorton Haiperin>
0t
- ^- anns contro, theory ln the 196us 8 ,
4H *
Jos Pen Kruzel hasidentified four major themes as a result of hihis review of these works.
1. The primary importance for arms mntmicontrol is to enhance stability
and reduce the vulnerability of the U S to * « 9<-ne u.b. a surprise attack. The
emergence of the ICBM as the central Qtrat-
h ,
s e^c weapon of the superpowers
nad further dramatized the threat nf a en o a surprise attack on U.S. forces
A critical objective in these authors' opinions was for the U.S. to
develop and deploy invulnerable weapon systems. These early remarks
were accurate in projecting the vulnerability problem as a major issue
of the deterrence debate of the ly/Os.
2. Secondly, these ear,y theorists placed particular importance on
the avoidance of an acddenta, nuclear war for which they argued was a
need to ,.prove communication
,i„ks between them su^ ^^
Union. U The establishment of the Washington to Moscow 'Hot Line' was
one result of this idea and the advances of communication links has
remained an important project among arms control advocates. S^e of the
more recent examples of these kinds of communication mechan,sms include
the Standing Consultative Committee (SCC) established by the SALT I
accords in which the superpowers can raise questions of treaty
compliance or any other strategic issue. A recent proposal by Senator
John Warner of Virginia calls for the establishment of a Crisis Command
Center permanently and jointly manned by Sbviet and U.S. delegates which
war.
or a
e
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~W P- critic., military and pol1tical ^
superpowers as a means of diffusing potmja
, ly
"ne of the proponents' argents for the ABM sy stem ,„ the 1960s
was that an ABM system could help protect aaain.t ,i" u,-ec g s an accidental
S^uld a oallistic missile be accidental,, Uunched by a superpower
.
Before a retaliation mi u ht be ordered a „ ka . A number of defense advocates
have reiterated this argument today. Another major concern that the
proliferation of nuclear weapons could increase the likelihood of an
accidental missile launch or nuclear detonation and that these
conditions might quickly draw the superpowers into a war.
3. A third theme was the notion that the new enterprise of arms
control need not be explicit. 11 In effect, these theorists suggested
that arms control need not involve formal negotiations or treaties.
Some of the early theorists argued that unilateral measures and/or
informally agreed upon steps to reduce weapons or control certain
aspects of the strategic balance could provide equally successful
measures to reduce the risks of war as could formal agreements. While
there have been proposals for unilateral arms reductions efforts since
the 1960s, particularly in the West, neither superpower has taken major
steps in this direction. For example, the U.S. has continued to reject
Soviet proposals to follow its lead in declaring a nuclear weapons test
moratorium. The Reagan Administration's response has been to argue that
the U.S. must continue testing in order to catch up with Soviet weapons
development efforts. In addition, Teller's SDI program for a nuclear
pumped X-ray laser defense requires the testing of nuclear weapons.
-1-U1..W appreciation for the Hm1tations of arms contror u
:
h
;
r
;;
as a clyar under
— ^ -— w, not aisarmam; nt
out that U was a potentially effectsy rrective instrument for stabilizing the
strategic balance That ic ,
U.S. strategic security problems; rather it minht h idun , g help prevent certain
of superpower activities or events that could have v ery serious
and adverse influence on the security of the United States.
As Kruze, has ar.ued, and taken as a whole, the basic principles of
these early theorists present arms contro, as a modest hut useful
process. Tnese tneorists were largely anns contro , £onsermtves
The task, then, for arms contro, was to help safeguard the condition of
mutual deterrence. Arms contro! was to be a coequal part of U.S.
defense policy, rather than a substitute for it. 14
The arms control process has been expanded beyond these modest
principles and goals and has been charged with a broader task. While
the preservation of stab„ity was an overriding objective of the early
arms controllers, it has often taken an equal or second seat to other
objectives. "A serious problem for modern U.S. arms control nas been
confusion over objectives, over the basic purpose of the entire
enterprise". b That is, it has become increasingly more difficult to
obtain agreement within the U.S. and Western strategic community on the
nature of more comprehensive and complex accords. For example, the ABM
Treaty and SALT 1 accords were presented to the U.S. Congress and public
and justified as appropriate steps that would lead to offensive nuclear
arms reductions. Having failed to achieve arms reductions, arms control
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"in its objective of security in »h
" " P rese"«of arms, by means ofnation techn1ques ,, has an but ^ ^ ^
~-chno,ogy bas a,l out ecHpsed
««^.iM 11«ir » number of obstacles have developed that
most important factor is the general degree of oolitic, „•a ur P itical willingness
displayed by the superpowers to rparhi™ av e ching an agreement. However, there
are a number of domestic nnlitiVai ,•political impediments to arms control.
Steven Miller has suqqesteri th.t thggested that the arms control process does not
lack for ideas and proposals, just success Mi 1
1
b . Miller argues that much of
the failure to achieve agreements is due to domestic political
factors. Miner further suggests that while politics can prevent
agents, it is not always to the detriment of U.S. security. Two
Phases of arms control can be described. On the one hand, the policy
formulation process occurs in „h,ch negotiations among the various
branches of the government are conducted. The Department of State,
Department of Defense, the Arms Control and Disamament Agency (ACDA),
and Congress often have their own differing arms control agendas for
'
political and foreign policy concerns. 18 The most important player at
this juncture is the White House. Any policy, therefore, is the result
of considerable position jockeying and political bargain, ng as tne
vanous interests of the players are often quite opposed. For example,
the Department of Defense is concerned with a myriad of defense issues
- budgetary, weapons procurement, and safety - all of which become
very complex when interfered and constrained by arms agreements.
However, these conflicts do not take away from the fact that arms
control agreements can enhance U.S. securitv h
weapons systems.
-cU l y by constraining obtain
On the other hanU, a second phase Qf ^
politics of ratification 19 n'"tio . Donng the initial phase the White Houseleads, however, the Senate becomes the center of att >attention during the
ratmcation process. The criti^i f ^crmcal factor i„ this regard concerns thehandling of minority groups, either for or against fh»u t e agreement. For
example, 34 Senators can block the ratify,-tification of a treaty, while
public opinion also can be brouaht intn rhnoug into the ratification process, the
yame of politics rules. And, as demonstrated by the SALT II
ratification debates, the outcome is not necessarily guaranteed even
after an agreement has been signed. 20
Miller concludes that the "results of arm, control" - seen, in
9enera,, as disappointing
- "seems to be a consequence of the effects
of an imposing set of political impediments: policy formation, the
ratification process, electoral politics, congressional politics
bureaucratic politics, public opinion, even international politics, (all
Of which) have to be aligned properly or managed effectively if arms
control is to be pursued successfully." 21
Finally, the absence of a few components in favor of an agreement
can prevent its successful completion. For example, while there appears
to be strong public and Congressional support for arms control today,
the Reagan white House has appeared less interested and consequently no
agreements have been reached during the Reagan Presidency.
In uniliteral Statement A of the ABM Treaty, the U.S. specified
that it considered an offensive arms reductions treaty critical to Us
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'supreme interests' and the failure to achieve such an „„n agreement would
represent a sufficient has,s for withdraw,, from the Treat, « It
retired more tnan five years, the time prescribed by statement A, for a
new strategic arms limitations treat, to he negated and s,gned. The
SALT
,1 Treaty has never been ratified by the U.S. for various reasons
among them the growing debate in the U.S. over the value of such
treaties to U.S national security In + iL nt . i addition, the Reayan
Administration has put added pressure nn f ha +o the standing treaties as well
as U.S. compliance with SALT II by publishing reports of Soviet
violations of the Treaty. Some arms control critics, such as the
conservative Heritage Foundation, have urged the U.S. to take steps to
counter reported Soviet Treaty violations to include withdrawal from the
Treaty. However, the Administration had decided until recently to keep
the U.S. in Treaty compliance. The Administration now plans to deploy
cruise missiles on U.S. B-52 strategic bombers in late 1986 which would
be in violation of the SALT II Treaty.
Another critique, espoused by Magnus Clarke, sees arms control so
far behind technology that "the complete abandonment of the arms control
process, as it exists, and consequent total de-regulation of the
superpower arms race in all its aspects may now be the more appropriate
policy. To continue in the pursuit of arms control ... is to ignore
avenues which offer more promise to the goal of security". 23 A number
of other arms control critics, including Reagan Administration
officials, go beyond these conclusions and argue that arms control has
in fact had a negative effect on U.S. national security.
These critiques are neither accepted by the entire policy community
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on
any
7 39reementS " ^ «* of maJor weapons programsto such efforts by the Administration In
•
add 't'°". U.S. NATO partnershave strongly backed the arms control p rocess Thp „ .. e deployment of new
•
' nt™—
-,ear weapons (INF) 1n Europe was ^ ^ ^
--called
'two-tracked' approach in wnic n the Europea „
support INF deployments so long as the U S ™a n .S. sought an arms agreement
these weapons at the same time. The NATO allies are sensitive to
suggestion that the O.S. abandon Us nuclear
"-sting treaties or the arms control process. While the European
oovernments w,sh to encourage efforts such as the SO, that may lead to
-creased security, they are fearful that current U.S. efforts outs,de
of an arms agreement may de-couple U.S. and NATO security. These
governments are likely to pressure the II s c„ . lP U.S. to seek an arms agreement on
offensive forces before the U.S. can begin dep.oy,ng a missile defense.
In addition, any anti-tactical baUistlc missile defense (ATBM) designed
for NATO is likely to be accompanied oy great pressure in the arms
contro, arena as Soviet offensive weapons related efforts to counter a
defense would agitate the Europeans.
Kenneth Adelman. Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency for the Reagan Administration, has criticized the arms control
process from another perspective reminiscent of the early theorists.
Adelman argues that the arms control process has become overly political
and a process in which the U.S. has not played very well. Adelman has
argued that the U.S. "changes its positions on arms control so often
that the Soviets can take pleasure in the expectation that if they stand
«.» win negate with itself ano probably [hMje j(s^
«aresuU». Arms control took on an Waord.an
, y symbol ictrance ,„ U.S. po,itical W for botn^^ ^^
concerns
re, ations wi th i ts a„ ies «
stood fir™ on certain arms centre, positions for .est of Ms first term
but has new shewn himse.f to be .ore flexible, in part, Oue to pressures
to include arms control in nis Administration's deterrence policies
That is, Reagan increasing,, h as sought to portray arms centre, as an
of strategic defenses. These pressures have been generated by the
Congress as wel, as U.S. allies. Aden's argument, a,ong with the
critique that arms control has been unable to account for the
differences in Soviet and U.S. strategic policy and objectives, is
central to the Reagan Administration's position.
Strategic missile defenses run against the central tenets of
existing arms control treaties which purport to regulate the strategic
nuclear balance by confining the arms competition to the offensive
arena. The decision to rely on offensive deterrence rests with the
realization that defenses could not prevent an enemy from causing
unacceptable damage to the United States. The U.S. has basically
dismantled its defenses against a nuclear attack and has, in turn,
sought to preserve its security through a policy of retaliation and arms
control agreements. For example, the U.S. dismantled its surface-to-air
missile network, has allowed its air defense interceptor force to
dwindle, ana mothballed all but the radars of the Safeguard ABM defense
system constructed in the early 1970s. A shift in favor of strategic
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defenses could overturn a number of the stratwlrn ategic assumptions upon which
the current nuclear balance r«t. >»jrests and the arms contro! policies proposed
•* control istied to the traditional strategic concepts, name,,
offensive dominance, national vulnerability, and strategic stability
through invulnerable offensive forces, it is ,i ke , y t0
Within a U.S. deterrence theory dominated by strategic defenses.
While not exhaustive, C,ar,e has identified
"two principle factors"
which he concludes "have been held to threaten the stability of the
deterrent relationship" between the superpowers. 26 The first is the
possession of a first str, k e disarming capability and the second is the
possession of an effective defensp 27 Rnth « na r e. Both would weaken the assurance
that an enemy was deterred from launching a nuclear attack and are
general ly attributable to assured destruction theory and policies. Arms
control, in this context, has been associated as a means for preventing
the emergence of destabilizing efforts by the superpowers. That is,
arms control has served to restrain those activities deemed most likely
to destabilize the nuclear balance as well as those most easily
verified. However, "the reality of the central deterrent relationship
has diverged from both deterrence theory and the arms control image". 28
Both the United States and the Soviet Union have sought to procure
counterforce capable weapons which could give them a limited first
strike capability and as such limited defense capabilities when used in
a damage limitation mode. Constraint on counterforce weapons has been
relatively unsuccessful as the accuracy of ballistic missiles has
improved and the superpowers have deployed thousands of warheads on
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MIRVed bal listic missile t u
_
siles. The arms control process ™ *
fha , . .
M'u has contributed to
re,a
r
e success
°
f
—
-
-
—
of M effective
—tlypreSslngthecred,imyofthearmscontro]
regulate this arena.
" "e — t0 portray arms contro
,
weakening element of U.S. deterrence policy. Existing treaties are
'"aliens part, by the strate91c defense Initiative. The anms
control regime and enternrico ^ kp se
,s being critiqued for undermining u S
security rather than providing for it
. However
_
the^
Administration believes "the pursuit o, the SO, and eguitahle and
verifiable arms control agreements are not mutually exclusive, in fact
they 'may be' mutually supportive"." The question remains: What is
H*e,y to be the future of arms contro, as the U.S seeks to implement a
defense deterrence doctrine, policy, and force structure?
Secretary of Defense Weinberger has argued that arms control can
serve U.S. national security interests as one component of the U.S.'s
larger national security policy but not as an isolated objective or
independent instrument. 30 As such, Weinberger believes that the U.S.
nnly can achieve effective arms agreements when negotiating from
strength. For example, the Reagan Administration has touted the
argument that the SDI has brought the Soviets back to the bargaining
table and will further lead to greater flexibility on the part of the
Soviets. In addition, the Reagan Administration has made the reduction
in numbers of weapons (measured by their effectiveness) the primary
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concern for an arms ^
^^ ^
Str6n9thenin9
*"«— <" -ces - has made ams
control a more difficult enterprise under
T^ere has emerged an interesting d 1Scuss,on among m p
—in, arms centre, from the critically m.noed t0 those
a™s contro, in some fashion an, see lmport ant options emerging as a
result of the strategic defense initiative. As such, the SO, couid befe .neatest
,mpetus to arms control or them^ ^ ^
Sov,ets nave been adament about an agreement on the SO, which
,nOicates
eventual difficulty in reaching any agreements, the, are back at the
negotiating tab,es and desperatiy want to reach some agrees. The
lesson of these developments for Administration hard-liners is to hold
fast on the SO, in Geneva while moderates see the SO. as a critica,
negotiating card to obtain meaningful offensive reductions. A number of
ams contro, critics, such as the Heritage Foundation, foresee little if
any role for arms control and have urged the Administration to abandon
U.S. Treaty obligations. Other strategic defense proponents, including
President Reagan, forsee an important role emerging for arms agreements
in a nuclear balance which includes controlled defensive deployments.
Hence, arms contro, could range from unhindered defenses and no arms
control to offensive arms limits and no defense. Between these two
extremes there could be various combinations for mutual offensive cuts
and restraints on defensive deployments.
A number of critics believe the Reagan Administration is insincere
about arms control. As outlined above, the SOI could require a major
shift in the traditional U.S. approach toward arms control. The
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important
" *"-""««. of a defense demoted balance. U th1s
regard, the superpowers have agreed to a three subject arms control
approach in Geneva. The first meetings held in Harch 1,85 divided the
agenda into strategic intercontinental weapons,
-lean weapons, and space-based weapons systems. Adelman announce, in
^ U - S
- ^ to the ,« contro, talts
more defense-oriented deterrents could lead to a situation where the
peace was not rest,ng on the threat of mu tua, annihi That is
the Reagan tea, Oe| leves that strategic miss.le defenses eventually can'
he deveioped and deployed in an arms control context. Reagan has stated
that the U.S. would be willing to share defense technology with the
Soviets if they were to agree to an arms control accord that called for
mutual deployments of ballistic missile defenses. The Administration
effectively is seeking to preclude any agreement that would constrain
the SDI research program during its current phase and leave open to
discussion agreements on later phases.
A cornerstone of the Reagan Administration's arms control policy to
date has been a proposal to reduce the size of the offensive land based
forces of the superpowers. Since his strategic defense speech, Reagan
has emphasized the need for offensive arms reductions as a part of a
defense deployment process. The Administration recognizes the threat of
a simultaneous offensive and defensive arms race should the Soviets seek
to overcome a U.S. missile defense by employing offensive
counter-measures to include an increase in the size of their offensive
-eararsena!.
offensive arms reductions are possible if the b. s . iswiIMng tQ
constrain the SDI bv a treat,, u„y P aty
-
H0Wever
-
the Reagan Administration has
said that the SDI is not negotiable Th„ «h. e Admin, strati on appears to have
every intent to continue the researrh „ ,c and development phases or the SDI
with or without an arms control agreement.
While there ma, be room in the Keagan Administration's position
for agreements on later stages to include a transitional deployment it
has not been revea.ed as yet. Weinberger has argued, in this regard
that the pursuit of defensive deterrence by the superpowers may provide
the Soviets with a reason to consider offensive reductions. The
Administration's optimism may not be well thought out as Soviet and
domestic objections could act as powerful obstacles to defense
deployments. A number of SDI critics have argued that the Reagan
Administration actually wishes to force the Soviets into an offensive
arms reduction accord by deploying a U.S. missile defense. Former
Secretary of Defense Brown has responoed to this idea by arguing that
"deployment of a U.S. missile defense ... to gain arms reductions
fails on logic. U.S. MIRVs may have produced the ABM Treaty but it is
difficult to see how U.S. ABMs will produce constraint on Soviet
it 32MIRVs". It the U.S. continues to insist that the SDI is
non-negotiable, there is unlikely to be any arms control agreements on
strategic offensive and defensive forces at all. Moderates in
Washington are hoping that the Soviets will accept deep offensive cuts
in returen for some restraint on the SDI. The Office of Technology
Assessment concluded that this would be a logical choice as limited
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-fenses are feasible on ly a, inst reduced^ , f
but that area defenses would not work.
A number of arms contro, advocates have suggested that the SDI can
serve as a bargain,ng chip, much as the orig,„d
, U-S
. ABM^
eventually served, to encourage Soviet flexibility in Geneva on an
offensive arms contro, accord. Critics claim that failure to ne9otiate
on SDI risks provoking a similar Soviet stratPnir h -ou i eg c defense effort and
thereby an escalation in the arms race. The Reagan Ministration has
Publishing its account of Soviet violates of existing treat.es and by
documenting existing Soviet strategic defense program. As such, the
Reagan Administration is seem,ng,y p, acing the s0 , ,„ th(j Qf
'reprisals' for Preach of Treaty obligations by a second party. In this
case, the Adm,nistration my have some justification for calling the SDI
legal in response to specific Soviet violations of the ABM Treaty,
namely the construction of large phased-array, early warning radar at
Krasnoyarsk. 33
President Reagan has suggested that the U.S consider discussing a
sharing and coordinated deployment of ballistic missile defenses with
the Soviets. In this regard, "the President ... is known to believe
that unilateral deployment by the U.S. would be destabilizing. The
Soviets would be convinced that the U.S. was interested in developing a
first strike capability and might respond with a pre-emptive strike of
their own." 34 The Administration may believe it can pressure the
Soviets into an offensive arms control accord and then establish an
agreement on phased defense deployments. However, the Administration
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"as not proposed pub, Icly
.„ arms control
f ,
ayenaa that would achievethese ends. Confusion persists due to confix
„h •
inflicting reports that theAdministration is inflexible on the SDT
feeders and „ ' ^
"hUe 3,50 pu "'"9 outt n hints of flexibility Thi, „ «
associated wth the f1rst J f ' "M S S^esof a „ew arWs control negotiating
"
additi
°- *—
—
-es not want to bind the
;
r
e
T
ram^ " *— ~- ~s to the goestion of
7 y - 5—-tate Shult, ,„ formPd
Un '° n ^ * revise its plans to dep, oy a
_
—egic defense ,f the Soviets wene willing to agree on significant
offensive arms reductions Tbis announcement may nepnesent the first
'oo, at a U.S. arms control position relative to defense weapons.
,„
fact, the U.S. may ultimate
,y seek t0 obuin ^ a ^ ^ ^
cuts in offensive forces and a„ow some strategic defenses. This avenue
-gh be far
.one effective in enhancing deterrence and stabilizing the
strategic balance.
what are the arms control options available to the U.S. should it
decide to proceed with a strategic missile defense? Ueorge Keyworth
science adviser to President Reagan, has outlined three goals for arms
control in the context of the SD1. He argues that arms control, to be
effective in promoting U.S. security must reduce the risks of nuclear
wan, reduce the level of arms, and lessen the consequences of wan. 36
The Reagan Administration may attempt to achieve these goals in a number
of ways. As described above, the Administration has argued that it
«ould like to conclude an offensive anms control agreement which, in
turn, might provide the basis for an eventual BHD deployment. While it
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is not inconceivable that the Soviets would agree to an ,arms control
treaty that cuts offensive j™=i arms and prov,des for scheduled defense
events, the
^'-e of power. Soviet Union, unlike the U.S., maintains the
verity of its nuclear capability on land-hased
,CB Ms ThesQbt?u i^b . e weapons
— y
to he the first tar 9et of a d,. defense. Hence, the Sov,ets
than by opposing it.
The resolution of thesp pnnfn,^n e conflicting positions - SDI's most
advantageous ro,e in arms control - „ dependent on , „ umber Qf^
—
s. F,rst, the techn,ca, feasibility of a missile defense wil,
erectly constrain the positions the U.S. can advocate in an arms
control regime, for example, should traditional ABM ,nterceptors prove
feasible while more exot,c defenses do not, the U.S. may seek
modifications to existing treaties rather than scrapping them. Second
the overall military/political implications of a U.S. BHD for the
superpowers' nuclear arsenals and the stability of the strategic balance
Will have to be cons,dered critically before advancing a defined arms
control position. That is, the benefits of a U.S. BMU may not outweigh
the continued or enhanced benefits of maintaining and strengthening a™
control. Finally, the options for arms control available to the U.S.
will influence the U.S.'s decis,ons as to its future arms control
approach.
A more detailed example of the offensive reduction and defensive
deployment scheme has been labelled a 'defense protected builddown'
(DPB). The proposal calls for a phased introduction of strategic
- Where lnitjal defenses would be deployed t0 protect retal1at0
StPUCtUred t0 inC
' Ude~ S
-— forces and deployment
-e capa b ,e tenses a round a greater number Qf targets
_
38 ^
defense problem might be made easjer an
environs, it would not automatica„y mea „ ^ ^^
was a wise decision for U.S. security.
Nitze's defense criteria m only pe met somewhat more easily
,„ an
offensive reduced world. 39 A defense U still i-l ,,s in ''^ly to have a number
of inherent technical limitations and flaws, such as
command-control-communication UnKage problems, in addition to
difficulty handling remaining Soviet penaided offensive forces.
Secondly, the cost savings associated with reduced offensive forces are
unlikely to compensate entirely for expenditures toward a defense.
Final,,, fitting the defense deployments into an arms control framework
in order to maintain stability in a manner acceptable to the superpowers
is a major task. 40
An additional arms control option to constructing a new agreement
could involve the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC). The
Commission is not well known but has been critically important to the
arms control regime for the past decade and a half. The Commission,
established during the SALT I accords, can consider compliance
questions, changes to the strategic balance that may bear on Treaty
provisions, measures to increase the viability of existing agreements
including amendments, as well as proposals for limiting strategic
41
weapons. The SCC has had success in clarifying provisions of the ABM
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Treat, ana ecu,. prove useful in clarify1ng lBtarpprt,tl0M of
provisions of the Treaty bearing on the strategic defense initiative
program. However, the SCCs effectiveness i„ th,s regard dependent
on the attitudes of the superpowers regarding the overall value of arms
control advocates. Thp srre SCC could prove useful to achiev lng less formal
arms agreements as suggested by AC DA Director Adelman and ma i may avoid some
of the domestic poHtlcal a rms contro, pitfalls and barr1ers nomd]]y
accompanying the more forma! arms contro, negotiating process.
1
1
• Mense and Existina^1£nn^j^j t lj^
The U.S. and Soviet Union have entered into a number of arms
contro! agreements over the past two and a half decades of which three
have an impact on the current and future character of the strategic
defense Initiative and any possible U.S. strategic defense system.
These treaties are: the 1963 Multilateral Limited Test Ban Treaty, the
1967 Mult, lateral Outer Space Treaty, and the 1972 ABM Treaty and its
amendments of 1974. Should the U.S. decide to move beyond its present
defense technology research program as defined by the SDI to the full
development of ballistic mis S1 le defenses or to expand the scope of its
technology test programs, it could begin to bump up against limitatibns
on these activities as established by these Treaties. Each of the
Treaties place specific as well as general controls and limits on
various aspects of strategic defense technology (ie. mobile ABMs are
prohibited by the ABM Treaty), and/or the development and deployment of
defense systems. President Reagan's SDI may require modification or
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U.S. withdrawal from these Treatipc ifI es
,f pursued beyond u$
configuration.
the U.S.', effort t0 estab)1sh ru|es
, nthe stmeg1c cMpetuion
between the superpowers Ypi- t-h^P . et, the measure of their success is dependent
on a number of factors including one's strain,a s trategic perspective, the extent
of change in the strategic balance over time and th„c n , e relative adherence
by the signing parties to the Wi.,'Treaties provisions. An additional point
else, to reduce the risks of war and not as an end in itself .« That
1.. not a„ forma, treaties serve or continue to serve the objective of
reducing the risks of War and promoting U.S. nationa, security. Neither
an individual treaty nor the arms control regime can be considered
sacrosanct
.
A
- Limited.
J
est Ban Treaty
The 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty was the first important Treaty to
emerge in what might be termed the arms control era, roughly represented
by the period from 1963 to 1979. Th 1S period represents the heyday of
the 'traditional approach' to strategic arms control between the U.S.
and Soviet Union. That approach came to be centered on efforts to
confine the activities of the superpower competition to quantifiable and
verifiable areas. The Limited Test Ban Treaty regulates the area in
which nuclear tests can be conducted; in this case, the areas are the
earth's atmosphere, outer space, and the oceans. The ABM Treaty and
SALT accords regulate the numbers of launchers for ABM interceptors and
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strategic nuclear weapons, respectively that th.'J'' n e superpowers candeploy. Generally, these regulated or control led' areas can be
ver,f,ed by
'national techn.cal means'.
in 1963, President Kennedy called the Limited Test Ban Treaty
"animportant step in man's effort to escape from the darkening prospects of
ore
-ruction and saw in Us Sign, ng the prospects of detente between
tne two superpowers" ThieP Th 1S enthusiasm for arms control has been
embraced by every president since Presidpnt , Ae Kennedy until the Reagan
Administration. The political appeal of arms control can be record
as these agreements can offer, according to Kruze,
, "the double virtue
°f slowing the arms race and improving U.S.-Soviet relates" +«
whether one believes that either the arms race has been slowed or
superpower relations improved does not taKe away from the appeal of arms
control.
,„
fact, the Reagan Administration has embraced arms control
m its effort to improve the superpowers' relations. The Administrate
also has raised the prospects of an arms agreement in a defense
dominated strategic balance. However, the Adm,n,stration has not been
willing to discuss the possibility of limiting the SD. program in order
to promote an arms agreement. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, has
stated that is unwilling to agree to an arms control accord in other
areas unless the SOI is included. The reasons for arms control's appeal
and the commensurate expansion of its role in U.S. policy as well as its
inability to fulfill all presidential dreams will be addressed further
in later sections of this chapter.
The 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty concluded a comprehensive ban on
nuclear explosions in the atmosphere, in outer space, and under the
oceans. Although the initial focus of the SDI had h
. -
6 bU been on non-nuclear
defense technology and weapons systems * „ kP^ , a number of defenses under
:
nS ' derati0n COnf,
-ed * -— weapons. The ABM systans of
^ - th6Nik
-—ol,ow
-onSent 1„a l and Safeguard
" employed nuclear warheads S cn as their operative kill mechanisms
against reentry vehicles. Currently, there are a f« h ,Ln ew defense systems
under ,nvest,ga tl on by the SUI0
, such a$ „„.,.., ^ ^
defense, that would be dependent on „uc , ear explosions fn outer $pace ^
generate missile killing lasers.
The Test Ban Treaty preCu.es the testing of nuclear weapons in the
atmosphere or in outer space, thereby preventing actua, 'envi ro^enta, •
testmg of these weapons. The Treaty would preclude the deployment of a
nuclear exp,osion dependent defense if It were designed to be deployed
in space. The future development or testing of this kind of system in
an operational mode would entail a U.S. violation of the Treaty.
Relative to these kinds of restrictions, President Reagan has stated
that the SDI will not violate the provisos of any arms control treaty
currently in force. However, research by the U.S. to develop an
effective defense of the kind envisioned by the Reagan Administrate
may eventually require the violation of a number of treaty provisions.
B. Outer Space Treaty
A second treaty which will have some impact on the development or
deployment of strategic defenses being explored by the SDIO is the 1967
Outer Space Treaty, formally called the Treaty of Principles Governing
the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space,
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including the Koon and other Celestial Bodies. 4 * Art icie „ „ ^Treaty prohibits the stationing of nuclear weapons ^
The Treaty also precludes tbe
establ1shraent of ™mtary bases, Inflations or fortifications
~s, or weapons test1„ g on celestial bod,es. The objective of the
Treat, was to b an the nuclear weaponization of space and P rec lude thedeploys of weapons systens siml, ar to a fractional orbital
bombardment system (FOBS), essentially nuclear tipped orbital ball1st1c
""ssi.es. However, the Treaty failed to effective,. Pan FOBS and does
not preclude the passing of nuclear armed ,CBMs through space. The
Treaty, as in the case of the Limited Test Ban Treaty, would Hn.it to
some extent the deploy.ent of ballistic
.issile defenses stationed in
space that employed nuclear weapons to destroy ballistic missiles.
However, the interpretation of these restrictions is likely to be
subject to debate between the superpowers. 46
According to Thomas Beer, strategic defense systems, such as a
directed energy weapon (DEW), which would draw their energy from a
nuclear source can not be considered a 'nuclear weapon' since the
nuclear component of the energy production source is not enough in
itself to define it as a nuclear weapon. 47 Even though the specific
technical components of Teller's nuclear pumped laser may not qualify it
as a violation of the specific prohibitions of the Treaty, according to
the previous interpretation, these weapons would clearly violate the
spirit of the Treaty. Beer has concluded that the "relevance of the
Treaty to the prevention of the militarization of space is marginal. It
leaves loopholes for
. . . military activities, such as the deployment
of
.
. . space-based BMU weapons." 48
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sP ,ce by the 0uter space Treny
_ While
prove useful to an offensive strategy -
„ a strat thW ie. n egy that relied on aP-mpt^e attack on Sov,et fonces - in conjunct
, 0„ ^ y $
-ces, they can not function as an offensive
.neat, pen se. The oniy
true offensive role U S mi^ii* h *. . ,ss,le defenses could play by themselves would
°e as anti-satellite weapons (ASAT). In an ASAT role, a U.S. laser
defense or Hnetlc kn, weapon might be able t0 destroy Soviet^
warn,n 9 and reconna, sance satellites as a precursor to a nuclear strike
on the Soviet Un,on or as a means to enhance the survivability of a U.S.
missHe defense system prior to or during a war.
In addition, there is considerable concern about the survivability
of a U.S. space-based missile defense. While hardening and overlapping
deployments can enhance the system's survivability, the U.S. would have
to ultimately consider some anti-countermeasure role for some of its
defense assets. That is, the U.S. is likely to require ASAT dedicated
Platforms or defense systems with inherent self-defense capabilities
against possible Soviet direct attack countermeasures. The issue of
discriminating ASAT from missile defenses will be particularly difficult
in an arms control agreement.
C. The ABM Treaty
The most important strategic arms control treaty to date is the
1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty 49 Tho ty
*
The Treat
^ ^presented the formalexpress.on cf U.S. strategic nuclear deterrence tho ht ,
1970, tk t
i ug of the earlys. The Treaty symbolizes the essence of fh«C t e concept of mutual
deterrence as enshrined by the mutual «c *7 U U a5SUred destruction doctrine and
suggests a common understanding on the relating k
•
,n
lationship between offensive
and defence weapons.** That is, "the Treaty reflected the
temporary predictionsm^ probable trends ln strategy forces „
^— ed-^ -her reasons, to help forestall the growth of
the superpowers' offensive nuclear arsenals.*' As such, the Treaty has
SerVed
" - of the arms control regime for the past decade
and a half.
The Treaty, mod,fied by protoco
, sjgned )n ^ ^ ^
depioyment of an ABM system around the nationa, capita, or an 1CBM
launch field to include one hundred Punchers and no more than one
hundred ABM missiles. Both the U.S. and Soviet Union have deployed ABM
defenses; the Soviets dep,oyed the Galosh ABM system around Moscow and
the U.S. deployed the Safeguard defense around a U.S. Minuteman field
While the Soviet Union has mainta,ned its ABM system since the signing
of the Treaty, the U.S. dismantled all but the system's radars in the
mid-1970s.
The Treaty contains a number of provisions which prohibit or place
restrictions on ABM activities and systems. Article V bans the
'development, testing, and deployment of ABM systems and components that
are sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile land-based' and
precludes deployment of launchers capable of multiple shots or rapid
reload." Article V represents the heart of the Treaty with respect to
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the goals and scope of activities th*+at can be undertaken by the
Strategic Defense Initiative Oration. As such any d1
miccil* a * 9 y plans t0 movedefense technolog, development into these restricted
as art,,,! c *
areas, such
c ual s,stem testing or to dep,o,men t
, would violate ^
Host ana„sts would ag ree that the Keagan Administration ^J, tflremain within the Treaty boundaries with respect „»'in to traditional ABM
-apons development. That „. the deve.opment of land-based ABM
-erceptors, similar to those emp,o,ed in the Sa fe9uard s,stem, are
to retire the violation of the Treat, Tor sometime as this
techno,
o
9y a, read, has been proven feasible. In addition, the Treat,
Provides tor the operation ot an ABM research facilit, b, ooth nations
However, there are a number ot 'exotic' techno,o g ,es under consideration
0* the SOIO that do not fall into the traditona, anti-ballistic missile
interceptor category.
in anticipation of the development of advanced technologies, Agreed
Statement 0 was attached to the Treat, to help with the handling of
these weapons. Statement D stipulates that "the parties agree that in
the event ABM s,stems based on other ph,sica, principles and including
components capable of substituting for ABM interceptor missiles, ABM
launchers, or ABM radars are created in the future, specific limitations
on such s,stems and their components would be subject to discussion in
accordance with Article XIII"." Until the Fall of 1985 the Reagan
Administration's justification for certain SDI related testing was that
the, were too rudimentar, or peripheral to be the kind barred b, the
54
Treaty. However, this issue is now the subject of intense debate as
the Reagan Administration has sought to define Treaty interpretation
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on
had
addUi0na
' — '* is »CH less restricted
;
—
-
ewofthe negotiating records conducte;
testing and development „^ ^^ ^
been a U.S. objective" during ^ ^
-cent statements by officials invo]vfid ,„ ^^
—ate that the U.S. sought t0 provlde cover in the ABM
U-hasea laser ABM defense then under consideration by the Department
of Defense. This basic conflict locates the latitude of
interpretation which the Reagan Administration feels it may need to
continue strategic defense research and testing beyond its current
status. It also inmates a desire on the part of the Administration to
stay within the Treaty provisions while bringing up the question of
Treaty compliance for debate domestically.
The interpretation of ArtiCe U, Article V, and Agreed statement D
poses the greatest threat to the viability of the ABM Treaty's continued
control on ballistic missile defenses. It also may provide the
'loophole' through which the SDI may progress without running afoul of
the Treaty and could either prevent or instigate a major political and
strategic setback to arms control. In October 1985, Reagan
Administration officials stated that the Administration's interpretation
of the Treaty, precipitated by the Pentagon Report mentioned above,
would "not prohibit the testing or development on new technologies such
as kinetic or directed energy weapons". 57 Critics of the SDI, including
former negotiator uerard Smith, charged that this 'broao interpretation'
would sound the death knell of the ABM Treaty. Smith's position is that
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««« defense weapons were banned „ ^ ^
:::rr
of Art,cie v and that A9reed^the handHng of e*ot,c weapon systans and components.** The
ministration Uter stated that ,t wou,d adhere to the more restrictive
interpretation « „ acknowledge th4t it „ ^ , y ^
applying the 'broad interpretation'. 59
The debate has become more intense due, in part, to the fact that
the Reagan Administration appears to have assaulted past
Adm,nistrat,ons' and their own
.nterpretation of the Treat,. The U S
Arms Control and Csanmament Agency's report to the U.S. Congress in
1** applied the interpretation that the creat,on of space-based ABMs
-u.d he a breach of Treat, obligations, whereas the creation of new
fixed land-based ABM technology would not. 6" ,„ ddd1tion
, , March ^
report to Congress "did not offer a reinterpretation of Treaty
limitations; rather, it argued that prospective tests were compatible
with the Treaty because devices tested in space did not constitute full
fledged substitutes for ABM systems or their components". 61
The restrictive interpretation, with respect to the development of
exotic defense weapons and as explained to the press, limits defense
weapons testing in three ways: 1. Tests must be conducted at reduced
power levels; 2. The development of defense system prototypes is
prohibited, 3. Additional technical limits also apply such as a
prohibition on automatic reloading. 62 The U.S.'s position was very
similar to this interpretation in its Iga5 Arms Control Impact Statement
to Congress. According to the Statement, the Treaty allows research
occurring in the laboratory and prohibits development and testing
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-™ypeSorabroa,basedmodel ,3
as announced by National Secu
researrh in„„,
McFarlane, would allow
c l Vlng
_ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^
de
7Pment - ——,som,ghta Udw the ,, t0 conduct»«- testing outs1de „ thfi Ubomory thepeby ppoviding^
rtilutlc assessments of operating limitations
Much of tMscontnovens.ne.Wes
anound the ,nten Pretat,on of the
components'.
tech„o, 0gi es used in ABM defense systems developed at the time of th.
Treaty
-
inte ncepton missies, launchers, and nadans." G1ven thjs
definition of an ABM system, debate centens on the handling of new
defense weapons technology. Milton Smith pointed out that "nowhene in
the ABM Tneaty ane lasens nartiri. k' , panticle beams, infrared sensons, on othen
types of new ABM technologies mentioned. The question thenefone anises
-ethen the ABM Tneaty covers these new techno,og,es.»" Been has added
that "while the wording" cunnently
"suggests that" advanced weapons "are
-Coded, the matter is
. . . completed by Agneed statement D that
. .
•
specific limitations on exotic systems and thein components will be
subject to consultations." 67 Acconding to the Admi„ ls tnation's bnoad
intenpnetation, Article V does not apply to new defense technologies
which ane the centnal part of the SOI. Both Abraham Sofaer and Paul
Nitze, anms contnol advisors to the Reagan Administnation, defended this
intenpnetation to the Congress. Sofaer's pos,t,on is that Article II
and V nelate only to conventional ABM systems and not futuristic
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. However; s
provision for uiscussion on sped negation, 0„
-systems implies an,ntent,on include them within the genera,
Treaty ^nations, ^he parties had intended for n0 limjtat1ons ^
apply to such systems they would not have needed t „ _ the ^
SPeC,f1C ""- Whilethe
-~s for and against certain
interpretations areeguaHy compe„i n9
, the overall issue is, as C. R a0 aMohan states, "only symptomatic of the ,arger crisis in nuclear arm
control .
"
/u
In light of the restrictions placed upon BHD by the ABM Treaty the
U.S. will he faced with a numher of choices should it pr0ceed with
strategic defense development, testing, and deployment of a defense
system. Although It is too early to know what a HKely 8MU system will
look like should the U.S. deploy such a defense, there are three hasic
avenues which the U.S might follow from the current status of BHD
development that would affect the ABM Treaty. The U.S. may decide to
forgo a BMD deployment and only maintain an active defense research
effort in order to hedge itself against a Soviet breakout, thereby,
protecting the ABM Treaty as it currently stands. This approach has
been widely advocated by such former government officials as Robert
McNamara and Harold Brown who feel that the potent, al hazards in trying
to achieve a BMD system include a vigorous arms race and a more
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--h P ro9 raraof somewhat sm.Her s1 ze than the SD,
prudent course of action for the United states
The second and third options open to the ,S. assume that the.,
"l.dep.o, either a 11mited counterforce defense or a broader
countervalue defense as discussed in Chapter Two. The U.S may seek to
ePl0ya,imUed dete " Se
— '"«**« ^rces
assets and to do so by seek,ng minor modificatfon$ tQ ^ ^
Modifications may ,„clude amenaments t0 ^ ^ ^^
of launchers and m,ssi,es and their deployment Nations. The U.S. also
»y atte.pt a more comprehensive defense that would In .„ , ikeHn00d he
seen as a 'breakout' from the ABM Treaty, he It gradual or radical, and
would necessitate a ma.or renegotiation or auction of the Treaty.
White House spokesman Edward Ojerejian has stated that the
Administration believes "that n.„ a
... the day will come when we will have
answered the questions necessary to consider going beyond the
restrictions that we have" in the Treaty." Presumably> the ^^
attempt to renegotiate to allow for exotic defense deployment or simply
notify the Soviets of a U.S. intention to withdraw from the Treaty.
Among the issues which the U.S. will be faced with by the early
199US, when defense testing will likely require reversion to the broad
interpretation, are a final resolution of the 'broad' and 'restrictive'
interpretations of Article V and Agreed Statement U as well as a more
precise definition of ABM components, launchers, missiles, and radars in
72Article II. The Reagan Administration has already created the
precedent of declaring it legally justifiable to use the 'broad'
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interpretation but has declared Us current Intent t""t i o continue researrh
under the restri«~- ™.
1 j::
~o,e St ,ons. At what pojnt w1 „ ^
bP0M
'
nterPreUti0n
"""«"'««
- the results at thit l1me?
atever tne outc^e of the interpretat,on debate H
-taxation of tne
""'.tested.
broad interpretation is likely to lead
to widespread condemnation by the Sov.et Union. NATO a„,es and
domestic arms control advocates.
position may be weakened as the Soyiets beajn ^ ^
interpretat,on to justify Us own strategic defense program.
Another major prob.em that has plagued the arms control process in
the past and is unlikely to recede anytime soon is compliance
verification. An agreement that ,s not verif,ab,e (can not he verified
for technical or tactical reasons) is general
,y believed to be useless
by the U.S. policy community. The IJ S ha<; in<:ict- QH „u,0> n s insisted on a number of
mechanisms to achieve venfiabi.ity in an arms reduction proposal.
However, the Soviets have been unwilling to accept a number of these
proposals due in part to their Internal security constraints.
A particular problem with respect to verification is the
implicate of cheating on an agreement. The threat posed by a nation
tnat cheats is roughly equal to the size of the cheating. In the
context of offensive arms reductions (ie. fifty percent), the danger of
unaccounted and clandestinely deployed weapons may prove highly
destabilizing. That is, the value of individual weapons is increased
when the total number of weapons is reduced. For example, a Soviet
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program for an add1tional nftyss _ 24 ICBMs
all °Wed
"
3 50 P™— ^nslve balance would be Sfien „
OOwa^s and might be adequatfi h Wf „ ^
land-based nuclear arsenal (i.e. where the U S has Sun mu.i. bUO Minuteman Ills
°r some combination with the Mx,. While this kind of scenario is
entire,, hypothetical, it d0es provlde ins1ght ^ ^^
"-ay face In a offensive reduced and defense dep,oyed world.
The introduction of missile defenses may render the probes of
arms control verification as presented in the scenario above less
critical and thereby enhance the prospects for reaching an arms
agreement. A missile defense system may be able to facilitate arms
reductions by reducing the utllit, of offensive nuclear forces. 73 That
is, the propensity to cheat on an arms reduction agreement may be
reouced as the individual value of offensive weapons is degraded. Fifty
clandestine!, deployed weapons is unlikely to represent a significant
threat to the defense capabHities of a U.S. missile defense, in
addition, there might be more pressure on the Soviets not to cheat in
order to prevent the U.S. from scrapping a treat, and deploy ,ng more
offensive forces and defenses. The Soviets would need to deploy
considerably more than fifty weapons to gain a meaningful increase in
their offensive capabilities. The size of such a deployment is unlikely
to go undetected by the U.S. intelligence community.
While a lessening of the verification requirements for offensive
forces may emerge from the deployment of defenses, a requirement for
defense verification may arise. For example, a mutual defense
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deployment and offensive redurtinn =,c To agreement would require careful
;°;
,tor1n9 as
°
ne ^ - seek *—
- advantages by deploying
defenses mone qu ick ,y and cutt1ng offens1ves ^^ ^
problem relianceon ^
could be threatened by missile defend, t-h>,a renses that are capable of an ASAT
--isslon. Oestruction or degr.dation of these assets ^ ^
'essen the U.S.', capacity to monitor any arms agreement
_
The strategic defense initiative has instigated a much broader
^ehate in U.S. policy circles concerning the future role of ar„,s contro,
vn U.S. deterrence po,icy than was be,ng conducted before. Arms contro,
support in the policy community, the Congress, the public, a nd with the
U.S.'. WTO allies. While there are a number of strategic and political
impediments to the conclusion of arms agreements. arms agreements have
served to confine the superpower arms race to some weapons areas. Adam
Uarfinkle has characterized arms control's contribution to the strategic
baiance in the past and its possible future contribution as bringing
both a sense of the limits to military competition and the seriousness
of the matter. In effect, the superpowers have acknowledged that they
Will not push a military advantage to its limits. 74 This was clearly
the case with the ABM Treaty when the U.S., ahead in the ABM technology
at the time, accepted limits in return for limits on Soviet offensive
forces. In addition, there are a number of equally compelling obstacles
to the scrapping of the arms control process. The greatest success in
this regard concerns defensive weapons with the signing of the ABM
Treaty. The SOI and the defense/offensive deterrence debate, in
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general, have challanged the very fn.mHfoundations upon wh 1C h U.S. arms
control policy has rested.
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CONCLUSIONS
Removing the horror" and thr^t nfrea of a nuclear holocaust
"is one ofour highest priorities 1,1 Thic h
nh f .
*
^Pnrase illustrates the fundamental
objective of the Strategic Defense Initioy u r itiative and the Reagan
Administration's commitment to the program <h c
u
.
.
P . Since Secretary of Defense
1 rSSearCh^ h3S~ 0-tly ,„ sl2e wh,,ethe policy
-unity has be9un to seriously
fistic missile defenses are integrated, indeed
, ch ^ ^
central .'
The concept of a defense against ballistic missiles i s not new as
dem0nStrdtea
^ *»«"•'. - Safe g uard pro g rams of the
'«0s and ,960s. On,, recently, however, nas the ^ ^
deployment of a ballistic missile defense as a means of brin ging about
the Obso,esence of offensive nuclear missiles. While this idea does not
equate to nuclear disarmament, it ooes ra,se the question of what will
assure deterrence of a nuclear war in the future. The SDI incorporates
the proposal that deterrence can be shifted from dependence on a policy
for nuclear retaliate to a policy of strate g ic defense. Ultimately,
these ideas foster a debate oetween deterrence as currently thought of
-
threat of offensive punishment - and deterrence as traditionally
thou g nt of - strong defense and capable offensives. This debate has
centered on the desirability and feasibility of a policy for retaliation
eear
—
s
a po,1cy for damage
.imitation. The SOI has ,nspired strategic
t^onsts and policy makers t0em ^ ^ ^ ^to U.S. strategic assets, inc,ud,ng Us population, is possibie.
In order for the U.S. to deveiop and dep, oy a bal , istic missi
,
oerense that wou,d provide for a rad,ca, and meaningful shift in nuc,
Policy in favor of a defense, a number of significant obstacles and
uncertainties will have to he overcome and resoived. The major
technical obstacle centers on the develops of yet unproven or
undeveloped defense hardware and software. major breakthroughs win
have to be made in such areas as ballistic m issi,e acquisition and
tracking systems, battle management radars that can digest initial data
inputs and provide effective responses to the missile threat in
extreme.y ti„,e-constra,ned environments, and finally, kill mechanisms to
include kinetic and directed energy weapons. While advances in each of
these areas appear to have been made in the last three years, the
technology in general is far too immature to support the development of
a space-based countervalue (area wide or population) defense.
In addition to the major technological problems, uncertainty
continues to exist as to the potential effectiveness of Soviet
countermeasure programs. The Soviets have stated their intent to
counter a U.S. BMD with offensive and defensive weapons designed to
overwhelm, confuse, avoid, and possibly defeat a U.S. ballistic missile
defense. These efforts have to be considered by U.S. weapons scientists
and policy makers prior to a decision to go forward with a defensive
system. Soviet counter-measures will require that a U.S. defense be
redundant to avoid catastrophe should the Soviets seek to disable the
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^™- - - -ater accuracy and
:
,uy,norderto
~-----c miss ,, eforcefitted
with fast booster rocket*s, hardened casings, and employed in cluster
attacks.
A" egually i raportant obsUc
, e ^ ^ ^ ^
a strategic defense is the growing policy debate as to the desiraMli
security. That is, the development
*pl«~ of a ba,„stic m,ssi ,e defense in a strategic defense ro,
otherwise wi„h,nge on its ^^^
Current,,, U.S. security with respect to the nuCear threat rests
-ix of nuclear policies. The centra, focus of these policies - assured
oestruction, countervailing, and war-fignting strategies - is that the
U.S. can respond to nuclear aggress,on with an egual, ,esser, or greater
nuclear retaliation. The mergence of a ballistic miss„e defense cou,d
profound,, alter the nature of these policies. In addition, U.S.
nationa, security has been intertwined with the arms contro, process for
the past 25 years. The U.S. currency is bound by a number of treaties
that „ou,d either come into direct conflict with a U.S. BMD or would
appear politically and militarily useless In a defensive balance of
power. For example, the ABM Treaty is likely to become an ineffective
agreement should the U.S. or Soviet Union 'creep out' or 'breakout' from
the Treaty's limits. These issues will create tremendous inertia on the
ty
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le or
ty.
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p- of many w1th1n the defense policycommunUyas^
procedure is pushed aside.
Once a BMD wn,cn can provide area^ j$
— essentia,,, 1„vulnerab
, e t0 Sov]et
(jf^
-eU.S. co u ,dOe,„ to adJust its^ deterpence
toward the defensive and couid inc, U de a dis.ant, in g of offensive
weapons. However, much of this process win aill depend on another set of
decisions which are more nnliHraii,- upolitically charged, namely arms control, as
well as actions by the Soviet Union.
^ Reagan Administration has stated that a U.S. BMD would not be
deployed without some form of offensive arms control, unless Soviet
actions were such that the U.S.'s vital national interests called for
such a deployment, i.e. in the event of a Soviet 'breakout' from the ABM
Treaty. A number of arms control experts and strategic analysts also
have charged that a U.S. BMD deployment in the absence of an offensive
arms control agreement would lead to a dangerous offensive/defensive
arms race. In as much as the Reagan Administration believes this
argument, arms control will continue to play an important role in the
manner, timing, and scope of a U.S. BMD deployment.
The scenario spelled out above is theoretically logical; however,
each step is dependent on the other and assumes that the U.S. can
perfect a ballistic missile defense of the kind envisioned by President
Reagan and that the Soviet Union will not create obstacles for a U.S.
BMD that cannot be overcome. It also assumes that offensive
countermeasures and offensive deterrence will not continue to play havoc
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on and finally> that ^ Sovjets wii|a^ ^ ^ ^
a defensive strategic balance. Having separated eacn of these
-Ponents of President Reagan's vision from the^ ^
order to analyze them independent,,, a number of ba sic contusions can
redrawn.
»
.ust be r^ered, however, that ,„ the 'rear woMd of
SO, and the nuclear balance, it is impossiole to separate eacn
exponent as neatly as has been done on paper above. ,„ addition, the
SDI program is still too young and lacks overall definition as to
preclude an exact critique. The program fails, according to Nevell
Brown, to meet the critenon of scientific hypothesis that it must be
testable.
The SDI has amplified a ,ong standing tension in the defense policy
community. That tension revolves around the notion of deterrence
policy: Is deterrence better served by the threat to punish an
aggressor for his attack or by the capability to prevent an aggressor's
attack from achieving its objectives? The extremes of these polices
are fraught with problems. For example, the ultimate threat of
punishment was symbolized and incorporated into the massive retaliation
policy which would have resulted in hundreds of millions of civilian
casualties once employed. However, there is no way to guarantee that a
nuclear weapon will not be used and hence prevention of an aggressor's
attack can never be assured without complete and verifiable nuclear
disarmament at all levels of weaponry. Hence, a range of options and
challenges remain. The policy community is faced with deciding how to
deter a nuclear attack on the U.S. and its allies by a number of
possible means. In the most basic sense, these include continued
-lance on offens.e
„uclear^ „^ .^
to deter an attac*. or a combination of the two tn add lt ,on to efforts
in the arms control arena.
Oiven the uncertainties involved in perfecting a 8MD an, tne yearsU may retire to ,mp,ement a strategic defense pol icy , it
that the U.S. win opt for some combina tl on of the two deterrence
-chants in the i™ediate future
. ^ ^ ^
on a number of criticai factors. Pau, Nitze has estabHshed a set of
criteria which when applied to the strategic defense debate make it
easier to understand the requirements for changing U.S. deterrence
Policy. First, the effectiveness of a strategic defense is at best
highly Citable today. However, the type of defense mission is centra,
to addressing this issue. A counterforce defense similiar to the
traditional ABM interceptor may prove highly effective in enhancing the
survivability of U.S. strategic forces. The .ore exotic defenses
potentially may prove effective but are subject to the pace of
technological development in both the defensive and offensive arenas.
Additionally, technological solutions to complex problems are not always
forthcoming. The Soviet Union, while acknowledged to have caught up in
strategic weapons technology in the 1980s, merely increased the numbers
and size of its strategic forces in the 1960s and 1970s to compensate
for U.S. technological advantages. The SDI "suffers from a ... defect,
namely that it fosters the spread of a sort of neo-technol ogical
illusion that the problems of the present strategic situation can be
resolved by the application of new, more sophisticated technology." 4
Nitze also argued that a defense would have to prove cost
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93,nSt 3 d6fenSe
- ^ to U.S. and soviet offensive
forces and weapons already developed or oeing explore. - advanced
-eanh bombers, air- an. sea-launched cruise missiles, penetration aids
^ reentry vehiCes, a„d ASAT weapons - are only
, ikely to ennance tne
Position offensive forces
Flnal.y, Nitze's criteria recognizes that techno!
o
9y a, one can not
solve the basic probes of the balance of power between the
superpowers. Rather, as hitze conclude, correcting these problems is
essential,, a politic, problem in which arms control has and can make
an important contribution. Whi , e past arms co „ tro ,^ ^ ^
criticized more adamantly by the Reagan Administration than by any
previous administration, they have imparted a degree of predictability
into the strategic balance. A completely unrestrained arms race clearly
is less stable and more dangerous. The costs of proceeding with BMD
research and development in terms of achieving arms control accords are
likely to increase in the caning decade and may in turn create pressures
to place that research in an arms control framework. Additionally, a
defense transition can not be accomplished without aggravating the
strategic balance and thereby creating dangerous instabilities unless
vision of a defensive balance of power.
The ABM of the 1960s proved to be less miHtari, .
„ , t
.
S 1 itan ly useful to the
u.5. than was originally thouaht u„y cn 9 n
-
However, the ABM did prove
-mendously useful ^ the political/military arena
^
^7 — -ro, accord. The ABM, among other
equally compelling factors aUn h 1a l uuu , also helped push thp 11 q a.« *
.
ne u
- i>
-
aw^y from massive
-—ion p„11cyand t0Mrd assured destruction policy and acceptance
-
S-et strategic eguality. Techno.ogy had transfer U.S. strategic
SUPen ° rity int
°
3 ^ as a result of the deve,opment of
«" ICBM. Today, technology has r.ced ahead again and the continued
The arms rac; has continued and strategic forces, namely icbms, are
increasingly v „ )nerable
. The ^^ ^ ^
presents a number of tremendous opportunities to change these
vulnerabilities.
The decades ahead are likely to be a period of great strategic
uncertainty stemming from new offensive weapons, the prospects of
defensive systems, and the erosion of the arms control regime. The ro!e
which BMD will play in the «tpjtM i, ».,<.P n s ra eg c future is not only dependent on
technology's influence, but also on factors such as the system's
economic cost and the political and military risks associated with
developing such a defense. As yet, it is impossible to judge the
likelihood of the development of an effective strategic defense as
envisioned by the Reagan Administration. However, there are currently a
number of extremely problematical issues which limit the debate to the
laboratory as well as to the paper pads of th
ana.ysts.
"""""^ of
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POSTSCRIPT
This study has emphasized that th» a ,n e development of strateni,- „.
Policy is a complex process which ,« , ,
,s ladened Py „ umerous ob
c^nge. The SDI i s „ot unique jn thjs
„ . . ,
regard and faces a number ofparticularly critical challenges in th» i-9 e Poll t'cal and technological
arenas aside from thoe strategic security problems.
Recent develbpments with resnert t„Sp C t0 a numbe r of these issues mays^d some insight on the prospects for the success of the SDI
pressure on the Reagan Administration to account
control Citations of the SOI program may be growings acute. TheSo-t Onion has initiated a new set of arms control proposals which
Soviet union has dropped their demand that the U.S. completely end the
SOI program They are currently proposing that the superpowers abide by
the ABM Treaty for a period of 15 years during wh ich the development and
deployment of ballistic missile defenses would be banned.
,„ tra de for
this re-cogent to the Treaty, which would allow for laboratory
research' (a tern, which requires elaboration), the Soviet Union is
proposing a sizeable (30* to 50%) cut in strategic offensive forces.
This proposal sounds very familiar, in some respects, to the line of
argument made by the U.S. in 19/2 that the superpowers agree to
constrain defenses in order to achieve offensive arms reductions.
However, the Reagan Administration clearly would like to stall any
agreement on defpncoc ,„u re ses in order to get the Sin f a
r
«~
-« ir;;;:"
-
initiative.
A-her issue ga,ning more^^ $
—cos,
Johns Hopkins Foreign Policy
Institute charges that a space-baspH
— an, operate over a t
^ ^ «'»•" *
thatth • °
V d en^ r
continues to respondat t ese k,nds of estimates of a BMD system's cost .r.^ s a e exagerated andt^t the true costs cannot be estimated at present. Whi ,e costs of this
magnitude would compare roughly to what
spend on weapons development and procurement for the same per,od the
.mtnl research and development phase is heing cut hack by Congress
thereby potent.ally hampering the development schedule.' The Asslstant
D-ector for Sensors Technology at the SDIO, Bin Fredencks, has stated
that Congress's current cuts in the ,g87 appropriate request (from 5 2
billion to 3.1 biHion), cou,d prevent the SD,0 from conducting certain
*ey technology demonstration tests and further hamper basic technology
stud,es. Congress's motivation in cutting the Adm,„,stration's reguest
is not strictly budgetary but relate to questions regarding the
Program's goals (counterforce versus countervalue defense). Resolution
of this issue is dependent on the technological feasibility of a
countervalue or counterforce defense as well as the relative
contributions of the different defense models to U.S. national security.
This debate already has shown signs of heating up within the
26
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the President.
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y al mPhasis on thpreqU'~ S for Protecting the nation other th, h
^ense. However, the cost of procuring an effective national
-ense cou,d he staggering and therefore might b
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, ° na ' a,r
NATO allies genera,,, have agreed to either partiesformally in thp snr Participatey l e SOI program or allow their hinh t* u ,-nei n g technology industry t-n
compete for research work. Additionally th P f
ha ,
onall , e European allies appear tohave lessened their initial ,i-'ieir critiques of thp
H»mt* 3n arms contro1
s we„ as a conceptoa,,, f, awed program
. ^
J
63 " 5 ^ P— «"— '—ration to ,nc,ude the stud, of
aPPHCab,et0t
h
— -ater wh ,ch has a different Jt of
strategic threats (name,, hundreds of med,um-range Soviet ballistic
-SSl.es
.thin minutes of Wester„ European targets).
Of an atactica, ballistic missiie (ATBM) on, y recent,, has Peen
-1«d by SDIO program directors. The a„ies are fearful that faiiure
hy the U.S. to appreciate their concerns cou,d ,ead to a de-coup,i„g of
NATO Europe from the United States' nuclear um bre„a (which w1l, have
become defensive as opposed to the current offensive umbre„a,. Another
Plaus,b,e European fear cou,d Pe a defense protected U.S. might fee,
less constrained by Soviet mint,
-lit.-,,, active 1
aPabimi6S andth
——
Finally, while political support at *hthe executive levels of theU.S. government may wain after the Re.n.n ah •aga Administration leaves the snprogram has become the larapct
' ^-~al,1 ng behind. The SDI prog ram ls
unlikely to be dismantled and. as a result „,of recent success in
technology
^^ _
lenses into us weapons arsena,. Wh11e strate9ic nuciear pol 1cy is
accepted offensive Oeterrence as a part * the fflatured Nuclear £ra ^
ballistic missi le defense concept has proven Itself to be endearing and
-n the opinion of SO, proponents, p„tent1ally iJSeful £Q ^
pol icy.
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APPENDIX A
TABLE 9.
LAND BASED
SEA BASED
AIR BASED
DELIVERY
SYSTEMS
Titan II
Minuteman II
Minuteman in
Poseidon C-3
Trident C-4
B-52G
B-52H
FB-111
WEAPON
YIELDS
5-9mt
1.2mt
17G/335kt
40kt
lOOkt
IQC DEPLOYED
1961
1966
1970
17
450
550
Subtotal 1017
1975
1980
288
360
Subtotal 648
12 ALCM 1959
(2U0kt) or
20 bombs of
various yields,
up to 9mt
167
16 ALCM
2 SCRAMS
(170kt)
1961
1970
96
60
Subtotal 323*
Total 1988
NEW STRATEGIC
WEAPONS Bib
SLCM
JLCM or 1986 17 by Sep tbombs of 1986
J c
various yields
20Ukt iy 84 10u
**
Sources: /'Strategic Nuclear forces of the United States and theU.S.S.R., Arms Control Today, lb (June 1 yfts ) u 1 ? V
"Start and ^l^m^inl
. Ill>Xlu ^986): 3T U
*13U ALCM equipped bombers are allowed by the SALT II Treaty.
"Estimated number of SLCMs that could have been deployed by 1986.
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APPENDIX B
TABLE lu.
LAND BASED
SEA BASED
AIR BASED
WEAP0N
WARHEADS
SS-il
SS-13
SS-17
SS-18
SS-19
SS-25
SS-N-5
SS-N-6
SS-N-8
SS-N-17
SS-N-ltf
SS-N-20
SS-NX-23
BISON
BEAR
BADGER
BLINDER
BACKFIRE
Source: Soviet Military
Printing 0f?TceTT985~
1 - 3
1
4
10 +
6
1
1
1 - 2
1
1
1 - 7
6 - y
10
Bombs
Bomos and cruise
missi les
Bombs
Bombs
Bombs and cruise
missi les
ImjiVm, (Washington, D.C.: U.S,
DEPLOYED
448
60
150
308
360
70
39
304
292
12
224
80
32
30
150
262
135
270
Government
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APPENDIX C
THE ABM TREATY AND RELATED DOCUMENTS
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